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PREFACE  
 
 
This collection of articles contains history papers of the third 
conference of the joint project of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and the Academy of Finland titled ‘Cult and Community’, 
held in Jyväskylä, 6–7 September, 2007. They are complemented by 
a couple of specialized, independent contributions by scholars 
working in the field of cults. It may be noted that the Finnish 
participants were newcomers in the cult research group since the 
Hungarian cult studies draw on traditions in the history of 
literature (e.g. Péter Dávidházi on Shakespeare-cult, the 
publications of the Petőfi Museum of Literature, Budapest and the 
Déri Múzeum, Debrecen) and critical studies. Also studies in 
personality cults of the Communist leaders in the Eastern Europe 
have been launched there.  
In Finland the situation has been different. There have been 
lively cults of J. L. Runeberg (national poet), J. V. Snellman 
(philosopher for the Finnish nation) and other luminaries but 
genuine political cults have been relatively rare and ambiguous. In 
such a legalist country as Finland has been, revolutionary popular 
movements imitating National Socialism and Fascism impregnated 
by obsessive cultic practices, could not gain long-standing, firm 
foothold. That Vihtori Kosola, the leader of the ‘fascismo of 
Finland’ – the label of a British contemporary correspondent – 
could call almost 13,000 peasants to demonstrate in 1930 at the 
main square in Helsinki, was the utmost he could manage and it 
was not enough to transform his popularity into a personality cult. 
And that he was donated a bust of Mussolini by the Italian 
Embassy rather was a symbolic diplomatic gesture not prone to 
elevate Kosola’s figure to wider public acceptance. Nevertheless, 
usually in times of crisis, some strong men have been promoted to 
represent the ‘ability to defend’ the country. One of them was, for 
example, President P.E. Svinhufvud for the White Finland in the 
early 1930s. In contrast, the feminine symbol of Finland, the white-
dressed virgin, was a rather fragile figure but all the same 
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politically utilized. Lenin and Mannerheim are exceptional types as 
they represent the heroism of the opposing political camps. 
It has been a great intellectual pleasure and refreshment to the 
Finnish participants to get acquainted with the Hungarian insights 
and methods to study cults during the project. Hopefully, the 
impact has been mutual. The Finnish contingent wishes to thank 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Finland 
for their support.  
 
Anssi Halmesvirta 
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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The Spartan Weltanschauung – building a ‘pure’ character with 
military virtues – has fascinated many a European intellectual. 
Variations of its ideals could be found in the Wanderfogel, the 
Hungarian levente, in the scout movement, and many others which 
had their own cult symbols and figures (St George et al). Usually 
they were geared to national defense, fitness and character-
building whereas National Socialism and Fascism set out to 
offensive, at first against their own societies, dismantling the 
representative institutions and the remnants of the state of justice 
by arbitrary and violent means.1 The personality and other cults 
analyzed in this book show how they variously functioned in 
camouflaging repression and making people forget their rights or 
turn away from social realities. The often aggressive and 
militaristic images teeming in cult symbolism and practices were 
not foreign in Eastern and Northern Europe either. In contrast, 
feminine cult figures represented purity and virginity.  
This volume contains a selection of some obvious (Hitler) as well 
as less-known cult-figures mainly from Central-Eastern Europe, a 
less-charted territory in this respect. We also purport to present 
theoretical insights into cult-studies in order to mark the essential 
conceptual boundaries. The first two articles in this volume are 
historical-theoretical, purporting from different angles to throw light 
on the recent developments in cult studies. Gábor Gyáni looks at 
cults from the angle of (bourgeois) identity or self-definition reflected 
in ‘national identity’. As he sees it, it comes close to being almost 
‘liquid’, in dual process of (unconscious) becoming and (conscious) 
choosing. In cultic acts and spectacles the identities of the 
participants are reproduced and enhanced. The leap from traditional, 
communal memories to the level of modern historical consciousness 
makes nations see teleological horizons – our history continues and 
brings us either happiness or ruin – manifested, for instance, in such 
                                                 
1  For one contemporary, incisive Finnish criticism of Nazism and Fascism, 
see: Y. Ruutu, “Nykyajan diktatuurijärjestelmät”. In: Historian diktaattori-
tyyppejä. Historian Aitta VII. Gummerus: Jyväskylä, Helsinki, 1937, 73-84.  
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national cult practices as celebrations of independence days or other 
nationally fixed moments of commemoration. The illuminating 
example of such a point for the Hungarians has been the battle of 
Mohács (1526) which marked the beginning of a tragic narrative of 
decline for them, culminating in the Peace Treaty of Trianon in 
which Hungary was shrunk to one third of its Dual Monarchy 
existence. The mission of the Hungarians between West and East as 
the Guardians of the Western, Christian values and justice in this 
respect resembled in the interwar years that of the Finns who also 
thought they had suffered from the wrongs of geography and 
history (the Peace Treaty of Dorpat, 1920). What makes the 
difference between the two nations is that the Finns have been able 
forge from it a ‘success story’, inventing cultic symbols from the 
twentieth century and contemporary history thus fostering 
their ’progressive’ identity whereas the Hungarians still stick to 
historicizing their European legacies. 
Balázs Apor reassesses the power of the key-concepts used in 
analyzing ideas and practices of personality cults of the communist 
leaders. As he repeatedly warns us, the concepts of charisma, 
personality cult and political religion should be utilized cautiously 
to describe and explain the cult phenomena. First, Weber’s 
‘charisma’ may gain more explanatory power if one could 
determine to what extent constructed and manipulated ‘charismas’ 
were accepted and believed by wider public (if any) in different 
communist political cultures. What comes to the concept of 
‘personality cult’ itself, much room is left for studies in its meanings 
disseminated by leading thinkers and ideologues vis-à-vis the 
attitudes of the man of the street towards megalomaniac 
propaganda. Special skepticism seems to be in place in using the 
concept of ‘political religion’ in the context of communist systems. 
Outwardly the myths and beliefs may sound similar and the 
rituals of different systems (Nazi, Soviet) display similar religious 
features but their ideological messages and political goals were 
even antagonistic. History defies even the best of concepts.  
It is the image of Lajos Kossuth that has carried the idea of 
‘liberation’ furthest in Hungary and no wonder why recent cultic 
representations of him point to more westernized foundations of the 
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Hungarian democracy. In his article Árpád Welker tackles the post-
modern Kossuth cult, manifested especially in commemorations 
celebrating him and his heritage. It becomes clear that although 
Széchenyi’s cult was quite lavishly financed and utilized by the 
party in power (FIDESZ), Kossuth-cult did not receive such 
extensive backing. It was the Free Democrats (SZDSZ) who wanted 
to ‘own’ Kossuth as the historic harbinger of an ultra-liberal 
political message but they run out of steam. The historians chosen 
to write up-to-date interpretations of Kossuth’s life were not 
receptive to this political demand, rather they stuck to traditional 
ones: hundreds of Kossuth statues had already been erected all 
around in Hungary. Given the enthusiastic and rather productive 
times for historiography since the change of the system, it is 
amazing that no scholarly biographies of him have been published. 
The commemorative, jubilee pictorial publications, however well-
edited and hard-covered they were, remained rather neutral 
probably because there was no concrete political demand of 
Kossuth’s utilization, Deák and Széchenyi were more usable in 
that sense. 
The conservative counter-figure to the liberal Kossuth was (and 
is) Miklós Horthy, whose image, as Ignác Romsics shows in his 
analysis in ample detail, was captured in Hungary by opposing 
political ideologies in opposing terms. For the conservative Right 
he was the Savior and to the revolutionary Left the Murderer in the 
1920–30s. For the legalists hoping to restore monarchy, he was the 
Traitor. During the World War II he was for most of the 
Hungarians the Enlarger of the Country but since the end of the 
war he became a Fascist Dictator which he still is for the 
Hungarian Left. After the change of the system (after 1989) the 
bourgeois found in him a real Hungarian patriot. Thus he remains 
a controversial personality to whom attach identities build from 
selected historical materials. In post-modern public and popular 
history he has at times become an object of glorification but the 
present evaluation seems – thanks to sharp scholarly criticism – to 
be very negative. The vicissitudes of Horthy’s legacy may be 
compared to the ones of Mannerheim or Pilsudski, the two obvious 
military parallels. The cultural agreement between Hungary and 
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Finland (1937) allowed room for mutual cult-building: Horthy-
propaganda reached Finland in October 1943 when a film 
celebrating his achievements in revision of the Trianon was shown 
in Helsinki for 160 members of the Finnish-Hungarian Society.  
In his section, the editor analyses the Nazi-cult with the “politics 
of the eye”-method. It transpires that the Nazis developed the new 
Spartan cult to its most complete fruition in the European culture. 
They made a magnificent but deceptive spectacle of it. 
A quite different analysis of cult is the one of the Queen Elizabeth 
of the Habsburg Dual Monarchy for the Hungarians pursued by 
Orsolya Rákai. The image of ‘Sissi’ was to change from a patriarchal, 
national and feminine incarnation of Hungarian virtues (cf. St. 
Stephen’s masculine cult) to a post-modern, commercialized 
product-image, to an image used for quite individualistic, intimate 
purposes in small net-forum communities. This is what Anthony 
Giddens would call ‘transformation of intimacy’, a process in which 
individuals, in this case women, develop their identities in such 
(closet) intimacy which has no connection to nationalistic imagery of 
the ‘outer world’. In the nineteenth and twentieth century 
Hungarian nationalism, Elizabeth was made by her admirers 
become one with them, no longer representing the German-
Austrian alterity (versus Hungarian identity) in any way. This 
identification was a general feature of all such nationalistic cult 
figures. In this way, the cult-builders enhanced their hegemony 
which has not been easy to break. But, as Rákai suggests, the 
materials of Elizabeth cult are nowadays so fragmented that even 
subversive and hidden cult practices may crop up. One may point 
to Sweden where the cult of Princess Victoria has become quite an 
addiction to some female fans.  
One can sense that György Tverdota’s contribution touches one 
historical sore point of the French who were in the nineteenth 
century famous for their national sensitivity, jealousy and pride. 
The cult of Napoleon marks the beginning in the long series of 
personality cults and remains as such a kind of paragon for the rest. 
Nevertheless, the cults connected to (re)burials of great persons 
constitute a distinct variation, and the reburial of the ashes of 
Napoleon is a sub-variation because of its international and 
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internal, party political dimensions. The foreign politically touchy 
point was whether the British would concede to handing over the 
ashes of Napoleon to their ‘rightful owner’, the French nation. The 
identity of the French challenged the alterity of the British, and the 
issue had to be duly negotiated. Finally, the moderate British 
would not reject a request appealing to Christian values and 
traditions, although the exhumed was a ‘child of anti-Christian 
Revolution’. On domestic front, the contention raged about who 
owns the remains of the Emperor and who can accrue political 
points from the reburial’s cult-proceedings. However, the memory 
of the Emperor appeared to be so ‘great’ that it could cover all 
Frenchmen. This episode reminds the editor of the people who 
nowadays rebury the remains of their kin in foreign countries 
(Hungarians in Poland and Russia, Finns in Karelia) or carry them 
back home to be reburied. This is one of the ways to put one’s 
mind at rest and forget, as Paul Ricoeur in his Memory, History, 
Forgetting (2004) recommends. It may also give consolation prone 
to enhance one’s identity 
Veera Rautavuoma’s article leads us back to Hungarian settings 
of commemoration and in midst of strictly controlled, peculiar 
‘cultic projections’, the liberation exhibitions. They could be seen as 
memorial museum exhibitions specifically designed to make 
people remember the defeat of Nazism by the Red Army (1945). 
They marked also the starting-point of domestic(ated) socialism 
and the ‘road’ from it via various ‘progressive steps’ to the present 
(successively 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985), the point of 
time which in itself was just another signpost leading to socialism’s 
earthly paradise in the unspecified future. As such the exhibitions 
offered possibly a too rigid and ready-made schema to remember a 
past and review contemporary history, and it transpires from 
Rautavuoma’s analysis that also the organizers and evaluators of 
the exhibitions were worried about whether the show would 
backfire in being too serious. The achievements of Socialism may 
have appeared incontestable in the 1960s and 1970s but as time 
went on they appeared rather pale in comparison to what people 
already knew from capitalist ware-houses and consumption. This 
was the fate of the socialist exhibitions brought from Soviet Union 
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to Finland, too. The purpose of the designers to make exhibitions 
sites of cult of secular religion finally failed, inspiring nowadays 
only romantic nostalgia. Something that was made unquestionable 
was revealed to be construed, more so since the socialist reality 
betrayed the idealized message. Would it be amiss to set up an 
exhibition of those liberation exhibitions in order to show the 
utopian self-image of Hungarian Socialism? In Finland, this 
purpose is obliquely fulfilled by the Lenin museum in Tampere. 
A more concrete example of a socialist wonderland is depicted 
to us by Zsuzsanna Varga. With the help of capitalist technical 
expertise and machinery (‘production line’) a model farm, Bábolna, 
was transformed from an Austro-Hungarian stud-farm to a 
streamlined chicken factory. It received wide international interest 
and fame, and was visited by high-level statesmen also from the 
West, among them President Kekkonen in 1969. Usually cults are 
about personalities and their superhuman qualities but in 
socialism material objects – achievements of all sorts from best-
bred animals to colossal industrial plants – could assume cultic 
propensities, inspire wonderment, admiration and awe. Certainly, 
this was in accordance with the logic of historical materialism 
which explained change in history basically in terms of 
innovations in forces of production (the means of production, 
capital and labour force). From the 1960s on it seemed that 
socialism could harness them more efficiently to production than 
capitalism and soon overtake it. Socialist science had already 
excelled in certain inventions and innovations. If Sputnik could 
arouse fear of socialist superiority in the West, Bábolna could 
become as a shock for such Western observers who had doubted 
the capacities of socialized agriculture. What is remarkable and 
basically contradictory to socialist ideology in Bábolna is that 
without capitalist money and know-how it could not have been a 
success, a fact which was not common knowledge of the time. 
In Rózsavölgyi’s essay we come across with the experiences of 
contemporaries of the critical years of 1989–1990 during which the 
socialist cult personalities and phenomena collapsed. It shows the 
frame of mind of the protagonists who have already turned against 
the system: freedom was their cult. 
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The concept of identity in the sense both of sameness and selfhood, 
a distinction made by Paul Ricoeur,1 came in vogue as a social 
science term as late as the 1950s.2 Historians started to use the term 
identity as an analytical category only after the collapse of the class 
theory. According to the “strong class idiom”, deduced from the 
works of Marx and Engels, the economic relations of production 
are held to permeate all segments of social life, including politics 
and culture. Accordingly, not a specific group identity, but the 
total realisation of collective (the so called class) interests and 
historical mission is playing decisive role in history.3  
In dealing with social history of the middle classes, however, it 
turned out that the notion of class consciousness is unsuitable for 
grasping and interpreting a group, the existence of which rests 
more on identity, since the middle class or bourgeoisie was not a 
class grounded on common economic position assumed by the 
Marxist theory, but on ”an amorphous space between notables on 
the one side and the mass of manual workers on the other”.4 In 
                                                 
1  “The problem of personal identity constitutes, in my opinion, a privileged 
place of confrontation between the two major uses of the concept of 
identity [...]. Let me recall the terms of the confrontation: on one side, 
identity as sameness (Latin idem, German Gleichheit, French mêmeté); on the 
other, identity as selfhood (Latin ipse, German Selbsheit, French ipséité).” Paul 
Ricoeur, Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago&London, 
1992, 115-116. 
2  Richard Handler, “Is ‘Identity’ a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?”. In: John 
R. Gillis (Ed.), Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity. Princeton, 
N.J., 1996, 27-40. 
3  For more about this see Patrick Joyce (Ed.), Class. Oxford–New York, 1995. 
4  Simon Gunn, History and Cultural Theory. Harlow, 2006, 140. 
GÁBOR GYÁNI 
 20
seeking the social facts giving cohesion to the cluster of people 
labelled as bourgeoisie, historians realized that the category of 
identity positing that culture is the main basis of a middle-class 
membership was of paramount importance. As Peter Gay has 
expressed the view in focusing on the European middle-classes: 
“Coalescing under external pressure, the nineteenth-century 
bourgeoisie generated common styles of thinking about love and 
aggression. It was, without metaphysical implications, at once one 
and many.”5 The bourgeois culture providing the middle classes 
with unity was both anticipation and result of a self-identification 
process. The common styles of thinking and feeling, Gay adds, 
“greatly mattered to the self-definition of the middle class”. True, 
however is, that the social history definiton through self-
identification contains a number of ideological distortions. “It 
would be too easy to assert that a bourgeois was someone who 
considered himself or herself a bourgeois, ideological self-
deception, whether conscious or unconscious”. But, Gay remarks: 
“Still, the historian dares not ignore these self-definitions; they 
rested on consistent, really profound perceptions”.6  
Unlike many or most analytical categories applied in social 
sciences and humanities, the notion of identity is not meant to relate 
to a totalized or essentialized social entity. The same is true for the 
bourgeois identity, as the bourgeois values, attitudes and acts of 
identification have not been bourgeois alone. Since “other classes 
could also claim at least some of them as their own”, it might in part 
become later on “the common denominator of the ambitions of their 
time”. Theodore Zeldin finally concludes, “The phrase, la France 
bourgeoisie was thus a tautology in that, to be a bourgeois meant to 
subscribe to the most general national aspirations.”7  
Even in such countries like Germany or Hungary where the 
local bourgeoisie could not claim with any confidence to represent 
the nation as a whole, there also were definite efforts of making 
                                                 
5  Peter Gay, The Bourgeois Experience. Victoria to Freud. Vol. I. Education of the 
Senses. New York–Oxford, 1984, 43. 
6  Peter Gay, Schnitzler’s Century. The Making of Middle-Class Culture 1815-
1914. New York–London, 2002, 32. 
7  Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945. Ambition and Love. Oxford, 1979, 19. 
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explicit the chain of linked loyalties and affections with bourgeois 
identity on the one hand, and national one on the other. 
This carries us further towards the problem of national identity. 
Beside the multiple identity constructions like that of the sex and 
gender, race, or confessional and ethnic, the national identity has 
an unambiguous central place both in personal and collective life. 
According to theories elaborated by Benedict Anderson and Ernest 
Gellner, the cultural factors fulfilled may play the greatest role in the 
modern nation-building process.8 The western model of a national 
identity is held to characterize or even define the modern European 
nations, which are “seen as culture communities, whose members 
were united, if not made homogeneous, by common historical 
memories, myths, symbols and traditions”.9 The nation, Anthony D. 
Smith says, as “a type of identity whose meaning and priority is 
presupposed by this form of culture” is always produced by the 
nationalist middle classes (including the bourgeoisie) which closely 
cooperate in this project with the intellectuals, professionals and 
artists. “Who, more than poets, musicians, painters and sculptors, 
could bring the national ideal to life and disseminate it among the 
people?”.10 And, one may add, who else if not the historians could 
bring the idea of national affinity to life and disseminate it by the aid 
of the school curriculum as a “unitary idiom”11 in order to establish 
an identity-conferring culture.12  
Therefore the category called identity is used here to refer to 
something which needs constantly be asserted, constructed and 
imposed, and not simply being given. It is not a fixed entity as 
being always put to changes. The great advance of using the notion 
identity in social analysis has a lot to do with the anti-essentialism 
inherent in the notion of gender identity. Judith Butler stated that 
                                                 
8  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism. London–New York, 1991; Ernest Gellner, Nations 
and Nationalism. Oxford, 1983. 
9  Anthony D. Smith, National Identity. London, 1991, 11. 
10  Ibid., 91-92. 
11  The phrase is to be found in Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 21. 
12  The role that the historian regularly plays in the process of creating a 
national identity will later be discussed in a detailed way. 
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the sex is no longer the invariant biological base of gender, but 
something that is enacted, not given, since “gender is a kind of 
persistent impersonation that passes as the real”.13 The 
performativity theory of (gender) identity elaborated by Butler 
cannot, alas, directly be applied to any other form of identity. Still, 
it may prove helpful in analysing a wide range of discursive or 
non-discursive human practices, rituals and symbolic events which 
are active in creating and maintaining the differences among 
various categories of people. 
One may conclude that identity as an analytical category implies 
at least two basic traits: first, it is subject to choice; second, it is open 
to change and subversion. The term thus pertains to a process of 
doing as “identities are formed in action through repeated patterns 
of behaviour, physical practices such as gesture and cultural forms 
such as masquerade and drama”, and of course acts of cults.14 This 
implies that one cannot be committed in historicizing identity 
together with experience as its foundation to any kind of essentialism. 
Since individual and group identity based on experience is also 
produced and constituted by “changing discursive processes by 
which identities are ascribed, resisted and embraced”.15 
The bourgeois identity linked to the sense of the abstract 
solidarity of a modern nation, i.e. nationalism, per se may manifest 
itself in a great variety of ways. In such a nation-state-less country 
like the nineteenth-century Germany the Heimat movement 
sustained by associations could play a decisive role both in 
constructing and stabilizing the “inclusivity of the cultural nation” 
on the one hand, and “the exclusivity of a social elite, the local 
notables”, the provincial bourgeoisie on the other. The movement 
arising in the late 19th century with the definite aim of facilitating 
the cult of certain local values, past and present, much contributed 
to the construction of collective identity, the sense being both of 
German and bourgeois. In holding that history is the common 
                                                 
13  Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. 
London, 1990, x. 
14  Gunn, History and Cultural, 152. 
15  Joan W. Scott, “The Evidence of Experience”. Critical Inquiry, 17 (Summer 
1991), 792. 
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heritage, folklore is the common life and the natural world is the 
common good for the entire local community, the Heimat 
associations were busily engaged in inventing traditions via 
establishing museums, or publishing popular history textbooks 
and organizing hikes in the countryside.16  
The term tradition as we use it now amounts to the mélange of a 
mindset and set of social practices (institutions) primarily 
produced not by rational experience or cognition, but by the 
unreflective process of inheritance or bequeathing. The 
word ’legacy’ occurring in this context pertains to the underlying 
attribute of tradition, the one conceptualized as effective-history.17 
This implies that there is no clear distinction made in tradition 
between past and present, and that the collective memory derives 
not from accumulation, but reconstruction; eventually the interest 
towards the past is permeated and informed wholly by 
identification. Tradition when it is acted out is thus the outcome of 
an incessant canonization process, based upon selection, 
discrimination and fixation. As canonization is to produce an 
established tradition, some portion of the past has always been left 
to remain latent waiting for its later possible invention in the 
course of the reconstruction.18  
A new, almost revolutionary mode of collective memory was 
brought about by emergence of the modern historical 
consciousness. Replacing tradition by history is anticipated by the 
separation of the temporal horizon of what is possible in the future 
(“horizon of expectation”) from the spatial realm of past 
possibilities (“space of experience”). These epistemological 
                                                 
16  Celia Applegate, “Localism and the German Bourgeoisie: the ‘Heimat’ 
Movement in the Rhenish Palatinate before 1914”. In: David Blackbourn 
and Richard J. Evans (Eds.), The German Bourgeisie. Essays on the Social 
History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early 
Twentieth Century. London–New York, 1993, 231, 240. 
17  Cf. Hans–Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. Ttrans. Joel Weinsheimer 
and Donald G. Marshall. New York, 1997. 
18  The whole argument advanced goes back to, Aleida Assmann–Jan 
Assmann, “Kanon und Zensur”. In: Aleida Assmann–Jan Assmann (Hrsg.), 
Kanon und Zensur. München, 1987, 72. 
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categories coming into existence in the 18th century are not just 
counterconcepts, but rather “dissimilar modes of existence” 
assisting us in the foundation of a history. The main difference 
between history and tradition in the light of the divergence of 
experience and expectation is that (1) unlike tradition distinction is 
made in history between past and present; (2) tradition is no longer 
able to carry the true sense of the image of the past when historical 
consciousness emerges; (3) historians writing history are expected 
to return to the past for gaining (and widening) their knowledge 
on the other, the alien, not merely creating and maintaining 
identity. Or putting it the other way, birth of a modern historical 
consciousness implies the recognition that history as well as the 
future is unique, because “In history, what happens is always more 
or less than what is contained by the given conditions.”19  
The thesis relating to the duality of tradition and history is, 
indeed, well-established and first advanced by Maurice Halbwachs: 
“We might perhaps be led to distinguish two kinds of activities 
within social thought: on the one hand a memory, that is, a 
framework made out of notions that serve as landmarks for us and 
that refer exclusively to the past; on the other hand a rational 
activity that takes its point of departure in the conditions in which 
the society at the moment finds itself, in other words, in the 
present.”20 His ideas were further developed by Pierre Nora in his 
well-known undertaking, Lieux de memoire.  
In spite of all the apparent differences between tradition and 
history, there are still some striking commonalities or parallelisms. 
The question at that point is: how is it possible at all? The 
convergence assumed between tradition and history may be 
explained both by the basically narrative form of history writing 
and the ideological function that any historical scholarship 
                                                 
19  Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time. 
Trans.with an intr. Keith Tribe. New York, 2004, 262, 268; see also 
Reinhart Koselleck,”Erfahrungswandel und Methodenwechsel. Eine 
historische antropoligische Skizze”. In: Reinhart Koselleck, Zeitschichten. 
Frankfurt am Main, 2000, 27-77. 
20  Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory: Ed., trans. and intr. Lewis A. 
Coser. Chicago, 1992, 183. 
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regularly fulfills. The narratives of historians are usually 
chronologically based linear accounts of the past which are 
necessarily informed by a teleological horizon. Every historical 
description is made retrospectively at a moment when the 
historian is already aware of some of the implications (including 
the unintended consequences) of past actions. In this sense, history 
is always our history as the past events and processes connected 
causally to each other may only be comprehended by knowing an 
after-history accessible to us. That is the main (regularly hidden) 
reason why historical narratives representing the past of a modern 
nation-state resemble so much the past image emerging and 
incarnating through tradition.  
Amidst the special setting of market economy and bourgeois 
society in the 19th and early 20th century the need felt by many for 
inner social integration, and outward national distinctiveness, 
paves the way for historicization. Accordingly, at the very moment 
when a historian goes into the archives to research the written 
sources as genuine traces of the past, and produces in the long run 
a neutral and non-partisan account of the world we have lost, 
he/she at once is expected to contribute to the construction of a 
national identity. In doing this the historian is unconsciously ready 
to create the image of a national past with which the citizens may 
easily identify themselves. Professional historians are thus not just 
meant to be patriots, and still worse nationalists or sometimes even 
chauvinists. They, in addition, are fully involved in “the 
representational practice best suited to the production of the »law-
abiding« citizen”, because the historical narrative is “especially 
well suited to the production of notions of continuity, wholeness, 
closure, and individuality that every »civilized« society wishes to 
see itself as incarnating, against the chaos of a merely »natural« 
way of life.” In the process of creating the mental categories best 
suited to the conceptualization of “reality” modern historical 
scholarship tends to become a “representational practice which has 
the effect of constituting an image of a current social praxis as the 
criterion of plausibility by reference to which any given institution, 
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activity, thought, or even a life can be endowed with the aspect of 
»reality«”.21  
This special way of engendering and sustaining collective 
memory is there to account for the final merger of memory and 
identity. Pierre Nora also observes that the norm of acquiring an 
(ethnic or national) identity lies behind any approach towards the 
past grounding a self-awareness: “So identity, like memory, 
becomes a form of duty. I am asked to become what I am: a 
Corsican, a Jew, a worker, an Algerian, a Black.”22 The academic 
practitioners of modern memory, the historians in contributing to 
identity politics regularly do their best to make their own versions 
of the representation of the past, serving the creation of a national 
identity. The end-product is that history resulting from a rationally 
based recognition also creates the image of the past resembling or 
even amounting to tradition based on identification. 
What this all implies may abundantly be evidenced by examples 
taken from the historians’ texts. But before looking at them, a 
general remark is still needed. A historian as a story-teller usually 
needs a guideline, and one or two dramatic turning points to make 
the story followable, that is intelligible, plausible and emotionally 
persuasive. According to William B. Gallie, followability of a 
narrative is always indispensible to the full historical 
understanding of an account of the past. Since, the argument says 
“history, like all stories and all imaginative literature, is as much a 
journey as an arrival, as much an approach as a result”; 
consequently “every genuine work of history is read in this way 
because its subject-matter is felt to be worth following–through 
contingencies, accidents, set-backs, and all the multifarious details 
of its development”.23  
Historical narrative as satisfying the requirement of 
followability makes and allows us to embrace the past as our own 
                                                 
21  Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore, 
1978, 87, 102. 
22  Pierre Nora, “The Tidal Wave of Memory”. IWM Newsletter 72 (Spring 
2001), 26-27.  
23  W. B. Gallie, ’The Historical Understanding,”. History and Theory, 3, 2 
(1963), 169. 
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through understanding the story that has been told about it. This, 
however, necessarily engenders the sense of identity the same way 
as it has usually been fulfilled by the perpetual reconstruction of 
the past through tradition. 
Now I am going to take a short look at some of the main 
characteristic narrative techniques regularly applied by historians 
when giving an account of the past. The textual examples cited 
derive from the Hungarian historiography and refer to the same 
historical event, the battle of Mohács in 1526. This historical event 
is seen as a turning point in the course of our past pointing to the 
“end of the medieval history of Hungary”.24  
The two armies clashing in the battleground of Mohács in 1526 
were the Hungarian one, commanded by the king, Louis II, and 
the Ottoman one, commanded by the sultan Soliman. The battle 
ended up with the defeat of the Hungarian troops, and the death of 
the young Hungarian king. Overall, the battle at Mohács is or has 
permanently been seen and assessed to have been the primary 
cause of the Turkish occupation of considerable part of the country, 
and as well as the dismemberment of Hungary into three distinct 
units: the Ottoman ruled middle part, the Habsburg ruled northern 
and western part and the southeast Principality of Transylvania.  
Maintenance of collective memory of the event was, however, 
not continuous at all over the succeeding centuries.25 The episode 
began to gain its today’s meaning and significance since as late as 
the end of the 18th and early 19th century; this had a lot to do with 
the then obvious ascendancy of a historically rooted modern 
national consciousness. Mohács came to signify or symbolize since 
that time the outset of a long term process of decay of the country, 
a development determined and accompanied by recurring 
catastrophes and tragical events. It was especially fit for this role, 
since the military defeat on the battleground of Mohács had 
broken the territorial integrity of a continuously existing 
Hungarian state sovereignty, dated back to the Middle Ages.  
                                                 
24  Peter F. Sugar (Ed.), A History of Hungary. Bloomington, 1990, 82. 
25  More recently, see Zsombor Tóth, A történelmem terhe. Antropológiai szem-
pontok a kora újkori magyar írásbeliség textusainak értelmezéséhez. Kolozsvár, 
2006, 22., 37–41. 
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The image of the medieval kingdom ruled by the Hungarians 
had a specifically central place in the national self-consciousness of 
the 19th century, the heroic age of the Hungarian nation-building 
process defined by an extremely heterogeneous ethnic composition 
of the country. The argument then stressing the historical 
permanency of the Hungarian statehood as against the absence of 
any similar state autonomy among the ethnic minorities living in 
the area of the country, was designed to underpin the claims of the 
Hungarian national supremacy over the ethnically non-Hungarian 
citizens. Hungarian nationalism in that sense was, however, in 
harmony with the general European pattern in which the 
membership of a historic state, the potential popular appeal of a 
strong state tradition for modern nationalism was also obvious at 
that time.26 So, Mohács by becoming the point of departure for a 
national historical narrative loaded with a peculiarly tragic 
perspective may even be looked at from this European perspective.  
The historical image Mohács then had acquired, was produced 
mainly by poets, painters and finally by historians; they were who 
made the event a piece of historical evidence by reference to which 
any claims for the national self-identification could be endowed 
with the aspect of reality and historical justification. The list of the 
poets writing poems titled Mohács in the first half of the 19th 
century is long indeed, including Károly Kisfaludy, Mihály 
Vörösmarty, József Eötvös or Gergely Czuczor. It is not an accident, 
however, that the cult of Mohács began to flourish especially after 
the surrender at Világos, the victory of the Habsburgs over the 
Kossuth led War of Independence in 1849, and not less in the 
aftermath of Trianon, the collapse and disintegration of the 
Hungarian Kingdom following 1918. The unambiguously vivid 
memory of Mohács was updated in these days for the explicit end 
of emplotting the story of the Hungarian national past in the 
modality of Tragedy. May I cite two striking, but typical evidences, 
one taken from the interwar period and the other one from the 
current Hungarian historiography.  
                                                 
26  Cf. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, 
Myth, Reality. Cambridge, 1990, esp. 80-100. 
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In showing how authoritative historians have depicted the time 
period preceding and following the so called Mohács Disaster, as 
the episode was called since the beginning of the 19th century, first I 
cite the master narrative, titled Magyar történet (Hungarian History) 
written by Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szekfű, an undertaking 
published in the interwar period by the two most eminent historians 
of the day. When the interim years falling between King Matthias’ 
Renaissance State in the second half of the 15th century, and the 
defeat on the battleground of Mohács was discussed, Bálint Hóman, 
author of that part of the work, made his best to metaphorically 
prepare the reader for the necessarily tragical end or dénouement of 
the story. “It is not an optical illusion that following the death of 
King Mathias, [...] we see an uninterrupted decline in the Hungarian 
public realm [...]. Longer period than that of a generation passed 
without a king during which the estates were to rule in the absence 
of an organically indispensable counterbalance; duality of the ruler 
and estates was thus fatally interrupted, and the estates, without a 
ruler of their own, tortured themselves and blindly staggered 
towards Mohács.”27  
The following textual evidence chosen in order to show the 
rhetorical base of any historical account is taken from the master 
narrative, titled Magyarok Európában (Hungarians in Europe), the 
volumes of which have been published in the 1990s. The second 
volume, written by Ferenc Szakály covered the time period 
between the mid-15th and the early 18th century. Even the title of 
the book itself was envisaged to suitably express the dominant 
modality of Tragedy into which the whole story was moulded: 
Golden Age and Decline.28 And the same is true for the titles of each 
of the chapters intended rhetorically to articulate the notion that 
the trajectory of the Hungarian past in these centuries was shaped 
and determined by a continuous and irresistible deterioration in 
sharp contrast with the basically positive European (Western) 
patterns of historical development. The first chapter titled, Europe: 
Getting out of the State of Disintegration is followed by a section 
                                                 
27 Bálint Hóman – Gyula Szekfű, Magyar történet, vol. 2. Budapest, 1939, 564. 
28 Ferenc Szakály, Virágkor és hanyatlás 1440-1711. Budapest, 1990. 
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titled, Hungary on the Road towards the Ottoman Expansion. Or: the 
fourth chapter titled, Changing Europe in the Centre of a Widening 
World is plainly contrasted with the a section titled, Hungary as 
Staggering towards the Fall (1490-1526). Finally, the seventh chapter 
titled, The Birth of a New State Form in Europe (1560-1600) is placed 
opposite to the following section titled, Fate of the Country being 
Sealed. “The War of Fifteen Years” (1593-1606). 
Mohács, one the most important Hungarian places of memory, 
gained an even higher prominence when the battleground was 
finally identified and recently yielded to the purpose of public 
memory as a memorial park. The opening of the Mohács Memorial 
Place in 1976 was preceded in the sixties by a wide-scale public 
discourse started by a semi- or quasi-historian, István Nemeskürty 
on the exact historical meaning of the episode.29 The decision of 
establishing the Memorial Place showed that the Kádárist political 
elite was ready, two decades after the 1956 revolution, to make 
some concession to the suppressed national historical 
consciousness, the last open manifestation of which had been the 
1956 revolution. The official policy to eradicate the memory of the 
revolution resulting in an “enforced historical amnesia” followed 
from the fact that 1956 was in some sense the “grounding 
narrative” for the Kádár regime.30 By allowing resurrection of the 
Mohács cult always carrying a deeply national, and especially 
tragical historical feeling and spirit, the regime made an effort to 
neutralize the tragical image or connotation of this symbolic 
historical date.  
In viewing the rhetoric of the official speaker, Gyula Ortutay, an 
ethnographer and leading public personality of the age, in the 
speech he delivered at the opening ceremony of the Memorial 
Place, this endeavour may easily be shown. The main focus of the 
speech was on the possible and wished new meaning what Mohács 
should acquire when approached from the perspective of a 
promising future rather than the tragical and nationalist mood 
turning back to the past. “The Hungarian national consciousness 
                                                 
29  István Nemeskürty, Ez történt Mohács után. Budapest, 1966. 
30  See Gábor Gyáni, “Memory and Discourse on the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution”. Europe-Asia Studies, 58, 8 (December 2006), 1199–1208. 
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retains the name of Mohács as one of the most serious days of 
mourning [...] Well, here is the site of remembering, we, however, 
do not want to adhere to a worthless celebration..., but not even the 
lament is justified now.” The main lesson to be drawn from 
Mohács, Ortutay says, is that the communist party is the single 
force striving in close cooperation with the working class, the 
peasantry and the intellectuals recruited from both of them for 
genuine national ends.31  
Seen from a wider perspective Mohács was meant for long to 
symbolize the national fall caused by the imperial submission of 
the country, first to the Ottoman and the Habsburg, later to the 
Habsburg Empire alone. The historical experience placed in that 
specific interpretive framework caused a duplication of traditions; 
from at least the outset of the 18th century there were the 
historically based Hungarian sense of tradition, with the cult of 
successive insurrections, the varied forms of uprising and 
revolutionary movements on one hand, and the tradition of 
negotiation and compromise on the other. The sense of historical 
tradition linked to the independence ideal which manifested itself 
first through the Rákóczi uprising, later the 1848-49 War of 
Independence and finally by the outbreak of the 1956 revolution, 
showed the vitality of the potential for unrest in a country 
permanently surrendered to the changing imperial rules. The 
opposite or alternative kind of tradition also influencing the course 
of Hungary’s history and the way it may be read suggested that 
the various outbursts of unrest prepared the way only for 
compromises aimed at resolving the recurrent tensions and 
conflicts in the country.  
The competing images of history as accounting for many 
internal contradictions of the Hungarian self-perception had 
established two diametrical opposite concepts of the Hungarian 
nation differing greatly from each other both in terms of inclusion 
and exclusion of canonization. The alternative historical notions or 
lines of argument were also committed to the confessional 
                                                 
31  Gábor Kovács, “A mohácsi történelmi emlékhely. Szimbolikus harc a 
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separation between Catholicism and Protestantism, as the former 
cherished a pro-Habsburg image of history, and the latter being 
engaged in envisaging the independence ideals.  
In trying to demonstrate the way how this divide has practically 
manifested itself by choosing between the accessible historical 
traditions, one may mention the example of the cult of Lajos 
Kossuth; his image embodying and articulating the independence 
ideal stood from the beginning in sharp contrast with that of István 
Széchenyi’s, representing and expressing the negotiation type 
political culture. The history writing of the first decades of the 20th 
century in particular was prone to use both of them for 
personifying the “usable past” serving highly acute present-day 
political ends. And today’s historical scholarship has too often 
been informed by this conceptual framing, when coming to a close 
contact with producing public history.32  
Lajos Kossuth, amounting to an emblematic figure of 
insurrections or uprisings in the course of Hungary’s modern 
history, always made a much greater impact on the popular image 
of history than anything and anybody else including Széchenyi. He 
could have been therefore the historical personality, the eternal 
merits and remembrance of whom was even codified by the 
Parliament in the interwar period in 1927. The then ruling Horthy 
regime was not an enthusiastic supporter of the revolutionary and 
liberal ideas, the assertion of which Kossuth had strived for in the 
1840s. Kossuth’s cult, however, remained unchallenged up to the 
second half of the 20th century; it was first sustained by the Stalinist 
communist regime in the 1950s, and was later cherished by those 
intellectuals, historians in particular, who persistently adhered to 
the dream of liberating the country from the Soviet imperial 
domination.33  
Beside Kossuth’s nationally approved cult, the worship felt 
towards the ideals incarnated by Széchenyi who until recently had 
some potential for an alternative way of national identification also. 
                                                 
32  On the notion of public history, see Jeremy Black, Using History. Hodder 
Arnold, London, 2005.  
33  György Gyarmati, “Kossuth kultusza–post mortem”. Korunk, 2003. 
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This was the case with the conservative government in power 
between 1998 and 2002, which, despite stressing its own 
historically-rooted national orientation, obviously preferred 
Széchenyi’s cult to Kossuth’s one. Although, Kossuth as a common 
national historical idol was not disputed either, the cult of him still 
had more supporters among the liberal than the conservative 
political and intellectual forces.  
The obvious split of the Hungarian national self-identification 
by history was articulated through the East/West conceptual 
opposition, a construction always used in creating a national self-
image.34 The vision advocating the oriental origins of the 
Hungarian tribes arriving to the Carpathian Basin in the 9th 
century from the areas of inner Asia, had been articulated before 
the ascendancy of the modern Hungarian nationalism in the 1830s 
and 1840s. Both the motif of the Scythian origins linked to the 
ancient Hungarians,35 and the recurrent mentioning of the kinship 
between the Huns and the Hungarians are indicative of the 
enduring relevance of a self-identification guided by the idea of 
uniqueness and distinctiveness of the Hungarian nation among the 
European people.  
The dual character of the national consciousness lays behind the 
divergent and opposing cults of chieftain Árpád, who brought the 
Hungarians to the Carpathian Basin, and that of Saint Stephen, 
establishing the Christian Kingdom of Hungary a century later. 
Árpád’s cult, that of a pagan hero, clearly representing the oriental 
origins of the Hungarians, began as late as in the first half of the 
19th century. Some time later it came to express in symbolic form 
the political values attached to the protestant-based Independence 
Party of the late 19th century. Saint Stephen, the Christian 
proselytizer, however, who was not even admitted in the pantheon 
                                                 
34  Gábor Gyáni, “European identity, modernisation and national self-
determination in Hungary”. In: Alberto Tonini (Ed.), Towards a New 
Europe: Identity, Economics, Institutions. Different Experiences. Florence, 
2003, 31–42. 
35  The poetic expression of the notion is discussed in Zsolt Aczél, “Közösség 
és ítélet. Kísérlet a nemzeti identitás elbeszélésre Berzsenyi Dániel A 
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of the Protestant’s own historical heroes, necessarily became the 
idol for the Catholic pro-Habsburg political establishment of the 
turn of the 19th and 20th century.  
The Millennial Monument erected at that time at the Heroes’ 
Square in Budapest clearly testified to the great popular appeal 
that chieftain Árpád then enjoyed in comparison to king Saint 
Stephen. This was evident “not only from the central position 
assigned to Árpád [at the Monument], but also from the spatial 
separation of the crown from the kings”.36 Likewise, the Panorama 
of the Conquest (exhibited in 1894) was exclusively dedicated to 
the personality of Árpád, not to Saint Stephen. However, following 
Trianon in 1920, Saint Stephen started immediately to replace 
Árpád as the founding father of a country, the historical Hungary 
that was then partitioned by the Western powers. 
 
To conclude, the various representations of the two eminent 
historical figures in the public imagery (as exemplified at least in 
the visual arts) were devised to symbolize two sets of ideas 
necessarily coming into conflict in the course of their history. 
Árpád expressed the following values or meanings: (1) a pagan 
princehood coming to power through the will of the nation (see the 
motif of the blood contract at Pusztaszer), not through the creation 
of the clergy; (2) a legitimacy obtained through his arms, paganism, 
the East, representing the continuity of Hungarian cultural 
traditions rooted in the ancient Asian homeland; (3) cohesion within 
the nation not comprising any minorities at that time (unlike the 
dualistic Hungary); (4) the national independence, viewed as the 
product of the Hungarians’ self-reliance and perseverance in 
defending their own. 
Saint Stephen, on the contrary, was assessed in the interwar 
period as an outstanding historical personality giving birth to the 
so called Saint Stephen-thought, the ideological guideline of the 
counterrevolutionary regime. His flourishing cult between 1920 
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and 1945 symbolized and expressed the main tenets of Catholicism 
and universalism, royalty, multinationalism, imperialism, sainthood and 
legislation.  
The divergent political cults of the two mentioned historical 
heroes throughout the whole of the 19th and first half of the 20th 
century formed an integral part of the ideological, political or 
cultural development of Hungary. Following the 1989 political 
change the widely shared cultic attitude towards the past seems not 
to lose much of its previous weight. Still, the almost simultaneous 
cults of Árpád and Saint Stephen, or Kossuth and Széchenyi clearly 
show the potential for plurality of choice among the diverse 
historical locii with the definite aim of constructing a national 
identity. It also appears as a confusion in present-day political 
discourse seeking ways how to historicize the national past.  
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The study of communist leader cults in Eastern Europe has 
received remarkable scholarly attention recently. In the past few 
years several publications have come to light that focused on 
different aspects of the phenomenon and interpreted cults from 
different perspectives. Such studies generally revolve around three 
key-concepts: Max Weber’s concept of charisma, the ‘cult of 
personality’ as defined by Nikita Khrushchev, and the concept of 
‘political religions’ developed by Emilio Gentile. This article is 
meant to provide an overview as well as a critical assessment of 
these concepts and their relevance to the study of communist 
leader cults. 
 
Charisma and Max Weber 
 
The leader cult should be understood as a system of rituals and 
myths that were meant to bolster symbolic and affective 
attachment to the regime and thereby to widen the social base of 
communist rule. The conceptual set that was first used to describe 
and represent the phenomenon in academic texts was borrowed 
from Max Weber’s sociology. In fact, it has almost become an 
academic ritual to refer to Max Weber’s concept of charisma in the 
beginning of a study that concentrates on the cult of a prominent 
personality.1 Weber’s typology of legitimate rule – legal/rational, 
                                                 
1  Max Weber, “The Types of Legitimate Domination”. In Weber, Economy 
and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. 1, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, 1978. 212-301; “Charisma and Its Transformation”. Ibid., Vol. 2, 
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traditional, charismatic – has been criticized, complemented and 
abandoned by scholars during the 20th century, his definition of 
charisma, however, has displayed an enduring relevance and still 
serves as the basis of current academic debates on the nature of 
dictatorships.2 What was most often applied to the Soviet context 
was Weber’s idea of the routinisation of charisma. The Soviet 
regime sought to sustain the extraordinary situation in order to 
preserve the legitimacy capital that had been gained at the time of 
the revolution. This was in accordance with the party’s self 
perception, since it considered itself to be an extraordinary 
institution, consisting of extraordinary people.  
An important amendment to Weber’s theory claimed that 
charisma was not necessarily inherent in a personality, but could 
also be constructed.3 The efforts of the party state to manufacture 
charisma for its leaders manifested in the development of the 
system of Soviet leader cults that gradually emerged from the mid-
1930s. The cases of Stalin, Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary and most of 
the Eastern European satellite leaders show the desperate attempt 
of communist propaganda to confer an aura of charisma upon the 
regime’s leaders. Manufactured charisma was not only applied to 
political figures, but also characterised the whole system of rule. 
Communist systems displayed a certain obsession with conferring 
                                                 
2  See, for example Luciano Cavalli, Charisma, Dictatorship and Plebiscitary 
Democracy. Florence, 1984; E. A. Rees, “Leader Cults: Varieties, 
Preconditions and Functions”. In Balázs Apor, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones 
and E. A. Rees (Eds.), The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and 
the Eastern Bloc. Basingstoke, 2004, 3-26, Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: 
Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago, 1975; Aristotle A. Kallis, “Fascism, 
‘Charisma’, and ‘Charismatisation’: Weber’s Model of ‘Charismatic 
Domination’ and Interwar European Fascism”. Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2006, 25-43. See also the special issue of 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2006. 
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charismatic qualities on institutions, organisations, the party, and 
certain political measures or historical events, besides the leaders of 
the party.4 In communist regimes, the entire regime and not only 
one individual were dressed up in the costume of charisma. Such 
political systems aimed at something similar to what Weber 
characterised as charismatic rule, but since the whole system bore 
charismatic traits besides the actual leader, communist propaganda 
could be viewed as an overall attempt to manufacture a certain 
collective charisma that applied to the whole establishment. 
Weber’s concept of charisma has initially been adopted by 
political scientists to describe the emergence of communist leader 
cults. Their approach, however, was equally influenced by the 
Cold War totalitarian-model, emblematised by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, as well as Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, that associated 
the cult’s development with Stalin’s rise to power. Therefore, such 
approaches linked the notion of ‘cult of personality’ to the 
establishment of the party’s authority in the Soviet Union, and 
Stalin’s achievement of dictatorial power.5 Most of these works 
focused on the cult’s genesis, which was usually linked to the 
changes in the organisational basis of the party. The ‘cult of 
personality’ was equated with one-man rule (Stalin or Mao) and all 
its attributes. The unnatural exaltation of the leader and the flow of 
eulogies were considered to stem from Stalin’s psychological 
                                                 
4  Rees, ‘Leader Cults’, 22. 
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predisposition to accept and promote eulogies of his persona.6 The 
explanation of the cult’s origins with structural preconditions and 
authority relations, however, did not account for the hierarchical 
nature of the cult, and the multiplication of mini-Stalins in the 
peripheries, not to mention the export of the Stalin-cult to Central 
and Eastern Europe. It has also failed to explain the semi-
spontaneous emergence of the Lenin-cult in the early-1920s. Little 
attention has been paid by the authors to the ritual nature of the 
cult, the role of institutions in constructing the leader’s charisma, 
popular reaction to the worship of leaders, or the cult’s functions 
in Soviet society. The spiritual, mystical aspects of the cult have 
also been ignored. 
Although the focus on structural changes and authority relations 
certainly had its advantages, recent developments in studies of 
communist leader cults have demonstrated that the Stalin-cult was 
far more complex than a megalomaniacal campaign of self-
aggrandisement by a communist despot.7  (This is not to say of 
course that Stalin discouraged the veneration of himself.) Scholars 
have pointed out the importance of social and cultural factors in the 
development of the cult: the role of intellectual traditions and social 
interactions, and the impact of pre-revolutionary myths and 
discourses. In the mirror of historiographical findings, it seems well-
grounded to posit that the complexity of the cult can only be 
grasped through the assistance of a wide variety of approaches. It 
needs social history to determine the social basis of the cult, 
anthropology to analyse the cult’s ritual functions, art history to 
assess the cult’s aesthetic dimensions, political history to outline its 
development, and discourse analysis to establish historical analogies 
with the language of leader venerations in different societies and 
different time periods. 
The concept of charisma, despite its ability to essentialize the 
nature of totalitarian regimes remains a little intangible. In Weber’s 
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definition, the attribution of charismatic qualities to personalities is 
dependent on the attitude of the following to the political leader in 
question. Thus, the concept of charisma is a little elusive and 
subjective. The preconditions of charisma in this sense are the 
assumption of power by an individual in an extraordinary 
situation, and the acknowledgement of his (or her) charismatic 
qualities by the following. This definition, however, ignores the 
actual size of the following and thus does not pay attention to the 
extent of social support for a charismatic leader. The concept of 
charisma is also incapable of incorporating the diversity of popular 
attitudes towards a particular leader. Many people, who supported 
the leader and dictatorial regimes, for example, did so out of 
pragmatic considerations, not necessarily because they considered 
the leader a charismatic personality. Strategic flattery was usually 
applied when trying to achieve material advantages or career 
goals, but the reiteration of the conceptual constituents of the 
leader cult discourse could also be interpreted as a survival tactic 
that could help someone avoid the attention of the authorities. 
Irrespective of the many possible reasons why people supported 
and hailed the leader – whether the reason was calculation, 
coercion, fear, the desire to socialise with the community, or 
interest in the radio set – a substantial part of societies under 
dictatorial rule became aware of the practices and the rhetoric of 
the leader cult. Whether whole-heartedly, or hypocritically, a 
significant part of such people participated in the cult’s rituals, and 
appealed to the leader cult discourse when communicating with 
state and party authorities. Consequently, they also contributed to 
the party’s attempt to construct the charisma of the leader, even if 
they actually retained a critical or sceptical attitude towards the 
leader’s qualities.  
In order to be able to apply Weber’s concept of charisma to the 
communist example, one should study the popular reception of the 
cult of party leaders. Such an approach would help to determine 
whether these leaders were truly considered charismatic by the 
people who supported them, or whether they only had the image 
of being charismatic created for them by official propaganda. 
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‘Cult of Personality’: Meanings and Functions 
 
The use of the phrase ‘cult of personality’ as an analytical concept 
is not without problems either. As several historians have shown 
recently, the term was rarely used with regard to the cults of 
communist party leaders in the Soviet bloc at the time when these 
cults actually flourished.8 Such cults were never defined officially as 
‘cults of personality’, and whenever the concept was used at the 
time, it usually appeared in a context in which it was abused and 
criticised. Thus the construction of one of the most pervasive cults in 
history – the Stalin-cult – was never acknowledged in the cult-
building phase. The Stalin-cult was never defined as an example of 
the ‘cult of personality’, only after the collapse of the Stalin-myth, in 
1956. After Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, however, the Stalin-cult 
became the synonym of ‘cult of personality’.  
The fact that the construction of the Stalin-cult was characterised 
by the denial of the ‘cult of personality’, however, was not 
necessarily the sign of hypocrisy or cynicism from the part of the 
cult-builders. It seems that socialist political movements before 
Stalin had also struggled with the negative connotations attached 
to the concept. As Boldizsár Vörös has shown, the Hungarian 
social democrats of the late 19th-early 20th centuries also rejected 
the notion of ‘cult of personality’ while they were eager to build up 
a pantheon of heroes and forefathers. The same attitude was also 
characteristic to the leaders of the Hungarian Republic of Councils 
of 1919, including Béla Kun.9 
The semantic ambiguities concerning the concept ‘cult of 
personality’ have been recognised and commented upon by 
several scholars. In the Hungarian context, historians before 1989 
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used the term in a narrow, strict sense as well as in a very general 
one. It was narrow in the sense that contemporaries – including 
politicians and historians of the Kádár-era – only used it in 
connection with a particular leader at the top of the party 
leadership – the General or the First Secretariat – who was the 
most representative figure of the whole phenomenon. On the other 
hand, the concept ‘personality cult’ was frequently adopted to 
refer to the whole period of High Stalinism in Hungary, until 1956. 
The semantic field of the notion could cover the deification of party 
leaders, the abuse of power by a small group, the purges and the 
show-trials, the terror of the Secret Police, forced industrialisation, 
and so on. It seems that communist historians, as well as many 
historians after 1989, continued to use ‘personality cult’ similar to 
the way Khrushchev had used it in his Secret Speech at the 20th 
Congress. Therefore, the concept ‘cult of personality’ appears in 
historical works as a mere cover-term that is usually applied as a 
metaphor to describe the period of Stalinism in Hungary. Such a 
superficial treatment of the term also contributed to the scholarly 
ignorance towards the phenomenon. 
In his introduction to a volume on Stalinist leader cults, Jan 
Plamper has attempted to sketch an outline of the history of the 
concept ‘cult of the individual’ in Marxist tradition. Considering 
the methodological findings of Begriffsgeschichte, he has followed 
the philosophical assessments of the role of great individuals in 
Marxist writings, from Karl Kautsky onwards, to Plekhanov, Lenin, 
Stalin and finally Khrushchev.10 In a similar way, Yves Cohen also 
tried to outline the history of the concept ‘cult of personality’ in a 
recent article.11 Both authors focus on the semantic changes of the 
concept in ideological/philosophical texts, but they both tend to 
overlook the use of the concept in party-speak, not to mention the 
vernacular. For this reason, they – similarly to the majority of 
sovietologists – link the rise of the term ‘cult of personality’ to 
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Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, which makes perfect sense in the 
Western European context. It has to be emphasized, however, that 
the concept had already been an essential constituent of the party 
language before 1956 and the 20th Congress. Moreover, one might 
suggest that the way the term was used in party language had a 
much greater impact on our present understanding of the cult 
phenomenon than the way the concept was used in ideological or 
philosophical texts. 
Despite the frequency of the term in contemporary sources 
(especially in 1956), the definition of what constituted the ‘cult of 
personality’ remained vague in the post-Stalin period. The 
vagueness of the term was apparent also to many Hungarian 
contemporaries, especially to members of the party leadership. A 
member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Worker’s 
Party (MDP), Mária Nagy, for example, already demanded a clear 
definition of the term at the meeting of the Central Committee in 
March 1956, where Rákosi presented his official report of the 20th 
Congress.12 Imre Nagy, who had been excluded from the party in 
1955, also criticised Rákosi for defining the ‘cult of personality’ in a 
very general and impersonal way after the Secret Speech. In his 
notes, Nagy expressed the need for a detailed analysis of the 
complex relationship between the emergence of the cult, the 
evolution of a one-man leadership, the ‘oppression of party 
democracy’, the terror, and the show trials.13 Likewise, at one of 
the meetings of the Petőfi-circle in June 1956, Tibor Déry pointed 
out the insufficient explanation of how the ‘cult of personality’ had 
evolved.14 Even Rákosi admitted in his memoirs that the party had 
used the term in a general sense, ‘without a definition of the 
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concept “personality cult” and the reasons for its rise’.15 A certain 
semantic uncertainty also characterised the use of the concept by 
communist politicians beyond the borders of Hungary. The Italian 
communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, for example, when asked in 
an interview in 1956 of what the Soviet leadership had meant by 
‘personality cult,’ refused to give a straightforward answer,16 but 
the Polish and the Romanian leaders also remained somewhat 
uncertain as to the proper explanation of the cult after the 20th 
Congress. 17  Apart from contemporaries, historians have also 
commented upon the semantic inconsistencies of the concept on 
several occasions. 18  One Hungarian scholar of the Kádár-era 
remarked that the evolution of the ‘personality cult’ ‘has not been 
clarified in concrete terms’, and that attention was only paid to ‘its 
secondary features’.19 
The question may arise as to whether the semantic obscurity 
that surrounded the term ‘personality cult’ was a unique 
phenomenon, particular to that notion alone, or whether the 
vagueness of its meaning reflects a more general feature of 
contemporary language use. One aspect of the Sovietisation project 
in Eastern Europe was the ritualisation of political language that 
was provoked by the intense transmission of the party’s 
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ideological messages towards the population. The complexities of 
Marxist vocabulary, that was held sacred by the regime, caused 
difficulties in understanding the party’s announcements and led to 
the incoherent use of the key-concepts of party life by various 
segments of the society, including party functionaries. The 
inconsistent use of political language, as spoken by party 
bureaucrats, and the tendency to perceive ideological 
pronouncements in slogans was recognised by various 
commentators of the time. Stalin at the 17th Congress of the CPSU 
in 1934, for example, condemned the way party officials spoke, 
emphasizing their tendency to overuse certain words, without 
possessing a genuine grasp of their real meaning. He illustrated his 
critique with an anecdote. 
 
I : How are you getting on with the sowing?  
He : With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have mobilized ourselves. 
(Laughter.)  
I : Well, and what then?  
He : We have put the question squarely. (Laughter.)  
I : And what next?  
He : There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will be a turn. (Laughter.)  
I : But still?  
He : We can see an indication of some improvement. (Laughter.)  
I : But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?  
He : So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any headway with the 
sowing. (General laughter.)  
There you have the portrait of the windbag. They have mobilized 
themselves, they have put the question squarely, they have a turn and some 
improvement, but things remain as they were.20 
 
The existence of a popular semantic chaos with regard to the 
key-concepts of Marxist vocabulary was also recognised by Georgii 
Dimitrov. In his concluding speech at the 7th Congress of the 
Comintern in 1935, he criticised the inclination of party 
functionaries to use impressive abstract formulas instead of 
                                                 
20  http://www.marx2mao.org//Stalin/SPC34.html (date of access: 20 
April 2002) 
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concrete terms, and expressed his dissatisfaction concerning the 
generally turgid style of communist propaganda material such as 
leaflets, newspapers, party resolutions, and so on. 21  Dimitrov 
advocated the simplification of party language, and called for the 
clarification of key-concepts, which he thought would eventually 
lead to the popular understanding of the intentions and aims of the 
communist movement.  
In Hungary the first to criticise the way the party communicated 
with the population was József Révai, the chief communist 
ideologue of the 1950s. In his contribution to the 2nd Congress of 
the MDP (26 February 1951) he bitterly remarked:  
 
We often speak a specific, imaginary and spoiled language, when we are 
talking to the people. A specific ‘party-language’ or more precisely a 
‘bureaucratic cant’ is evolving here, which is toneless and odourless, intricate 
and lifeless and breaks our links with the masses.22 
 
The jargon-like character of political language and the 
ritualisation of linguistic formulas during the period of High 
Stalinism in Hungary have also been observed by several linguists 
of the time. 23  Such authors usually highlighted the tendency 
towards the devaluation, or inflation of words, originating in the 
‘conspicuous and unnecessary’ overuse of certain words and 
phrases. 24  The monotonous and mechanic repetition of certain 
expressions rendered the meaning of such expressions vague and 
obscure and contributed to their general deflation in terms of 
                                                 
21  http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935 
/unity.htm (date of access: 20 April 2002) 
22  Révai József elvtárs felszólalása a Magyar Dolgozók Pártja II. Kongresszusán 
1951. február 26-án. MDP KV Agitációs és Propaganda Osztály, Budapest, 
1951, 7. 
23  Iván Fónagy and Katalin Soltész, A mozgalmi nyelvről. Budapest, 1954; 
Lajos Lőrincze, “A ‘Tartós békéért, népi demokráciáért nyelvéről’”. In: 
Lőrincze, Nyelv és élet. Budapest, 1953, 61-75, and Lőrincze, “Mozgalmi 
nyelvünk kérdései és a jó magyar nyelv”. In: Nyelv és élet, 79-99; Szergej 
Tóth, “A szovjet birodalmi nyelv, avagy a totalitarizmus grammatikája”. 
Aetas, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1991, 5-39. 
24  A mozgalmi nyelvről. 21. 
BALÁZS APOR 
 48
‘linguistic currency’. There was also the problem of overusing 
ready-made – often trivialised – set phrases. The frequent and 
tendentious misuse of such phrases would lead to conceptual 
laxity eventually resulting in meaningless speech. The linguists 
have pointed out that the increased number of hollow set-phrases 
and generalities had triggered the rise of a jargon-like party 
language. The absence of creativity and inventiveness in language 
use prevented users from grasping the essence of what a particular 
concept had originally signified, and contributed to the 
formulation of empty and obscure remarks. The use of empty 
phrases and fixed formulas buttressed the ritual character of 
standard party practices such as criticism/self-criticism rituals, 
and ensured that acts of (self)criticism remained within the realm 
of obscure generality.25 
The tendency of ‘Soviet Imperial Language’, as one scholar has 
labelled Soviet political language, to denote generalities instead of 
concrete referents, provoked the proliferation of semantic ambiguities 
and eventually resulted in the failure of party language to fulfil its 
communicative functions.26 Since the ideological discourse was full of 
difficult and complex notions, which even agitators and party 
functionaries had often failed to understand, the transmission of 
ideological messages between the party and the masses remained 
superficial, and revolved around various key-concepts and slogans. 
                                                 
25  On the role and interpretations of the notions of criticism and self-
criticism see Michael Waller, The Language of Communism. A Commentary. 
London, 1972, 55-57. 
26  Tóth, “A szovjet birodalmi nyelv”. Tóth’s work was largely influenced by 
Victor Klemperer’s study on the language of the Nazi party. See Victor 
Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI, Lingua Tertii Imperii: A 
Philologist’s Notebook. London, 1999. On the usage of ‘Bolshevik-speak’ by 
the Soviet population see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as 
a Civilization. Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1995, 198-237. 
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Due to the pervasiveness of 
‘semantic splodgeing’27(i.e. the blurring 
of meanings), and the inadequacy of 
presenting the otherwise complicated 
Marxist terminology to the population 
had resulted in the popular 
misperception of concepts and notions 
of the essential Marxist vocabulary.28  
The semantic uncertainty and the 
tendency to perceive political pro-
nouncements in terms of slogans 
contributed inevitably to the rituali-
sation of political language. 
It seems that the obscure nature of the 
concept ‘personality cult’ was but one 
example of the general semantic 
vagueness that characterised the parti- 
Rákosi, the Father figure. 
(Hurrah! The 2nd Congress of 
the Hungarian Workers’ Party) 
cular language variant spoken by the party elite and the party 
bureaucracy. When the general features of the linguistic 
environment are taken into consideration, however, the unclear, 
ambiguous character of the notion is not at all surprising. The 
semantic haziness of certain words or expressions could be 
exploited during rituals of criticism or self-criticism, for example, 
because the empty nature of phrases and formulas could 
contribute to the formulation of a general, meaningless – and at the 
same time harmless – critique. Since the concept ‘personality cult’ 
most often appeared in the context of criticism/self-criticism acts, 
its obscure character is not remarkably striking. 
 
                                                 
27  Lóránt Czigány, “Államosított szavaink átvilágítása, avagy szótáríróink 
diszkrét bája”. Kortárs, Vol. 44, No. 7, 1999, 1-32. 
28  On the difficulties of transmitting Bolshevik terminology at the time of 
the Russian revolution see Orlando Figes and Boris Kolonitskii, 
Interpreting the Russian Revolution. The Language and Symbols of 1917. New 
Haven and London, 1999. 
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Rákosi having his head portrayed – on the wall ‘the Founding Fathers’ look on him. 
Probably the first occurrence of the term in Hungary after the 
war was in 1948, when the Politburo of the MDP criticised the 
Congress of Trade Unions for overemphasising the significance of 
the unions and overshadowing the leading role of the party. The 
leaders of the unions were condemned for establishing a certain 
‘personality cult’ around themselves, which ‘totally underplayed 
[the authority of] Comrade Rákosi.’29 The resolution emphasized 
that there were no portraits of Rákosi in the hall where the 
congress took place, and that more pictures of István Kossa 
(prominent trade union leader) were circulated than that of the 
MDP leader. The concept ‘personality cult’ reappeared a year later 
in the party resolution, which excluded the previous Minister of  
 
                                                 
29  Péter Sipos, “Mikor kezdődött Magyarországon...”. História, Vol. 9, Nos. 
5-6, 1987, 12. 
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Home Affairs, László Rajk, from the MDP (11 June 1949).30 Both 
denunciations preceded a political campaign against the 
personalities mentioned in the documents. The decree condemning 
trade union leaders was the warning signal before the propaganda 
campaign against the Social Democrats, whereas the exclusion of 
Rajk was followed by his arrest in September 1949, and one of the 
biggest show trials in the Soviet bloc. The term ‘cult of personality’ 
resurfaced in June 1953, when the Presidium of the CPSU 
stigmatised Rákosi for promoting the cult of his person, but it was 
also used before the denunciation of Nagy and his eventual 
exclusion from the ranks of the MDP in 1955. The same charge was 
reheated and was connected to Rákosi again after the 20th Congress 
and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, when the party secretary was 
finally removed from the party leadership. The Kádár-regime 
continued to use the term in reference to Rákosi only, with the 
intention of distancing itself from the misdeeds of the pre-1956 era. 
In the Soviet Union the concept was picked up by the heirs of 
Stalin after the death of the dictator, culminating in Khrushchev’s 
dramatic speech at the 20th Congress denouncing Stalin’s sins. 
Paradoxically enough Khrushchev was also accused of having 
established his own ‘personality cult’, when he was removed from 
the party leadership in 1964 by the Brezhnev group.31 
It can be concluded that the term ‘cult of personality’ functioned 
as a general term of condemnation in Stalinist political culture. The 
accusation either preceded the removal of a rival, as in the case of 
Rajk for example, or followed the displacement or the demise of a 
leader, when the denunciation of the predecessor was exploited in 
order to confer legitimacy onto the successors. Therefore, the term 
                                                 
30  “Vigilance should be intensified. We should watch out for every sign of 
deviation from the party line, for every clap-trap, self-glorification, 
personality cult and for the pushers”. “A Központi Vezetőség és a 
Központi Ellenőrző Bizottság közös határozata Rajk László és Szőnyi 
Tibor kizárásáról a pártból”. In: Lajos Izsák (Ed.), A Magyar Dolgozók 
Pártja határozatai, 1948-195., Budapest, 1998, 70-71. 
31  On the emerging cult of Khrushchev see James George Boylan, “The 
Development of the Khrushchev “Cult of Personality’: A Survey and 
Interpretation of Pravda and Izvestia”, Unpubl. M.A. Thesis, University 
of Washington, 1961. 
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‘cult of personality’ should be interpreted as an essential verbal 
requisite of Bolshevik denunciation rituals, rather than as a key-
concept of Marxist philosophy. With the ritualisation of political 
language in the age of High Stalinism, the usage of the concept ‘cult 
of personality’ also became ritualised, which eclipsed its semantic 
qualities. For this reason, an approach that focuses on its function in 
party rituals rather than on its meaning in ideological texts would 
prove to be more fruitful in attempting to reveal the characteristics 
of the notion and its actual relationship to the cult phenomenon.  
Irrespective of the problematic nature of the concept 
‘personality cult’, it can still be regarded as a key-symbol of the 
1950s in Koselleckian terms, because Hungarian academics as well 
as contemporary Hungarian society perceives the period between 
1949 and 1953 (sometimes up to 1956) as the ‘era of personality 
cult’. 32  The concept, which nowadays can equally refer to the 
glorification of Rákosi, the show trials, the purges and so on, 
turned into a verbal symbol of the 1950s, denoting the party leader, 
Rákosi. Consequently, the term retains strong semantic 
connotations, due to the complexity of its meaning and the wide 
range of associations it may evoke. 
Yyes Cohen was right in pointing out that when historians and 
political scientists define Stalinist leader cults as examples of the 
‘cult of personality’ they use a concept that was not used to denote 
the phenomenon in the past.33 Thus, historians of our times should 
be careful when using the concept with regard to Soviet-type 
leader cults in order to avoid methodological mistakes. The 
semantic ambiguities related to the concept as well as its ritual use 
in party-speak – as outlined above – also make a strong case for a 
cautious use of the phrase in an academic context. One might even 
                                                 
32  For Koselleck’s understanding of key-concepts Reinhart Koselleck, 
“Einleitung”. In: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (Eds.), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politischen-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland. Stuttgart, 1974-1997, Band I., XIII-XXVII; Koselleck, 
“Begriffsgeschichte and Social History”. In Koselleck, Futures Past: On the 
Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge, 1985, 73-91; The Practice of 
Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford, 2002. 
33  Cohen, “The Cult of Number One”, 599. 
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suggest abandoning the term and replacing it with other concepts 
that are more suitable for analytical purposes. The alternative 
suggested by Cohen is the Koestlerian ‘cult of the number one’. 
This concept, however, overlooks the hierarchical nature of the cult 
phenomenon and thus ignores the dynamics of the dissemination 
of the cult at lower levels of party and state administration. From 
this point of view, the term leader cult seems to be more fitting to 
describe the cult in the Soviet context. Since the word ‘leader’ 
could equally refer to high-ranking party officials as well as to 
local/regional party secretaries, the phrase leader cult also 
indicates the hierarchal nature of the cult. Nevertheless, it has to be 
acknowledged that this concept only signify cults in the political 
sphere, and thus fails to denote general cultic behaviour and other 
cultic practices (such as intellectual traditions and so on) in the 
society. Therefore, one should also consider using the expression 
‘cult of the individual’ as a more general term that equally refers to 
political cults and other cultic social practices in dictatorial, but 
also in democratic regimes. The use of the term is also justified by 
the fact that the Russian phrase kult lichnostii has a double 
meaning: it equally means ‘cult of personality’ and ‘cult of the 
individual’. Moreover, the concept is less politically laden than its 
semi-equivalent, i.e. ‘cult of personality’.  
Irrespective of the possible alternative concepts to be used in 
place of ‘cult of personality’, a full Begriffsgeschichte of the 
expression still needs to be written. Such a study should focus on 
the on the way the concept was used by political thinkers and 
party ideologues of the time, but also on the way it was used in 
party-speak and by the population of the respective countries. 
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Rituals, Myths and Political Religions 
 
The Soviet project was for the most part an offensive for the 
occupation of the symbolic field and the conquest of symbolic 
space.34 It was also a utopian, millenarian – and militant – venture 
to remould society and create the socialist New Man. The 
Bolsheviks created a new system of myths and cults and 
introduced a new set of symbols (hammer and the sickle, red star, 
etc.), celebrations and rituals. The attempt to realise socialist utopia 
on earth also manifested in the formulation of a master narrative, 
which permeated novels, political biographies, historical works, 
and newspaper articles. The aesthetic-discursive framework of the 
regime that is usually labelled as Socialist Realism was also 
represented through visual means: on paintings, photos, posters or 
statues. Besides the implementation of a new symbolism, the 
Soviet regime often recycled old symbols and traditions, but also 
appealed to religious sentiments. 
At the centre of Soviet myths stood the myth of the party and 
the myth of the revolution, complemented after 1945 by the myth 
of the Great Patriotic War. Soviet mythology was crammed with all 
sorts of heroes. The apogee of Soviet heroic culture was the Stalin 
period that elevated revolutionary heroes, Stakhanovites, stock 
workers, aviators, partisans, or those who denounced their 
relatives, to a hero status. 35  The multiplication of everyday 
supermen was complemented with the cult of martyrs and the 
heroic dead.  
The cult of the party secretary was an integral component of 
Soviet mythology. He was the super-hero of the heroic age, and the 
                                                 
34  For the concept of symbolic field Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of 
Practice. Cambridge, 1977; Language and Symbolic Power. Oxford, 1991; 
“Social Space and Symbolic Space”. In: Bourdieu, Practical reason: on the 
theory of action. Cambridge, 1998, 1-18. 
35  For the multiplication of socialist heroes Silke Satjukow and Rainer Gries 
(Eds.), Sozialistische Helden. Eine Kulturgeschichte von Propagandafiguren in 
Osteuropa und der DDR. Berlin, 2002; Miklós Kun, “Hőskultusz és 
deheroizáció a szovjet rendszerben”. Café Babel, No. 3, 1994, 87-90. For the 
cult of Pavlik Morozov see Catriona Kelly, Comrade Pavlik: The Rise and 
Fall of a Soviet Boy Hero. London, 2004.  
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super-symbol that absorbed all symbols of Soviet power. The myth 
of the leader was summarised in his biographies that cemented the 
leader-myth to the system of myths promoted by the regime. In the 
case of Stalin, his figure was linked to the founding myths of the 
regime: the revolution, Lenin, and later on, World War II. The leader 
cult with its routinised practices – letter-writing, expressions of 
gratitude, applause, the offering of pledges, and so on – should also 
be interpreted in the context of the complex system of rituals that had 
been implemented in Soviet-type societies during the Stalin-era. 
Stalinist culture was, in fact, characterised by a high degree of 
ritualisation of state-societal relations. Due to the existential 
uncertainty that saturated the regime, rituals of expressing loyalty, or 
expressing penitence when stigmatised, became common practices 
through which the individual attempted to improve his/her social 
position, avoid arrest, or survive in case of mortal threat. 36 
Denunciation, criticism, self-criticism and other ways of public 
confession – confession of convicts at show trials, for example – 
became widespread social practices that spread through the structure 
of Soviet society from top to bottom, and involved prominent 
members of the party elite and politically impoverished individuals 
alike. The high level of routinisation of these practises led to the 
ritualisation of the use of language, resulting in the semantic 
emptiness of certain concepts, expressions and linguistic formula. 
Apart from the spontaneous ritualisation of social relations, the 
regime also promoted a set of ritual practices to celebrate itself and 
to re-enact authority relations in the society. Mass demonstrations 
                                                 
36  Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in 
Soviet Russia in the 1930s”. Slavic Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, 1996, 78-105, 
Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately (Eds.), Practices of Denunciation in 
Modern European History, 1789-1989. The Journal of Modern History, Special 
Issue, Vol. 68, No. 4, 1996; J. Arch Getty, “Samokritika Rituals in the 
Stalinist Central Committee, 1933-38”. The Russian Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, 
1999, 49-70; J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and 
the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. New Haven and London, 
1999, 23-24 and 78-79; Alexei Kojevnikov, “Rituals of Stalinist Culture at 
Work: Science and the Games of Intraparty Democracy circa 1948”. 
Russian Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 1998, 25-52. 
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and party meetings at various levels gradually took a standardised 
format and turned into routine activities. 
Although the leader cult had its own distinct set of rites, the 
person of the party secretary was usually placed in the centre of 
distinct rituals that were not directly linked to the worship of 
leaders. During demonstrations, public holidays and festivities, 
when Soviet social relations were remodelled by the participants, 
the leader (or an image of him) generally occupied the centre of all 
celebration activities, which provided symbolic support for his 
unquestionable position in society.37 In the case of denunciations or 
practices of self-criticism the leader’s name was frequently invoked, 
with the hope of providing absolute credibility to the confession 
ritual. Cultic practices often merged with more traditional – usually 
religious – everyday rituals. Instances of prayers to the leader, and 
the images of Lenin and Stalin replacing icons, were clear examples 
of the amalgamation of orthodox religious practices and rituals of 
leader worship. In general, orientation towards the leader was an 
essential characteristic element of socialist rituals. Consequently, the 
persona of the party secretary became the focal point of the great 
majority of routinised social practices in the culture of Stalinism. 
Socialist rituals of the Stalin era thus provided a ritualised 
remodelling of the practice of ‘working towards the vozhd’ [leader]’ 
in Soviet-type societies.38 
The Soviet-type consecration of politics had its roots in the 
writings of utopian socialist authors but it was also an emphatic 
element of late 19th century Russian intellectual traditions. Saint-
Simon, the God-builder movement (especially Maxim Gorky and 
Anatolii Lunacharskii), and even Stalin contributed to transferring 
                                                 
37  For the analysis of rituals in the Soviet Union James von Geldern, 
Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920. Berkeley, 1993; Christel Lane, The Rites of 
Rulers. Ritual in Industrial Society – the Soviet Case. Cambridge, 1981; Karen 
Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades. Celebrations in the Time of 
Stalin. Bloomington, Indianapolis, 2000. 
38  The expression ‘working towards the Führer’ has been coined by Ian 
Kershaw. It has been adopted to the Soviet context by several authors. 
See for example, Ennker, ‘The Stalin Cult’, and Malte Rolf, “Working 
Towards the Centre: Leader Cults and Spatial Politics in Pre-war 
Stalinism”. The Leader Cult, 141-157. 
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of religious sentiments into the political arena. The God-builders, 
who wanted to replace the God of Christianity with a human deity, 
were mostly responsible for the foundation of the Lenin-cult, which 
eventually became the core myth of the Soviet Union.39 The aim of 
the Soviet-type regimes was to excise the dominant religions from 
the spiritual sphere – Orthodoxy in Russia, Orthodoxy and 
Catholicism in Central and Eastern Europe – and to exercise full 
control over the minds of citizens. The offensive against the Church 
involved the elimination of priests, the weakening of religious 
institutions and the punishment of those who continued to 
participate in religious rituals. The Sovietisation of religious 
holidays was one of the more sophisticated strategies of the party. 
Despite the antagonism of the Church and the party, however, the 
Soviet regime acquired a strongly religious character. The 
reconciliation of the Lenin-cult with Orthodox beliefs was one of the 
most spectacular signifiers of the return of the sacred to politics. 
Communism is often regarded as a sort of secular or political 
religion; a dogma that superseded traditional beliefs.40 The sacred 
                                                 
39  Ferenc Tallár, “Sztálinizmus és reszakralizáció”. Valóság, Vol. 32, No. 2, 
1989, 32-51; Nina Tumarkin, “Religion, Bolshevism and the Origins of the 
Lenin Cult”. Russian Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1981, 35-46; George Louis 
Kline, “The “God-Builders’: Gorky and Lunacharsky”. In: Kline, Religious 
and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia. Chicago, 1968, 103-126. 
40  The subject of political religion has a substantial literature. See for example 
Philippe Burrin, “Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept”. History 
and Memory, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2, 1997, 321-349; Richard Faber (Ed.), Politische 
Religion – religiöse Politik. Würzburg, 1997; Emilio Gentile, “Fascism as 
Political Religion”. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, Nos. 2-3, 1990, 
229-251; “Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and 
Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation”. Totalitarian Movements 
and Political Religions, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2004, 326-375; Marcin Kula, 
“Communism as Religion”. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 
6, No. 3, 2005, 371-381; Hermann Lübbe (Ed.), Heilserwartung und Terror: 
Politische Religionen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Düsseldorf, 1995; Hans Maier (Ed.), 
“Totalitarismus und “Politische Religionen’: Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs. 
Paderborn, 1996; Stanley G. Payne, “On the Heuristic Value of the Concept 
of Political Religion and its Application”. Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2005, 163-174; Ákos Szilágyi, “Istenek, cárok, 
főtitkárok. A Sztálin-vallás eredete”. Rubicon, Vol. 3, No. 7, 1992, 23-26. 
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position of Marxist-Leninist writings in the Soviet empire was 
safeguarded by the Communist Party that also defined the only 
possible interpretation of these texts. Those who deviated from the 
official interpretation were treated as heretics: they were 
stigmatised and often perished in Stalin’s prisons. Besides the 
centrality of the dogma, Soviet-type regimes resembled religious 
belief systems in many other ways. The universal claim of the 
doctrine, the attempt to create the socialist New Man by promoting 
exemplary behavioural patterns, the teleological view of history, 
that envisaged the struggle between the forces of good and evil, 
and the paternalistic perception of community all made 
communist ideology look similar to traditional religions. 
Communism also had its collective rituals (such as party meetings), 
public confessions during self-criticism rituals, procession-like 
mass demonstrations, shrines (the red corners) and holy places 
(such as the Mausoleum of Lenin, for example). Certain relics, and 
sometimes dead bodies, were also surrounded by an aura of 
holiness. Communist faith assembled a remarkable pantheon of 
heroes and deities, who were presented to the population like 
Christian saints: in hagiographic terms or on icon-like images. The 
defenders of the faith were the members of the party, who became 
the priests of the new religion. Stephen Kotkin goes as far as to 
describe the Soviet regime as a theocratic system of rule, where 
governance fell under the authority of governmental organs, 
whilst the party’s role was to provide spiritual guidance to the 
population.41 Therefore, the organisation and the functions of the 
party were similar to those of the Church in institutionalised 
religions. Besides the ranks of priests, apostles, saints and ardent 
believers, the new religion also had apostates and dissidents, who 
became disillusioned by the dissonance of reality and the way 
communist propaganda described it. 
The first secretary of the party played a central role in the semi-
religious system. His biography was the story of the nation’s 
redemption, and the leader was portrayed as the terminus of 
history. Through his portraits, which often functioned as icons, he 
                                                 
41  Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 286-293. 
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became literally omnipresent in the public as well as in the private 
sphere. 42  Likenesses of the leader were also used during ritual 
communications with the party secretary; during the submission of 
oaths or pledges, for example. There were other rituals of the leader  
cult, however, that resembled religious 
practices. Leaving an empty seat for 
him during the meetings of party cells, 
rhythmic applause, chanting, letters of 
gratitude, hymns to the leader or poetic 
appraisals of his persona, and lofty 
vows all had their equivalents in 
traditional religions. The communist 
party secretaries, in fact, were in the 
focus of all ritual activities of the 
regime that contributed to the 
emergence of the image of the party 
leader as a creator and an all-powerful 
deity.43 
Rákosi, the First Secretary of the 
Party. 
Such rituals aimed to realise unity between the leader and the led, in 
a similar way Orthodox rituals attempted to realise unity between 
men and God.44 The spatial organisation of the leader cult was also 
somewhat similar to universal belief systems. By virtue of being 
portrayed as the centre of Sovietised symbolic space, an additional 
element of sacredness was conferred upon the figure of the party 
leader.45 
                                                 
42  For the icon like representations of the leader Victoria E. Bonnell, 
Iconography of Power. Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin. Berkeley, 
1997. 
43  Lane, The Rites of Rulers, Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades. 
44  Lars Erik Blomqvist, “Introduction”. In: Claes Arvidsson and Lars Erik 
Blomqvist (Eds.), Symbols of Power. The Esthetics of Political Legitimation in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Stockholm, 1987, 14. 
45  Jan Plamper, “The Stalin Cult in the Visual Arts, 1929-1953”. PhD 
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2001. See also Malte Rolf, 
“Working Towards the Centre”. 
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 Rákosi, the Military Leader and Hero. 
The religious character of the communist leader cult has often 
been compared to the mysticism of the worship of medieval kings. 
Ernst Kantorowicz’s famous theory of the king’s two bodies has 
inspired several scholars to describe the adulation of communist 
leaders with the vocabulary of political theology.46 The proposition 
holds that party secretaries, similarly to medieval kings, had an 
immortal, mystical body (the body politic), besides their physical 
body. The mystical body was, in fact, the embodiment of the 
community, which allowed the Soviet citizens to imagine 
themselves as members of the Soviet society. Due to the 
 
                                                 
46  Ernst Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political 
Theology. Princeton, 1957. For the use of the theory in the Soviet context 
Bonnell, Iconography of Power; Katalin Sinkó, “A politika rítusai: 
emlékműállítás, szobordöntés”. In: Péter György and Hedvig Turai (Eds.), 
A művészet katonái. Sztálinizmus és kultúra. Budapest, 1992, 67-79; Malte 
Rolf, “The Leader’s Many Bodies: Leader Cults and Mass Festivals in 
Voronezh, Novosibirsk, and Kemerovo in the 1930s”. Personality Cults in 
Stalinism, 197-206. 
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problematic nature of succession in the leadership of communist 
parties, however, the idea of the leader’s immortal body seems 
problematic. Since the cult of leaders varied in intensity over time 
and in different countries of the Soviet Bloc, the idea of 
immortality was conveyed not so much by the person, but by the 
party. With the exception of the Lenin-Stalin succession and the 
period of Stalinism, when Stalin came to symbolise the continuity 
of Soviet power and Soviet community, it was the party that was 
represented as a collective immortal body, which constantly 
reproduced itself through the physical bodies of party members.47 
Nevertheless, the typical first secretary of the Stalin-era was 
portrayed as the symbol of the party’s authority, and his figure 
provided the medium through which the citizens joined the 
community of the Stalinist ‘great family’. Moreover, the symbolic 
surplus of the leader’s persona remained powerful enough to 
overshadow the physical aspects of the leader’s body that 
eventually resulted in a largely impersonal imagery. 
Similarly to Kantorowicz’s idea, the theory of political religions 
as outlined in the works of Emilio Gentile and Christel Lane – not to 
mention the journal Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions – as 
well as its application to communist regimes, remains somewhat 
problematic. However, the advantages of viewing the cult through 
the prism of political religions should be acknowledged first. 
Whereas earlier, mostly political scientists’ approaches could not 
account for certain aspects of the communist leader worship, the 
theory of political religions provided a broader framework of 
interpretation. This made it possible to explain those features of the 
cult that had been ignored before, such as the ritual character of the 
leader’s representations, and the connection of the language of the 
leader cult to the master narrative of the communist regime. The 
theory of political religions, on the other hand, enables the 
interpretation of the cult as part of a system of myths and rituals 
that characterised the regime as a whole, and accounts for the fact 
                                                 
47  Péter Apor, “The Eternal Body: The Birth of the Pantheon of the Labor 
Movement in Budapest”. East Central Europe/L’Europe du centre est, Vol. 31, 
No. 1, 2004, 23-42. 
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that the cultic perception of leaders had been to some extent 
inherent in the ideology of the movement before the takeover.  
The analytical value of the concept political religion however, is 
to be questioned. There is a tendency to use it as a certain meta-
concept, which is equally used to describe Italian fascism, Nazism, 
Soviet communism, the (semi-)authoritarian regimes of Portugal 
and Spain in the inter-war period, and even political correctness of 
our times.48 The jamming of the concept’s semantic field with a 
diversity of meanings has contributed to the substantial inflation of 
the phrase in academic texts, and therefore one should have 
serious concerns about its applicability to the Soviet context in 
general. The analytical defects of the term in this cases are 
manifested in a tendency to ignore the substantial political and 
ideological differences between the 20th century authoritarian 
political regimes. It has to be emphasised, however, that 
communist regimes displayed a remarkable religious appeal, and 
there were clear attempts to make the leader cult appear religious. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the cult emerged as part of a system of 
myths, beliefs and rituals that were implemented in Soviet-type 
regimes does not necessarily mean that it emerged as an essential 
part of a certain communist political religion. Even if the term 
political religion is not the most suitable term to essentialize 
Soviet-type regimes, it should be emphasised that the cult was not 
simply the product of the self-aggrandisement of communist 
leaders, but was an integral part of the Soviet project and served a 
multiplicity of functions. Therefore, it should not be interpreted as 
a separate phenomenon that emerged as an excessive feature of 
communist rule, but rather as an essential component of the 
system of myths and rituals implemented in Soviet-type regimes.  
                                                 
48  See for example, Payne, ‘On the Heuristic Value…’. 
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The present article concentrates on analyzing the so called 
Kossuth1 commemoration year, a form of modern cults, held in 
Hungary in 2002, and its impact on historiography in Hungary. To 
put it bluntly, the main question is how political commemoration, 
and financial support generated by it, affected historiography. 
Commemoration years are not a rarity in Hungary nowadays, and 
the Kossuth-year was not either. The Kossuth-year has been 
chosen because of its significance both in terms of national 
mythology and in terms of scholarly interest. Of the many, the 
Deák-year 2 seems comparable to the present theme in many ways. 
However, its impact on historiography – meaning by historiography 
here publications written by professional historians or publications 
that qualify as scholarly works – has been evaluated thoroughly by 
one of the most meritorious researchers of nineteenth century 
Hungary, Gábor Pajkossy. 3  Consequently, the Deák-year was 
included here as an equal part but, relying on Pajkossy’s work, it is 
                                                 
1  Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) was a lawyer, politician, journalist, regent-
President of Hungary in 1849, to say the least. Even a brief summary of 
his life, numerous roles and achievements would require a lengthy article. 
This article, however, focuses on the various interpretations and 
representations of Kossuth’s life. 
2 Ferenc Deák (1803–1876), the other most prominent representative of 
nineteenth-century Hungarian liberal nobility, was a politician, minister 
of justice in the first Hungarian parliamentarian government in 1848 (in 
which Kossuth served as minister of finance), and the main organizer of 
the Austrian-Hungarian settlement (the Compromise) in 1867. 
3 Gábor Pajkossy, “Deák-emlékév”. BUKSZ (Budapesti Könyvszemle) 
2004/2, 144-158. 
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a mirror which serves as the basis of comparison while the focus 
remains on the Kossuth commemoration year. 
Commemoration years, by are by definition calendar years 
dedicated to the commemoration of great historical events or figures 
whose anniversary happen to be a centennial, or quartercentennial, 
or even millennial anniversary, are not Hungarian specialties. The 
two hundred years anniversary of the French Revolution may be 
one of the best known examples but the very expression, 
commemoration year, is used, for instance, in connection with the 
abolition of slavery by the UNESCO while another French example, 
the Verne year, could serve as a parallel to the one under study. 
Also the Finnish Snellman 200-year scheme seems a very 
interesting case in this respect.4 While the purpose and the content 
of such undertakings may vary to a large extent according to local 
political culture and traditions, they are illuminating examples of 
political commemoration.  
In case of Hungary, commemoration years are not specific to the 
post-socialist era either. Not forgetting the ‘mother of all 
commemoration years’, the Millennial festivities in 1896, such 
forms of political use of history were employed also during the 
state socialist era. Amongst others the series of events belonging to 
the initiative called ‘Petőfi ‘735  probably made their impact on 
contemporaries. However, the chain of commemoration years, to 
which the Kossuth year belongs, are seen as a distinct 
phenomenon which has more to do with the activity of 
                                                 
4  Just like his Hungarian counterpart, Snellman was a theorist of national 
politics, a practicing statesman, pioneer of modern political journalism in 
his country. Taking into account the central role of the respective heroes 
in the narrative of “national awakening” or “struggle for independence”, 
which are both possible – nationalist – interpretations of nineteenth 
century history, it could be even the subject of a distinct study based on a 
comparison with the Kossuth year. 
5  Sándor Petőfi (1823–1849) was a poet, one of the leading figures of 
national romanticism. His role in the revolution of 1848 and his plebeian 
attitude made him especially usable for socialist cultural politics. 
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democratically elected governments and post-socialist political 
culture than with earlier traditions. 
The first occasion when a commemoration year had been 
established by a formal decision of the government was the series 
of festivities, exhibitions and publications called millecentennial 
anniversary. Millecentennial, that is the one thousandth and one 
hundredth, is a word that can be found on the Internet only 
referring to this specific series of events, and only on Hungarian 
sites, underlining the fact that something specifically Hungarian is 
in question.6 It was organized in 1996 to commemorate the “1100th 
anniversary of the Magyar's settling in the Carpathian Basin, and 
the 100th anniversary of the grandiose millennial celebrations” as 
one source put it, 7  or “the millecentennial anniversary of the 
Magyar conquest of the Hungarian basin” to quote another one.8 
The citations probably tell how ambiguous the historical 
background of the subject of commemoration was. “Settling” is 
quite a neutral term, but “conquest” is much closer to the 
Hungarian language. The celebration of a nineteenth century myth 
seems inevitably problematic. This might be a possible reason for 
the relative lack of enthusiasm it seemed to generate on the one 
hand, and the relatively low frequency of attempts to exploit it in 
terms of daily politics, on the other. According to Éva Kovács, the 
Millecentennial commemorated as much the Millennial festivities 
as it commemorated the conquest or settling.9 Lővei’s point that 
                                                 
6 1896 saw a great festival representing Hungarian state and culture 
together with a great number of ‘civilizing’ investments. A good number 
of schools were established, museums and other institutions founded, not 
forgetting the first underground of the Continent built in Budapest. Cf. 
András Gerő, “Két millennium Magyarországon”. Mozgó Világ, 8/2004. 
7 Cf. Pál Lővei, “Millennium plus. Hungary 1100 – Austria 1000”. Buksz, 
Spring/1997. 
8 From a speech held in the opening ceremony of an exhibition in 1996: 
http://www.c3.hu/~bartok32/millecen.htm.  
9 Éva Kovács, From the Turul Bird to the Image of the Finance Minister: The 
Role of Myths in the Post-Communist Transition, Hungary 1988-1996 
http://www.ssees.ucl.ac.uk/kovacs1.htm 
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the commemoration year was a substitute for the failure of the 
Expo, seems to hold explanatory power in this context. 
The next similar undertaking was the series of Millennial 
festivities in 2000, which connected the turn of the Millennium 
with the one thousandth anniversary of the establishment of the 
Hungarian Kingdom, or the coronation of the first Christian king, 
Stephen. The cult of St Stephen, the ‘Apostolic King’, offered 
several possible points of identification, which were exploited to 
differing extents. He was the one who gave constitution to 
Hungary, being at the same time the founder of the ‘national’ 
Royal house, the one who ‘led Hungarians to Europe’, just to 
mention a few. One of the peculiarities of the Millennial festivities 
among commemoration years was that it lasted longer than a 
single year, a total of twenty months. According to András Gerő, 
as opposed to the Millennial one hundred years earlier, politics 
and words had a determining role. 10  The law passed on the 
historical relevance of ‘the Holy Crown’ seems to be an 
outstanding example of this tendency.11 The anniversaries of these 
kinds of events are regarded as the most significant ones in 
Hungarian history, including evidently the fiftieth anniversary of 
the Revolution and War of Independence in 2006. It has evoked a 
historicizing manner of discussion in Hungary, but is known in 
Finland as the Uprising. They tend to involve more money and 
more mass celebrations than the ones discussed here.  
The commemoration of the bicentenary of Lajos Kossuth’s birth 
was the first occasion in the history of political commemoration 
after the system change which focused on the anniversary of any 
historical figure. Soon it became a habit since after the Kossuth 
year was over, the Prime Minister himself announced the Deák 
                                                 
10 Gerő, “Két millennium Magyarországon”. Interestingly, Gerő considered 
the relevance of the comparison between the two Milleniums rather than 
a comparison of two consecutive commemoration years (the 
Millecentennial in 1996 and the Millennial around 2000). 
11 Act no. 1/2000, which among others ordered the Holy Crown to be 
moved from the National Museum to the House of Parliament. 
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year in 2003, and now Hungary is having two anniversaries of 
great men a year on average. However, in the name of correctness 
and punctuality one should not forget the fact that, while a 
straightforward “commemoration year” was not established, the 
Fidesz-led government, across and over the emphasis on the 
Millennium, used the name and the image of István Széchenyi12 
very heavily in its communication. The use of Széchenyi’s name to 
cover a program to subsidize small enterprises, which was a 
central element of the government's election campaign in 2002, was 
only one part of this development. Just to give a hint about the 
phenomenon, it may be useful to recall that a movie on the life of 
Széchenyi was supported from governmental funds up to an 
amount, which at least equaled the total sum of governmental 
support for filmmakers in the given year. 
One of the most important aspects of organizing 
commemoration years is the administrative staging of the 
celebrations. On the first occasions ad hoc organs were established 
to run the celebrations and events, and naturally to raise funds to 
the given project. A High Commissioner (kormánybiztos) and his 
office run the organization and administrative tasks in those cases. 
As commemoration years were made regular, a distinct office was 
established for their administration. It is called the ‘Secretariat of 
National Anniversaries’ (or ‘Jubilees’), the Nemzeti Évfordulók 
Titkársága, founded in February 2003. The Secretariat belongs 
administratively to the Ministry of Culture, which at the moment 
of the establishment of the secretariat was called the Ministry of 
National Cultural Heritage. To have a separate Ministry for 
cultural heritage appears to have been a curiosity, as no other of its 
                                                 
12 Count István Széchenyi (1791–1860) was a leading liberal aristocrat who 
actively participated in the creation of modern Hungary and its national 
institutions (like the Academy of Sciences), political forums (like the 
National Casino) and infrastructure (like the Chain Bridge named after 
him). His heated journalistic debate with Kossuth contributed to a large 
extent to the crystallization of liberal standpoints in the early 1840s. 
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kind existed at the time.13 As it is explained on the web-site of the 
secretariat, 
 
The existence of a permanent secretariat ensures the organized and high-
level mediation of those messages of moral nature and relevant for the public 
debate embedded in anniversaries. 14 
 
It is very vague what moral messages the anniversaries might 
contain by nature, which should be communicated or mediated 
but that is not the main point here. A more important aspect is 
probably that through this pathetic act the question of 
commemoration years was factually depoliticized, as from that 
moment on no distinct governmental decision was required to 
organize a commemoration year.15 
The Secretariat also participated in working out the document 
titled ‘Program of National Memory for the Republic of 
Hungary’. The latter served as the basis for the government 
decision on the program of national memory for the years 2004–
2010 in December 2003. According to the decision, the purpose 
of the Program was to achieve certain goals, which were 
                                                 
13 Cf. Heino Nyyssönen, ”Metsoja, peikkoja ja vampyyrejä. Poliittinen 
kulttuuri ja stereotypiat”. In: Sakari Hänninen, Kari Palonen (Eds.), Lue 
poliittisesti: profiileja politiikan tutkimukseen, Jyväskylä, 2004, 185. 
14 “The existence of the permanent Secretariat guarantees a well-organized 
and high-level communication of the moral and communal messages of 
the anniversaries” reads the official translation: http://en.emlekev.hu/ 
secretaritat/index.html. 
15 “Thus there is no need to adopt a separate government decree for each 
anniversary, as an opportunity is now presented to celebrate them on the 
basis of the memorial years in the programme.” However, the decision 
also specified the individuals to be commemorated through the next six 
years, while on long run the Secretariat is dependent financially on 
political decisions. 
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considered by the government to be of central importance, 
namely:16 
 
[…] to present both in our home country and abroad A, the historical and 
cultural values of the Republic of Hungary about to join the European Union; 
B, the links and common features of Hungarian and European history and 
culture; C, the role of local communities in national culture. 
 
In order to achieve these goals, the Secretariat has prepared nine 
anniversaries for the seven-year period. If the 50th anniversary of 
the uprising is not counted, we have three composers, three poets 
and writers (or at least figures, who had an impact on Hungarian 
literature), a medieval king and only one politician. This only 
politician happens to be Lajos Batthyány, the first person in 
Hungarian history to bear the title of Prime Minister who actually 
completes the series of great figures of the first half of the 
nineteenth century which started with Széchenyi and was followed 
by Kossuth and Deák. Batthyány’s commemoration had its 
political message also, as his figure could be linked to the highly 
valued ‘Reform era’ of the nineteenth century and ‘Progress’ and 
the government deliberately tried in 2007 to sell its own ‘reform’ 
policies – widely understood as mere austerity policy – in the spirit 
of a ‘new era of Reforms’. However, the other figures selected for 
commemoration do not seem to hold similar political connotations. 
On the whole it seems that the establishment of the Program of 
National Memory has led to the de-politicization of state-funded 
commemoration in Hungary. An analysis of the images, 
ideological links and myths these historical figures embody would 
be a tempting task even if it seems doubtful whether there was any 
straightforward political/cultural will behind the selection of these 
very figures. The most probable criteria of the selection might have 
                                                 
16 Decision of government no. 1127/2003. Interestingly, the establishment of 
the Snellman-year was justified using similar arguments referring to 
national and European identity:  
http://www.snellman200.fi/juhlahanke/fi.jsp 
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been the urge to find anyone mentioned in the secondary school 
history books who happened to be born or die in a specific year, 
which involves an anniversary of ‘round’ years in the near future. 
However, this analysis would lead too far from the actual topic of 
this article. 
The Kossuth year seems irregular if one compares it with other 
commemoration years organized or planned, be it earlier or later. 
The most important difference is the lack of governmental support 
both in ideational and material terms. The fate of the Kossuth year 
was in fact very peculiar. While the government made a decision 
to commemorate the bicentennial of Lajos Kossuth, no funds was 
made available from the budget in order to finance the festivities 
and programs related to it. In fact, the announcement of the 
Kossuth-year was quite spectacular and entailed glorious 
festivities. The government did not simply declare the organization 
of a commemoration year, or the will to commemorate the 200th 
anniversary of Kossuth’s birth, but announced the establishment of 
a Memorial Committee, which would consist of several ministers 
and which would have as its chairmen jointly the Prime Minister, 
Viktor Orbán and the President of the Hungarian Republic, Ferenc 
Mádl. At the same time the historian, and the leader of the Institute 
for Military history, Róbert Hermann was appointed the secretary 
of the Committee, who would lead the operational tasks attached 
to the commemoration year.17 However, the commemoration year 
was not mentioned in the budget for 2001–2002 which made the 
implementation of the great plans practically impossible. This was 
                                                 
17 The publicly available information concerning the Kossuth-year is 
extremely scarce. My description of the events relies heavily on the article 
by Endre Babus: “Kossuth (mostoha)apánk” (the title revokes a special 
element of the popular Kossuth-cult, namely that he was referred to as 
“father”, while making a verbal joke out of it using the term “stepfather”, 
which carries the connotation of “badly treated” in Hungarian). It was 
originally published in the economic weekly Heti Világgazdaság in August 
2002, and is accessible on the Internet as http://www.mult-
kor.hu/cikk.php?article=5285. The article is to a large extent based on 
interview(s) with Róbert Hermann.  
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not the only peculiarity. The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), 
an opposition party, which tended to identify itself with 
Hungarian liberalism, declared a commemoration year of its own, 
referring to the fact that “no sign of willingness to commemorate 
Kossuth in a worthy way could be traced on the side of the 
government.”18 It is actually even difficult to follow how ‘official’ 
and ‘alternative’ versions of the commemoration year existed 
together, especially, since SZDSZ became a coalition member after 
the elections held in the middle of the Kossuth year, and the 
separation of Kossuth-years was not maintained.  
While the Deák year had a clear political message, 19  and 
Széchenyi acquired a central role in the message of the previous 
government’s election campaign, Kossuth did not seem to arouse 
similar interest. At the same time, Széchenyi’s semi-official cult 
seems to have brought his one and a half century old quarrel with 
Kossuth again to the fore. During the 1830’s and 1840’s Széchenyi 
increasingly felt that Kossuth’s struggle against the barriers of 
cenzorship and his aspirations to make new social groups 
interested in the politics of the liberal opposition endangered his 
own achievements in the modernisation of the country. This 
anxiety led to a public attack on Kossuth’s style of politics, 
accusing him of irresponsibility and instigation of revolt. The 
above mentioned movie on Széchenyi’s life presented Kossuth 
                                                 
18  http://kossuth.szdsz.hu/. SZDSZ made a strong opening move when 
Árpád Göncz, the popular former President, was announced to be the 
patron of the initiative. 
19 The central achievement of Deák’s career was the Hungarian-Austrian 
Compromise which could be interpreted as ‘reconciliation’ between the 
Emperor and his nation. At the same time, one of the central messages of 
the government was the aspiration to achieve a settlement in the country 
after very bitter battles of political campaign, pointing to an emphasis on 
consensual politics. Also a connection between the Compromise and the 
approaching EU-accession was established to utilize Deák’s 
commemoration for the present. On the political aspects of the Deák-
commemoration, see Pajkossy, “Deák-emlékév”, 144; Endre Babus, 
“Finisben a Deák-emlékév”. Heti Világgazdaság 42/2003, 101-103. 
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according to this image. Babus wrote half-seriously that the film, 
which had gained unprecedented governmental support, made an 
impact on the governments’, or actually the Prime Mininster’s 
image of Kossuth in that it influenced the financial support of the 
Kossuth commemoration year.20 
In terms of material support, while the millennial festivities 
were supported with a total of two hundred and fifty million 
Euros, 21  the Széchenyi film with another seven million, the 
Kossuth year got the moderate sum of 1 200 000. In practice, 
somewhat more than half of the sum proved to be available. The 
new government made additional funds available at the last 
moment in order to make the year-ending festivals and 
celebrations possible the planned way. However, several 
momentous schemes had to be canceled because of the lack of 
funding: a Kossuth-exhibition in the Risorgimento Museum in 
Rome and a statue in London. No monuments could be funded 
inside Hungary either, while the Millennial year’s budget financed 
four hundred statues and monuments. The financial support of the 
Deák year was similar to the Kossuth year in order of magnitude. 
The whole budget of the Deák year was slightly less than one 
million Euros but the actual governmental spending was some 
15% more. Most of the money went to renovations and advertising 
costs, while one hundred thousand Euros were allotted to the 
support of different publications and conferences. The sum in the 
case of the Kossuth year was one hundred and fifty thousand, 
which is clearly higher but comparable.22 
At the beginning of the article a claim concerning the 
significance of Kossuth was made. It can be argued for in several 
ways. Kossuth’s cult is possibly the best known example of cults of 
historical figures in Hungary. It has been strongly supported by 
                                                 
20 Cf. footnote 17. 
21 The figure (calculated at a 250 forint rate) contains all costs including the 
yearly costs of the renovation of the Hungarian royal residences in 
Visegrád etc. 
22 Cf. the articles by Pajkossy, Gerő and Babus. 
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politicians during the last 150 years23, and during this period a 
genuine grass-root Kossuth-cult also used to be a vivid 
phenomenon.24 The number of Kossuth monuments is very high in 
the country, and according to several accounts, Kossuth has more 
public monuments than all other Hungarian historical figures put 
together. Most probably every single town and village has a street 
or square named after him, and one can find fourteen of them in 
Budapest even now, after some of them had been abolished for the 
sake of coherence of street names. According to an official 
announcement, with the first Hungarian King, István, Kossuth was 
the most popular and widely known figure of Hungarian history, 
and he was the only one of the great figures of nineteenth century 
Hungary who had become a part of the folklore. He was also one 
of the most known Hungarians on earth since he had a monument 
both in the Capitolium and in New York.25  
 
 
                                                 
23 András Gerő, “A Kossuth-kultusz”. Mozgó Világ 2003/4. Gerő presents 
Kossuth as a sacral figure of the secular religion, i.e. nationalism. 
Kossuth’s name and image have been used by very different political 
groups and in extremely divergent ideological contexts. It all started with 
Independence Party nationalists, and democrats when Kossuth was still 
alive and did not end with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. Horthy’s Hungary, the system which defined itself as 
‘counter-revolutionary, made March 15th, the day of the 1848 revolution, 
a national holiday and erected Kossuth’s statue in front of the House of 
Parliament. However, Kossuth’s cult took also an anti-Fascist dimension 
in the 1940s. Paradoxically, Kossuth also ‘achieved’ a central position in 
the communist hall of fame. 
24 One of the bicentenary publications contains an article on Kossuth as the 
hero of folk songs: Lujza Tari, “Kossuth Lajos, a népdalok hőse”. In: 
Kossuth Lajos 1802-1894. Kossuth Lajos és kortársai. Kossuth, Budapest, 2002, 
131-145. 
25 Cf. http://kossuth.szdsz.hu/ 
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This also means that the literature on Kossuth’s life, his ideas and 
his cult is extremely voluminous.26 The list of historians who wrote 
about him includes almost all the great names of Hungarian 
historiography – excluding medievalists and sorts – from Gyula 
Szekfű to Elemér Mályusz and Domokos Kosáry, just to mention a 
few. Besides the fact that his described popularity generated a 
continuous interest and flow of publications, the various 
anniversaries of not just his birth and death, but of the particular 
events and historical epochs he has been associated with, like the 
“revolution and war of independence of 1848/49”, also meant 
certain peaks in the production of Kossuth-literature. A recent list of 
the Kossuth-literature published between 1992–2006 contains more 
than six hundred entries, most of which were published before 
2002.27 Contrasted with this background, surprisingly enough, at the 
moment of the announcement of the Kossuth-year, virtually no 
scholarly Kossuth-biography existed. 
In his essay on the results of historiography of the Deák-year, 
Gábor Pajkossy concluded that “the commemoration year, together 
with the funds available in the form of governmental and municipal 
support, inspired two- or three dozens of researchers to deepen or 
summarize their own research on Deák’s life, or, linking with the 
advantages the Deák year offered, to utilize their expertise and 
interest”.28 Pajkossy underlined the fact that the commemoration 
                                                 
26 Not totally independently from the Kossuth-year, a group of researchers 
collected a volume on the different Kossuth-images from the history of 
Hungarian historiography: Zoltán Iván Dénes (Ed.), A bűnbaktól a realista 
lényeglátóig. A magyar politikai és tudománmyos diskurzusok Kossuth-képei 
1849-2002. Argumentum, Budapest, 2004. The book seems the most 
illuminating to read together with its critique, especially the rich essay by 
Ambrus Miskolczy, “A Kossuth-ábrázolás technikái. Szubjektív 
historiográfiai széljegyzetek A bűnbaktól a realista lényeglátóig című 
gyűjteményes munka kapcsán”. Korall 2005/November, pp. 124-160. 
27 Róbert Hermann, “Az 1992-2006 között megjelent Kossuth-irodalom 
válogatott bibliográfiája”. In: Róbert Hermann (Ed.), Kossuth Lajos, “a 
magyarok Mózese”. Osiris, Budapest, 2006, 252-294. 
28  Pajkossy, “Deák-emlékév”, 157. 
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year did not generate change in the paradigm or new approaches. 
However, three historians published some sort of political 
biography about Ferenc Deák, and several compilations of his work 
appeared including also a cd-rom with almost all his writings. 
The case was not radically different with the Kossuth year. As 
the focus here is on the Kossuth year as a state- or government-
funded case of political commemoration, the article deals with 
those events and publications that were actually funded officially 
by the commemoration year’s organization.29 However, even some 
significant publications did not belong to this group but still 
deserve mention. The most notable is probably the book by 
György Szabad, which is especially important for two reasons. 
Szabad has been considered at least one of the leading experts of 
Kossuth’s life, and he was almost considered at the heavily 
historicizing times of the system change as the reincarnation of 
Kossuth. Additionally, his book appears to be the most 
ideologically oriented, with a seeming intention to present Kossuth 
as a mythical figure (the one who has the answers), which is 
accentuated by its title: Kossuth’s Directions.30 
                                                 
29 There is no publicly accessible information available about the Kossuth-
year. The Secretary, however, kindly gave a list of subsidized 
publications and events to the author of this article. 
30 György Szabad, Kossuth irányadása (Válasz, 2002: Budapest). The 
translation of the word, which Szabad uses here, is not an easy task; even 
the interpretation of the original might be problematic. However, it seems 
quite clear that it was meant to say that Kossuth was exemplary for the 
present. Szabad has published on Kossuth extensively, but it is exactly 
the reconstruction of Kossuth's political work through his ideas and texts 
that seems central. One of Szabad's most influential works is Kossuth 
politikai pályája ismert és ismeretlen megnyilatkozásai tükrében (Budapest, 
1977), ie., Kossuth’s political career in the mirror of his known and 
unknown utterances. He also published a compilation of Kossuth’s texts 
in 1994 (the one hundredth anniversary of Kossuth’s death) under the 
title Kossuth Lajos üzenetei, that is, Kossuth’s messages. Ferenc Kulin also 
noticed the author’s intention to present Kossuth’s ideas as being 
“guiding” for the present day reader in everyday politics: Ferenc 
Kulin, ’Az időszerű Kossuth. Gondolatok Szabad György könyvéről’. In: 
Magyar Szemle, 2002/October. 
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There were 78 different publications and events which gained 
financial support from the commemoration year organization. The 
organs which applied successfully for funding were typically 
organizations of public memory, like museums and archives or 
professional publishing houses. The former group consists of 
publicly (state or municipal) funded agencies, while in the latter 
case the commemoration year supported profit-oriented activity. 
The more numerous of the two is the group of public institutions 
including universities. Other publicly funded bodies and 
organizations like municipalities and different types of 
foundations make up another third of the whole; however, these 
are not easily discernible from the first group. 31  The list also 
includes several surprises in this respect, like the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and a local TV-channel. Another interesting feature 
is the remarkable presence of extra-Hungarian applicants 
representing various countries and various purposes. Looking at 
the various types of publications and events the commemoration 
year funded, two basic aims seem to have guided the decision-
makers. One was the intention to offer a helping hand for non-
governmental attempts to popularize Kossuth locally, while the 
other might have been to complement the budget-based subsidy of 
scientific publications as far as it has to do with Kossuth’s life or 
his contemporaries. However, based on the information available it 
is not clear what the agenda was in these cases. One might have 
the impression that neither political nor scientific goals were set. 
Most of the support went for three basic commemorative acts. 
There are eight conferences on the list together with eleven 
exhibitions, the rest being various forms of scholarly and 
popularizing publications from books to thematic issues of 
periodicals and journals including a cd-rom containing the already 
published works of Kossuth, not to forget a comic strip presenting 
Kossuth’s life on 24 pages. Somewhat surprisingly, some of the 
                                                 
31 The mentioned list of supported initiatives does not contain information 
concerning the amount of support the individual applicants gained 
through the commemoration year competition.  
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supported events and publications were not linked directly to the 
personality or life of Kossuth. These were, as a rule connected to 
the events of the ‘revolution and war of independence, which 
apparently was seen as the most important period of Kossuth’s life, 
or it might have been the other way around, i.e. the Kossuth year 
was perceived as the extension of the one hundred and fifty year 
anniversary of 1848–49. The list includes, but is not limited to a 
book on a single battle of the war,32 a book on the history of a 
diocese in 1848-49,33 and collected sources concerning a specific 
division of the army.34 
Some of the projects do not seem to have realized, i.e. there are 
neither signs of them in the database of the Hungarian National 
Library, nor on the world-wide-web. The most regrettable among 
these is surely a planned book on Kossuth’s life by three experts, 
László Csorba, Gábor Erdődy and Gábor Pajkossy.35 On the other 
hand a book concerning Kossuth's relations to freemasonry, which 
is successfully published, does not meet the standards of a 
scholarly publication.36 
Summarizing the results of making special funds available for 
the publication of literature on Kossuth, the most striking feature is 
probably the lack of a comprehensive scholarly biography. While 
                                                 
32 Tamás Csikány, Csata Komáromnál, 1849. július 2-án. Hadimúzeum 
Alapítvány, Budapest, 2003. 
33 Péter Zakar, “Hazám sorsa az én sorsom” az Esztergomi Érsekség 1848/49-ben. 
Belvedere Meridionale, Szeged, 2003. 
34 Az 1848-49-es I. magyar hadtest iratai. Heves Megyei Levéltár, Eger, 2002. 
35 The application was handed in by the Argumentum publishing house. 
The planned book divided the study of Kossuth’s life to three 
historians according to their strongest period. Erdődy, whose share 
was the shortest but dealt with the most intensive two years of 
Kossuth’s life – 1848–1849 – published his part separately: Kossuth 
Lajos a demokratikus polgári átalakulásért és a nemzeti önrendelkezés 
kivívásáért folytatott küzdelem vezéralakja. Magyar Mezőgazdasági Múzeum. 
Budapest, 2002. 
36 Zsuzsanna Ágnes Berényi, Kossuth és a szabadkőművesek. Argumentum, 
Budapest, 2002. 
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the Deák year produced a book which covered his whole life even 
if not especially extensively, the Kossuth year brought only partial 
accounts, which include the re-publication of Domokos Kosáry’s 
book on Kossuth’s youth,37 and a good deal of articles. A number 
of researchers contributed with several articles into conference 
publications and thematic issues of journals. The periodicals 
dedicated to the popularization of historical research published 
their own special issues. 38  Besides the several collections of 
conference papers, the thematic issue of the Századok,39 the journal 
of the Hungarian historical society, seems especially rich. Some 
thematically focused collections of articles, like those concentrating 
on the political ideas of Kossuth and their relation to issues like 
nationality and religion, brought some new aspects of Kossuth’s 
history to light.40  
One of the beautiful popular picture-books on Kossuth’s life 
deserves some attention as the only conscious attempt to influence 
the perception and image of Kossuth. Róbert Hermann, the 
secretary of the Kossuth Memorial Committee, worked very 
actively throughout the year presenting papers, writing prefaces 
and articles. He participated in one way or another in a good share 
of the publications of the commemoration year. He published his 
text on the extremely disputed relation between Kossuth and 
general Görgey at least three times. Of the two representative 
picture books, he was the author of one41 and wrote the preface to 
                                                 
37 Domokos Kosary, Kossuth Lajos a reformkorban. Osiris, Budapest, 2002. The 
late grand old man of Hungarian historiography accomplished 
something quite unusual by publishing his own book's second edition 
(almost) sixty years later. The book contains only minor corrections in 
comparison to the first edition published in 1943. 
38 História 2002/9-10; Rubicon 2002/8. 
39 Századok 2002/4. 
40 Kossuth és az egyházak by Botond Kertész (Ed.). Evangélikus Gyülekezeti 
Kiadványok I. Budapest, 2004; A nemzetiségi kérdés Kossuth és kortársai 
szemében. (Eds.) Kiss Gábor Ferenc és Zakar Péter. Belvedere Meridinale, 
Szeged, 2003. 
41 Róbert Hermann, Kossuth Lajos élete és kora. Pannonica, Budapest 2002. 
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the other together with the mentioned article on Görgey.42 The 
former, the more important one from our point of view, appears to 
be a conservative political biography going through the major 
stories related to Kossuth the politician. The author himself, 
however, while denying that he would attempt the de-heroization 
of Kossuth, explained that his intention was to present Kossuth, 
the person (or human being). In his preface, he also underlines that 
Kossuth’s life’s work is so extensive and that Kossuth created such 
an enormous amount of texts and gave such an amount of 
speeches that no lifetime could be long enough transform his 
contribution into a comprehensive biography.43 The question arises 
how on earth biographies of internationally remarkable figures 
could be written this proviso in mind. Hermann also stated that he 
did not intend to describe Kossuth in a radically different way 
from the traditional images, nor did he want to say anything new 
forcedly, at all costs (mindenáron)44. 
The result does not seem to match what Hermann wrote in his 
preface and on the cover of the book. One might conclude that the 
genre and the occasion, together with the attitudes of the author, 
determined the outcome to a great extent, and it is not quite clear 
that a ‘traditional image’ of Kossuth does really exist. Actually, 
even if one does not take into account the politically-ideologically 
motivated characterizations, it is exactly the complexity of his 
activities and character which allows a wide range of possible 
interpretations. However, at least the detailed description of 
Kossuth’s relation to Görgey, settling the long and heated dispute 
about the responsibility for the loss in 1849, seems ‘new’, at least 
                                                 
42 Kossuth Lajos 1802–1894. Kossuth Lajos és kortársai. (editor not mentioned). 
Kossuth, Budapest, 2002. The book is especially beautiful, illustrated by a 
remarkable set of paintings and an additional audio-cd with material 
related to Kossuth and his cult. The book consists of articles which 
describe Kossuth in relation to other remarkable figures of the nineteenth 
century, comrades and enemies. 
43 Kossuth Lajos élete és kora, 7. 
44  Ibid., 8. 
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for the wider public. Hermann produced an especially enjoyable 
description of the main events of nineteenth century Hungarian 
history and Kossuth's role in them. Funnily, while one cannot be 
quite convinced about the author’s intentions not to de-heroize 
Kossuth, the outcome appears to be an epic. The struggle for 
liberal reforms –the abolishment of the feudal barriers which 
prevented the unification of the Hungarian nation – and the war 
for independence are so heroic, and Kossuth’s role is so central in 
them that one cannot describe the former as a great, heroic drama 
without presenting the latter as almost supernatural.  
Hermann presents Kossuth in interaction and conflict with other 
key-figures, however, mostly following a favorable, or at least not 
negative, interpretation from Kossuth's point of view. The author, 
as a rule, does not reflect on his choices among the possible 
interpretations of the various details of Kossuth’s life, however, 
there are certain accusations, against which he feels it important to 
defend the hero. One of these was a possible accusation of Kossuth 
not being ‘genuine Hungarian’ or ‘Magyar’. At the beginning of 
the book, Hermann apparently refers to earlier debates concerning 
the origins of the Kossuth family. Here he points out that it could 
have been also of Slavic origin which explains also the etymology 
of its name which means buck in Slovak, but it is also very possible 
that the first Kossuth was “regarding his ethnicity Hungarian”, 
who adopted the name of the village he possessed.45  It is not 
necessarily easy to comprehend the meaning of ethnicity in a 
thirteenth century environment. The next sentence, in which we 
are guided further to understand the relevance of that information 
by laying down the fact that “Slavic, Polish or German origin did 
not influence the national self-consciousness developed in the 
nineteenth century”, does not make it clearer either. The author 
probably makes an attempt to defend the nineteenth century 
concept of the Hungarian nation as a political entity against racism 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 9.  
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but fails to impose the modernist understanding of nationalism on 
the whole story.  
Although Kossuth was to be presented as ‘human being’, the 
book does not tell much e.g. about his family-relations. Hermann 
makes statements occasionally about the supposed negative sides 
of Kossuth’s character. Taking an example from the rare occasions 
when Kossuth’s personal life is mentioned telling about the close 
relations of Kossuth with the wife of a Major which developed 
during the months of internment, the author describes Kossuth as 
a person who happily got rid of the control of his wife. However, 
the contemporary accusation that Kossuth would have been led 
and governed by his strong-willed wife was something he feels 
important to deny explicitly.46 Hermann’s approach is ambiguous, 
however, because while he is ready to ‘de-heroize’ the person, he is 
not ready for the ‘de-heroization’ of the great deeds of Hungarians 
during the heroic times of the nineteenth century. His style of 
describing the historical events is so high that it raises the central 
figure of the story with it. It must be difficult to write a 
representative biography, an act of commemoration itself, 
attempting at a less heroic presentation of the hero. 
The Kossuth commemoration year, thus, was not typical in the 
series of commemoration years in post-Socialist Hungary for two 
reasons. It was the first one in the series of commemoration years, 
which focused on a single historical figure, but it was the only one, 
which suffered from the lack of financial support. At the same time 
one must remember that of all possible historical figures Kossuth 
generated the widest interest among historians, and his popular 
image rested on the strongest tradition of historical cults. The main 
question of this article was, whether and how this commemoration 
year affected historiography, the output of the history profession, 
and how this was related to the result of the Deák-year. Despite the 
dissimilarities in terms of political support and financial 
background, the outcome appears to be quite similar. There was no 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 23. 
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discernible attempt to redraw Kossuth’s image, and no biography 
exploiting new research or covering his whole life was published. 
On the whole, however, despite the lack of a comprehensive 
biography, the Kossuth year produced several important 
publications, and it seems that it has enriched the research on 
Kossuth as well as has generated a wide range of activities related 
to him. At the same time, much of the subsidies went to re-
publishing earlier research and overlapping publications which 
together with the high proportion of projects that served only 
representative purposes raise questions concerning the 
purposefulness of such commemoration seen solely from the point 
of view of historiography. However, one should mention that the 
uncertainty concerning the availability of funds might have 
affected the results to a great extent. The Kossuth-year can also be 
interpreted as the first step to a direction which weakens the 
political aspects of commemoration. Time will show, whether this 
is only a temporary development, or a change in Hungarian 
political culture. 
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“Do we know what we want to forget or are we simply 
forgetting? Do we now what we want to remember or are 
we remembering only what others want us to remember?” 
Tjebbe van Tijen: Ars Obliviendi 
 
Introduction 
 
The observation and analyzing of a society’s mechanism of power is a 
difficult task, perhaps because we can fall into the trap of prosopopeia, 
i.e. we “give a face”1 to something, and so the grammatical subject of 
the examination (the power) imperceptibly extends to the deficient 
place of meanings that are implied there. This way the problem either 
becomes one that “we won’t name” the subject to which we give a 
face, and so we do not oblige to the conditions of concretism or 
almost in a paranoid way we make others see an actor, an agent 
behind the different movements and events of society. This double 
trap is almost impossible to avoid since the main element of the 
semantic domain of the power is indeed the initiation, the activity 
(moreover, it can be aggression) which points to the ‘giving a face’. 
This force of impersonation can make it difficult to define where, how 
and with what kind of means we can start the examination of the 
power mechanism. This power characterizes a given society in its 
base, dispersion and intensity of which is per definitionem always 
uneven. Consequently, it always reproduces the conceptual or legal 
equality that can never be realized.  
                                                 
1  See Cynthia Chase, Giving a Face to a Name = Decomposing Figures. Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, 82-113. 
ORSOLYA RÁKAI 
 84
The developing of identity happens in a space inside the society 
through which the power passes. Moreover, identity is often the 
result or the purpose of a power struggle. For the examination of the 
microdynamics of power and identity is worthwhile to evoke the 
definition of hegemony of the critical culture research borrowed 
from Antonio Gramsci as “it serves to discuss such ruling relations 
that don’t look like rulings: they are based not on the constraining of 
the oppressed (or dependants), but on their consent.”2 Basically the 
cult in this interpretation is nothing else but one of the most 
effective tools of developing and maintaining hegemony. 
It is generally believed that the main task of the ritual social 
practice named cult is to form, strengthen and sustain collective 
identity. This is on the whole right: there is a close connection of 
many aspects between cult, canon and collective identity and this 
connection plays a great part in wielding power as hegemony. 
Cults connected to the notion of nation are very significant from 
this point of view, for they can make functioning of hegemony 
almost smooth, and make the differences inside society or between 
minorities defined on a basis (e.g. ethnic minority, religion or 
gender) which is invisible, inapprehendable and incommunicable. 
Concomitantly, there are some forms of cult, especially after the 
introduction of internet and net-forums, which contribute to 
drawing of the pictures of personal identity and to separating these 
from the ‘crowd’ (in smaller groups). The aim of these apolitical 
forum-communities is not to shape and sustain a collective identity 
but they have only their subject of cult and their relation to it in 
common. This phenomenon reminds us of a paradox of the 
individual born in the consumer society who is only one of 
countless copies. The individual is always the target of 
advertisements and a person's individuality or uniqueness remains 
illusory. This tells of the outstanding role of mass media in the 
twentieth century history of collective identity-forming. 
                                                 
2  Simon During, The Cultural Studies Reader. Routledge, London and New 
York, 1993, 1-25. 
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The cult of the Franz Joseph’s wife, Queen Elizabeth of the Dual 
Monarchy, illustrates this transformation and the unbelievable 
adaptive capacity of cult. The cult of Elizabeth changed from a rite 
serving Hungarian collective identity (cf. other patriarchal female-
stereotypes) into a cult of ‘modern woman’ who seeks 
independence and tries to regain command over her own body. 
Furthermore, her cult continuously served as an advertisement to 
sell different ideas, political programs or ideologies. But these 
ideologies are qualified to form the individual identity coming into 
existence in the course of commercialization. 
 
The Mirrors Of Hungarian Virtue 
 
The development of the cult of Queen Elizabeth began from two 
directions: from the Habsburg and from the Hungarian. On the 
Hungarian side it began as a political image to arouse interest, and 
the Court in Vienna reacted to it because it recognized in it a 
perfect tool for strengthening their sovereignty. Nothing proves it 
better that the cult is all about interpretation than this duality – 
neither of the parties had interest in the ‘reality’ – what Elisbeth 
really was – and both parties created an icon according to their 
own needs. The image of the ‘Queen of the Hungarians’ was useful 
for both, though for different reasons. The Hungarians expected 
the reorganizing of the power relations within the Austro-
Hungarian Empire while the Court believed that it strenghtened 
the status quo. This is how Kálmán Mikszáth summoned it:  
 
That ardent hope heated the simpletons who behold that the long-awaited 
days of [glory to] Hungary have thus arrived and the centre of power of the 
Empire was going to shift to Hungary. That was the prelude to everything. 
And because it seemed plausible that Franz Joseph made Hungary great and 
lovable. […] The love, which first belonged only to our Royal Lady grew so 
large that it covered the King itself and his family too.3  
 
                                                 
3  Kálmán Mikszáth, “Cseh földön a király”. In: Kálmán Mikszáth, Cikkek és 
karcolatok. Akadémiai, Budapest, 1960, vol. IX, 93-94. 
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The scholars of the Elizabeth cult emphasize that the Queen's figure 
was integrated to the particular image gallery of Hungarian 
nationalism. 
First, following the logic of representation of the Hungarian 
nobility's concept of the nation, Elizabeth was made the 
personification of Hungary. This becomes clear in the political 
scandals which erupted in connection with her funeral. The 
newspapers of the time stated that originally only the sign of the 
Empress of Austria was placed on the Queen's catafalque, and that 
the delegation of the Hungarian Parliament did not have a suitable 
place to watch, and that for the sake of the procession they were 
pushed back.4 Secondly, and this is the most interesting part, the icon 
of Elizabeth gave a perfect medium to define and strengthen the 
particular Hungarian national characteristics. One of the articles 
about the funeral points out the following: 
  
In Vienna the mourning was not as general as in Budapest where everyone 
practised the right to mourn, and the wealthy and the poor participated 
equally. The Hungarian, not only in his love, but also in his sorrow is honest, 
enthusiastic and devoted. Nobody loved her as much as we did and nobody 
mourned her as much as we did.5  
 
The queen, according to the logic of the cult perfectly became 
one with the Hungarian national ambitions:  
 
[...] with the ideal of the Hungarian Queen, after a long period she was the 
first one who learned, loved and used our national language with love. She 
understood the grievances and sufferings of the nation which was devoted to 
its rights to freedom and history, the fight for its national independence,  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4  See Eszter Virág Vér, “Erzsébet királyné magyarországi kultusza 
emlékezethelyei tükrében 1898-1914 között”. Budapest Negyed, vol. XIV. 
nos. 2-3 (2006). 
5  Vasárnapi Ujság, no. 25. September 1898, 667. 
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understood our rightful efforts, became one with our aspirations and she was 
the inspired interpreter and benefactor of all these things with her anointed 
husband.6 
 
This was written in the Parliamentary proposition to enact a law 
to the memory of Queen Elizabeth. And it continued stating why 
she loved Hungarians and Hungary: “Here she finally found what 
she was searching for in the Court in vain: freedom, honesty, life 
without acting. She found herself […]”. The rest of the quotation 
points out a distinct quality in the collective national identity: 
“Here she could be what she was, not an Empress, not a superior 
person, but only a woman”.7 A particular factor in the nineteenth 
century Hungarian nationalism was this strange ressentiment 
which attached emotional charge to the struggle for independence. 
Namely, that the ‘nation which was born to rule’ groaned under 
the yoke of a foreign ruler who was not elected, and who did not 
oblige to the general laws, but forced his own laws on the nation. 
This ressentiment have been the reason why already from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century the determining man/woman 
-dualism emerged. That is why ‘manliness’ has become 
emphasized in everything that is in connection with Hungarian 
essence, Hungarian culture, language, morality and tradition, and 
that is why everything that reveals ‘soft’ womanliness was 
pungently condemned as dangerous and stigmatized as breathing 
the ‘death of the nation’.  
For the collective national identity Queen Elizabeth was useful 
mainly as an oxymoron, by being a woman who practically 
invalidated the ruler: 
 
 
                                                 
6  Az igazságügyi bizottság jelentése Erzsébet királyné emlékének 
törvénybeiktatásáról szóló törvényjavaslathoz (Report of the judicial 
committee for enacting the law about the memory of Queen Elizabeth). In: 
Képviselőházi irományok 1896-190, vol. 18, no. 464, 220. 
7  Pál Gerhard Zeidler, Erzsébet királyné mártíromsága. Pantheon, Budapest, 
[1924]. p. 18. 
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In her we do not see the zealous consort of a reigning princess who untangles 
the intrigues of the court, [...] but the true wife and mother who does not 
want to influence her husband and her children, rather she worries about 
them, she wants to dispel the clouds from above them. She was not lead by 
diplomatic cunning when she helped the policy of rapprochement between 
the King and the Hungarian nation, she did not want any one to feel her 
power or to organize a party to reach her own goals. She had no private 
motives. She only realized that the oppressed Hungary could not wear her 
chains calmly and that how much uneasiness it causes to her princely 
husband, how strongly it disables the King to function and how much pain 
his soul suffers because of it; so he realized that the love of a woman can play 
a part in solving this problem too [...] In her we have found that ideal which 
Hungarian thinking created about a good woman and that is why every 
Hungarian heart and love have attracted to her because she embodied the 
ideal of every one.8 
 
In order to reach her goals with the manly Hungarians she used 
the ‘female power’:  
 
Every one looked at her with silent amasement, in a happy daze. Then she 
said:-I love you my nation because you suffer. I love my husband and I want 
you to love him too. Forget what is impossible to forget for my sake. Give me 
your hand, here is his. Such thing cannot be said by a statesman only a 
woman can do that. And miracle happened. King and nation became one 
[...]9 
 
Well, only a woman, called forth by Gyula Krúdy, knew how to 
handle the Hungarians: 
 
There wasn’t one man in Hungary who wouldn’t give an arm for Elizabeth. 
Our men who respect woman and love horses wait for their new queen with 
hats in hand. Thank God, a pretty young woman shall sit on the throne 
whom we can fall in love with again, who we can indulge and we hope she’ll 
like Buda and with womanly heart she’ll read her husband and children the 
memoirs of those Habsburgs who became unfortunate when they turned 
their backs to us after the coronation [...]10 
                                                 
8 Ferenc Herczeg, “Temetés után”. Uj Idők (25 September, 1898), 267. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Gyula Krúdy, “Egy királyné albumába”. In: Gyula Krúdy, Erzsébet királyné. 
Palatinus, Budapest, 1998, 152. 
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And in another occasion: “in the idea of a respectful nation there 
is no better notion than a young and lovable queen. A manly 
country more heartily bends its stiff knees before a young woman 
than the legs of old Emperors”. 
 
‘Yesterday I Tried That Nettle Recipe She Wrote In The Book’ 
 
Elizabeth's biographers who have attempted historical 
interpretation of her cult emphasize that the motives of the Queen 
were often distanced from the role that was attributed to her, and 
many times she had no connection with it. Eszter Virág Vér states 
that in the eyes of the Austrian public Elizabeth: “Lives as one of 
the first representatives of the modern female ideal: an image is 
outlined of a woman who is searching herself, who emphasizes her 
sovereignty, who made an effort to vindicate her liberalism and 
wished for her freedom in every circumstance”.11 We must add 
here that this can largely be attributed to her extremely popular 
Austrian biographer Brigitte Hamann. Remarkably, this image 
appears also in the Hungarian cult around the turn of the 
twentieth century. The yearning for freedom will be the Queen’s 
‘most Hungarian’ quality, and yet at the same time, freedom is the 
least characteristic of the female figure in the Hungarian cult since 
it embodies the patriarchal ideal which does not carry with it 
independent will or independent desire, and has no independent 
thoughts either. 
The woman who emphasizes ‘the search and sovereignty of 
herself’ is also a stereotype: it resembles the literary manifestations 
of early feminism which can be taken further and developed also 
as examples of the female individual. Hamann states that the body 
cult of Elizabeth organically fitted her strategy she developed 
towards the outside world. Her diets and rituals to maintain her 
beauty seemed extremely unusual in that period and her sport 
activities were considered unwomanly and did not serve the 
                                                 
11  Ibid. 
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connection with the outside world but separation from it since she 
very rarely appeared before the public even in her youth. She 
rather wanted to secure and demonstrate the sovereign rule over 
her own body. In those times and taking no account her situation 
Elizabeth's narcissism was her only way to attain her individuality. 
This is what secures the characteristic foundation of today’s 
Elizabeth – or Sisi, as she is called nowadays – cult: many fans of 
her take up the subject of anorexia as psychiatric diagnosis on the 
net12 which is the most important way to demonstrate the exclusive 
and complete rule over one’s own body as the final ‘property’ or as 
the final shelter of individuality. 
The cult manifesting itself on fan forums reveal mania for 
collecting (books, pictures, souvenirs, etc.) and imitation as 
important aspects in it. One participant of a fan forum explains: 
“You think it's possible to have a fifty cm waist without corset or 
something like that. I’d love to achieve a waist like that or almost 
like that because then the size of my body would be totally similar 
to Sisi’s. I’m fighting for it now, I don’t see the end of it yet, but I 
will still write about it”. Another fan on the same forum writes 
about her trip to Corfu (where the main attraction was the palace 
of Elizabeth) : “What I also liked very much was the Kaizer Bridge! 
That’s the bridge where the Miramare reached the port, and Sisi 
walked in on it. It was great to walk on those stones her foot 
touched too:)”. When Elizabeth’s ‘beauty recipes’ were published 
in a book, they were tried by several fans: “Lately I washed my 
hair with nettle, yesterday I tried the nettle recipe she wrote in the 
book [...] it’s totally different, yet its effect is pretty close to the 
simple nettle + distilled water method [..]”. 
Although the members of the forums established a strong 
communal feeling and often meet, they do not become a collective 
by frequently participating in the cult: their collective is the 
‘collective’ of those who by their knowledge of the subject and 
                                                 
12  The exact places of the forums and quotes cannot be given because of the 
personal rights of the quoted persons. 
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their emotional relation separate themselves from the masses of the 
inexperienced. This duality can be observed at several thematic 
Internet forum. The last quotation is a very good example of how 
controlled this modern cult is since the marketing strategies for the 
selective memory fragments and cult elements which became 
commodities can be important initiatives in shaping the cult. 
However, it seems that it is not possible to develop modern cults in 
a more direct way then this. The reason might be that the memory 
structure of ruling, ‘classic’ cults which strengthens and shapes the 
collective identity is a collective memory secured from above with 
the help of institutions. And yet, the cults that function on the 
forums are rather a cultural memory13 which ensures the possibility 
of criticism. Thus they actualize and monopolize memory for the 
sake of establishing individual identity. This kind of individual 
dispossession might be able to create a possibility to challenge 
hegemony. 
                                                 
13  Aleida Assmann, ‘Von individuellen zu kollektiven Konstruktionen von 
Vergangenheit’. www.univie.ac.at/zeitgeschichte/veranstaltungen/a-05-
06-3.rtf 
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Miklós Horthy, Regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944, has been a 
subject of heated debates ever since he entered the 
counterrevolutionary government in Szeged in 1919, and started 
organizing the National Army as part of the efforts to overthrow 
the Hungarian Soviet Republic. As a direct reaction to his activities, 
the early 1920s saw three distinct images of Horthy emerge: that of 
the savior of the country, that of the murderer with blood on his 
hand, and that of the traitor of the throne who stripped the 
Habsburgs of their title and the right to the Hungarian crown. 
Horthy’s image as a savior was largely received in groups of the 
propertied classes and certain elite groups, the strata of society 
who saw their assets nationalized during the Soviet Republic. In 
addition, he also had a fair number of supporters from the lower 
middle classes, notably citizens who had come into conflict – for 
one reason or another – with the Communist rule. For them, the 
propaganda materials which interpreted the Soviet of 1919 as a 
national catastrophe equal to the defeat of the medieval Hungarian 
kingdom to the Mongols in 1241 and by Ottoman arms in 1526 
seemed real and acceptable. Horthy himself was likened to the 
greatest figures of Hungarian history, notably to Árpád, who led 
the conquest of the Carpathian basin, and to Saint Stephen, 
founder of the medieval Christian kingdom of Hungary, and Béla 
IV, re-builder of the country after the Mongol invasion. Further 
parallels included János and Mátyás Hunyadi, who distinguished 
themselves in the Ottoman wars, and leaders of anti-Habsburg 
independence movements such as Ferenc Rákóczi II and Lajos 
Kossuth. There can be little doubt that Horthy himself sought to 
cement such an image of the savior about himself. He depicted 
himself as a leader above parties and taking his inspiration from 
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the national idea and Christian morality, most famously so in his 
speech delivered on 16 November 1919, during his entry to the 
capital. This image was also conveyed by a series of printed 
matters, most famously by the poster which showed strong arms 
holding the pilot wheel of a ship over a stormy red-colored sea. 
(Picture 1.) In a green field with bold white print the poster said 
merely one word, Horthy, with an exclamation mark added for 
emphasis.1 
 Picture 1: Horthy steering the wheel in storms. 
 
                                                 
1  Jenő Pilch, Horthy Miklós. Athenaeum, Budapest, 1928, 241-286, 358-392. 
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Parallel to the conscious image-building around Horthy, images 
promoted by his opposition, both democratic-progressive and 
communist crystallized around the theme of the savage murderer. 
This pattern of representation was rooted in the memory of the 
1919–1920 reprisals which targeted both revolutionaries and the 
not implicated Jewish citizens. The so called White Terror cost the 
lives of hundreds and hundreds of people, even moderate 
estimates estimate over 1000 victims (no document has ever been 
Picture 2: White terror in Hungary. 
found that showed Horthy as having issued a direct order to 
commit the atrocities, especially executions). Yet it could not be 
doubted that he had been aware of the murders and showed a 
great degree of leniency towards the perpetrators, officers of his 
very own National Army. It was therefore hardly surprising that 
political opponents capitalized on his involvement in the criminal 
acts of the counterrevolutionary period, even if the exact measure 
of his personal responsibility for these crimes was not clear. 
This veritably counter-cult, constructed in opposition to the cult 
of the nation’s savior, was first promoted by left-wing Budapest 
dailies. Articles titled ‘The horrible crimes of the Horthy-boys’, 
‘The prison-guard of the white terrorists of Siófok’, ‘The 
persecution of Jews in Transdanubia’, ‘Prison Hell’ and ‘The 
Bloodbath of Kecskemét’ barely required the reader to read the 
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actual article in order to reckon the message of the author. Space 
for such criticism, however, became very narrow after Horthy’s 
election to the office of Regent in March 1920. (Picture 3.) 
Following this, the counter-cult lived on primarily in periodicals 
and memoirs published abroad by exiled leaders of the 1918-1919  
Picture 3: Regent with his papers. 
revolutions. According to Social Democrat and one-time people’s 
commissar for war, Vilmos Böhm the rampage of Horthy’s war-
bands will rank among the darkest pages in Hungarian history 
forever. The number of murdered people reached hundreds as 
there had been “shooting unarmed citizens, hangings, castrations, 
copping off limbs, poking out eyeballs, rape, child murder” – these 
were the military actions of the ‘glorious’ Transdanubian 
campaign. 
In a reversal of the received pro-Horthy imagery, Böhm 
summed up the activities of the National Army neither as the 
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saving of the country, nor as the new founding of the realm, but as 
a second Ottoman invasion.2 
Oszkár Jászi, one-time Minister of Mihály Károlyi’s October 
government also concentrated his criticism of Horthy and his 
regime on the war crimes committed by his troops. The 
dictatorship of Horthy, he argued, may have raised Christianity to 
state doctrine, but Hungarian public life has nevertheless been 
“symbolized by the gallows and torture” since his rise to power.3 
Elite groups loyal to the Habsburgs, including sections of 
aristocratic and bourgeois upper classes, the Catholic high clergy 
and some officer groups, as well as segments of the middle classes, 
held a similarly negative image of Horthy – although for reasons 
quite different. Their dismay sprang from Horthy’s checking of 
Charles’s return attempts in 1921, followed by the formal 
dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty on 6 November. When 
Horthy had been elected governor or regent, these pro-Habsburg 
groups viewed the situation as a temporary one, to be replaced by 
the ‘legal’ rule of the crowned king upon his expected return. Once 
the treaty of Trianon had been signed on June 4th, and then 
subsequently ratified in November 1920, many felt that the time 
for restoration had come. In the two return attempts that followed, 
Horthy did in fact declare Charles IV to be the legitimate ruler of 
Hungary. At the same time, however, he insisted that the 
international environment did not permit an immediate restoration. 
In March 1921, he used merely words to convince Charles to leave 
the country but in October he ordered armed force to evict the king 
from the country. Following the failure of Charles’s second return 
attempt, Horthy also conceded to the dethronement act and to the 
short-term imprisonment of a few leading royalists. 
The Regent’s behavior in 1921 was never forgiven by the royalist 
camp. In such circles, he was routinely referred to as an upstart and 
a worthless man whose word meant nothing. Socially this entailed 
that some sections of the traditional elite sought to evade contact 
                                                 
2  Vilmos Böhm, Két forradalom tüzében. Verlag für Kulturpolitik, München, 
1923, 477-479. 
3  Oszkár Jászi, Magyar kálvária – magyar föltámadás. Magyar Hírlap Könyvek, 
Budapest, 1989, 152-161. 
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with Horthy. They found numerous ways to express their contempt 
for him and their devotion to Charles, his wife and, after the king’s 
death in 1922, to his son Otto. These groups, however, lacked the 
means to launch a propaganda campaign against the Regent. So, 
their influence on public opinion decreased year by year. 
Picture 4: Horthy with regalia. 
As we have shown, in the early 1920s it was hard to predict 
which of the competing images of Horthy would emerge dominant. 
Once the consolidation of the new regime got underway after 1921, 
this issue became settled in a few years. The negative image 
shaped by the leftists and the progressives, as well as that of the 
royalists did persist, but rapidly lost their relevance for the greater 
part of society. The strong military man, who had saved the 
country was the image being projected by the whole of the state 
apparatus and gained increasing acceptance. (Picture 4.) This was 
especially true for the younger age groups who had little in terms 
of personal experiences of the past eras and relied largely on 
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information gained during their schooling. Their vision of the 
events of 1919–1921 was based mostly on the official interpretation. 
The peak of Horthy’s cult, however, came much later, during 
the years 1938–1943. In these six years, according to the catalogue 
of the Hungarian National Library, 28 Hungarian and foreign-
language volumes dedicated to Horthy appeared in print.4 This is 
especially significant in light of the output of the preceding 18 
years: from 1920 to 1937 only 17 such books had been published. 
The series of books of the late 1930s was opened by the biography 
of the journalist Baroness Lily Doblhoff. The 300 pages long 
biography, which was timed to coincide with the Regent’s 70th 
birthday, was the first one to provide a detailed account of 
Horthy’s family and his childhood years, his service in the Austro-
Hungarian navy and at court, as well as of the years of the World 
War and the events that followed. Doblhoff did address the alleged 
“overreactions” of the National Army in her book, but merely 
stated that “a civil war was underway in the country, and these 
private acts of vengeance are inseparable from civil wars.” Also, 
she intimated that random acts of violence were necessary to 
reestablish order and rule of law. As far as the other chief 
accusation directed against Horthy was concerned, Doblhoff left 
no doubt as to her conviction that Horthy made the right choice in 
resisting Charles’s return attempts. She conceded that “both 
parties were led by their patriotism”, but only Horthy had a 
realistic perception of the situation.5 
In the same year, a huge genealogical synthesis, almost 600 
pages thick, was also published. It attempted to prove that the 
Horthy family had acquired its nobility long before the 17th 
century (as it had been thought), linking the Regent’s ancestry to 
                                                 
4  Ed. note: It may be added that in Finland Horthy was celebrated with 
pictures and all as “a thoroughly refined personality who had risen to the 
highest level of European civilization and who could really be a paragon 
to the youth of the new, young Europe just about to be born”. See: Arvi 
Sovijärvi in Heimotyö V (1941–1942), 23-32. Cf. “Unkarin valtionhoitaja”. 
Suomen Heimo, no. 3-4 (1940), 31. 
5  Lily Doblhoff, Horthy Miklós. Athenaeum, Budapest, 1939, 243-244, 283-
284, 290, 321. 
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the “world of the free Seklers” and also succeeding in positing him 
as a descendant of the House of Árpád.6 This perfectly unfounded 
statement aimed at providing an ancestry for Horthy that matched 
the already accepted greatness of his deeds, an undertaking which 
may have been motivated by the desire to furnish the Regent with 
an appropriate lineage for the founding of a dynasty by making his 
position hereditary. 
Picture 5: Horthy arriving horseback from Szeged to Budapest. 
The year 1940 saw another anniversary: that of Horthy’s 
appointment to the regency in 1920. Of the numerous publications 
from this period a photographically richly ornamented volume 
written by several authors stands out. It was edited and introduced 
by Ferenc Herczeg, the leading conservative writer of the day. He 
conjured up – highly ritualized – memories of the turbulent years 
1918–1919, when “the flood of corruption had infected the souls.” 
The memory of this most unhappy period was contrasted with the 
march into Budapest on 16 November 1919 (Picture 5.), which he 
likened to the return of the Hun army of Prince Csaba, Attila’s son, 
returning from the Milky Way itself to rescue the Seklers – a story 
captured in a popular and ancient folk myth known to most 
                                                 
6  József Sándor, Vitéz nagybányai Horthy Miklós, Magyarország kormányzója és 
népe az Árpádházi királyok vérében. Szerző: Budapest, 1938,5-13. 
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Hungarians. “Like Prince Csaba and his horsemen had descended 
from the Milky Way, Herczeg wrote, Horthy’s men came to help 
the orphaned country.” Herczeg went on to describe the rebuilding 
of the country in similar terms: “As after the Mongols and after the 
Ottomans, the miraculous regenerative powers of Saint Stephen’s 
realm triumphed in the end”. In the present, he saw the Regent as 
the very core of the “central power around which the thousand 
year old machinery of the state revolves”. In fact, he used the 
metaphor of a “diamond axis” to describe Horthy’s role in the 
machinery.  
 
The working man sees in him the greatest guardian of law and order. The 
patriot hopes of him the fulfillment of the nation’s desires. Every soldier in 
the army holds an allegiance to him unto the death. Even the faithless have 
no choice but to have faith in him, even the inconstant has to find constancy 
in his person. Without him, the masses of Hungarians can imagine neither 
their present, nor their future.7 
 
Beyond the two anniversaries, a further cause of the peaking 
Horthy cult in the later 1930s and early 1940s was the partial 
success of Hungarian revisionism. The reoccupation of Southern 
Slovakia and Northern Transylvania following the two Vienna 
Decisions in 1938 and 1940 were both commemorated in feature-
length documentaries, while the newspapers published ecstatic 
reports on the re-conquering of the historically significant 
townships. The central figure in all of the reports was that of 
Miklós Horthy. On a white horse, reminiscent of the one he rode in 
1919, Horthy often chose to lead the parade of Hungarian troops 
into the city (Picture 6-7.), at other times he looked on from a 
tribune as the troops defiled. In the process of reoccupation, he 
delivered scores of short speeches and listened to many, many 
more from speakers often in tears. Accordingly, Horthy the savior 
of the nation received a further epithet, that of the enlarger of the 
country. 
 
 
                                                 
7  Horthy Miklós. Singer and Wolfner, Budapest, 1939, 7-11. 
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Picture 6: Horthy riding to upper Hungary. Picture 7: Horthy again on horseback 
somewhere in a reconquered country. 
Attested by scores of historical examples, living persons who 
became subjects of a cult tend to increasingly believe in their own 
exceptional abilities and their greatness. Well-known examples 
include 20th century dictators such as Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. 
Horthy, for one, never developed ambitions like the former – he 
was too much of a 19th century traditionalist and conservative for 
that. But he did undertake to expand his powers, and did develop 
an ambition to prepare the ground for a family succession upon his 
eventual demise. The founding of a dynasty was also suggested by 
members of his personal network. (Picture 8.) Such plans were 
vehemently opposed, as could be predicted, by royalists attached 
to the Habsburgs – a small platform but not without considerable 
influence. Similarly, the extreme right rejected such plans, albeit 
for different reasons: they found the Regent and his family too 
much embedded in the conservative tradition of anglophilia. The 
end result of these opposing preferences was the election of 
Horthy’s elder son to the post of vice-Regent in February 1942. Just 
how significant a step in the realization of Horthy’s plans this 
could have become we will never be able to ascertain, because the 
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fighter pilot István Horthy died shortly thereafter in a plane crash 
on the Russian front. (Picture 9.) The tragic event, however, led to 
renewed debates about succession. It was proposed, that the two 
year old son of the deceased Vice-Regent should be either crowned 
or made Vice-Regent, cementing the power of the family over 
Hungarian politics. Very significant groups of the social and 
political elite, however, opposed all such designs. Royalists and 
conservatives pushed for adjourning the whole issue. Ideally, they 
were envisioning to offer the crown to Otto of Austria after the war, 
or, alternatively, to a member of Italy’s royal dynasty. They 
inclined, only as a third option, to consider the Regent and his 
family.8 
Picture 8: Horthy: happy family. Picture 9: Horthy's son. 
Hungary’s place in Soviet orbit after the Second World War 
made all dynastic plans illusory. Horthy had resigned from his 
post on German pressure on 16 October, 1944 (Picture 10.), and 
handed over power to the leader of the Hungarian extreme right, 
                                                 
8  Horthy Miklós titkos iratai. Ed. by Miklós Szinai, László Szűcs. Kossuth, 
Budapest, 1972, 327-337; Hans Georg Lehman, Der Reichsverweser-
Stellvertreter. Mainz, 1975, 48-49, 55, 92. 
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Ferenc Szálasi. German authorities had interned him in Bavaria, 
where he lived until 1949. He moved from there to Portugal as a 
permanent exile, where he stayed until his death in February 1957. 
Picture 10: Troubled Horthy. 
While Horthy was living the quiet life of a political exile without 
any concrete ambitions for the future, opinions about his role had 
undergone a Copernican change at home. With Soviet support, the 
very forces that had branded him as a murderer in 1919 and 1920 
came to power in 1944–45. They had been the spearheads of 
resistance to the canonical image promoted by the political system 
in the interwar period. The Regent’s role in the World War II 
provided them with more ammunition in their quest against 
Horthy. Social groups under the influence of their education prior 
to 1945 did not abandon their attachment to the Regent’s figure, a 
phenomenon that propelled the new holders of power to engage in 
a vigorous and systematic effort to construct a counter-cult. In the 
socialist rhetoric of the new political power, the Horthy era became 
synonymous with the lowest point of Hungarian history, a 
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position which entailed stripping the Regent’s memory of any 
positive features and accomplishments. 
The first purportedly Marxist synthesis of Hungarian history, 
titled the History of the Hungarian People and published in 1951 (an 
extended version of the book was a textbook for secondary schools) 
presented the narrative of the counter-cult in its definitive version. 
According to it, the National Army of 1919 was a “band of mass 
murderers”, which had emerged from the “reactionary officers, 
kulaks and the scum of society” that Austria-Hungary had left 
behind. Its leader, Miklós Horthy, a “one-time lackey to the 
Habsburgs”, responsible for “putting down the rebellion of navy 
servicemen at Cattaro”, spoke only a “broken Hungarian”, and 
was known for “his hatred of workers and his opposition to the 
Soviet”. In this reading, responsibility for the “terrible deeds 
committed during the White Terror” was borne collectively by 
Horthy, his clique and by entente-imperialism. The political system 
he shaped was described as “fascist from its inception”, and his 
role in it as that of a “bloody military dictator” and responsible, 
among other things, for the attack on Yugoslavia in 1941, the 
invasion of the Soviet Union, for accepting the German occupation 
without having put up a fight, the deportation of the provincial 
Jewish population, the failure of the attempt to break with the Axis 
in October 1944 and for having legitimized the seizure of power by 
Szálasi and his Arrow-cross men.9 
The re-professionalization of Hungarian historiography that had 
unfolded after 1956 failed to yield a more nuanced interpretation 
of Horthy’s person in the short run. György Ránki, a prominent 
figure of this process, perpetuated the above schematic image in a 
synthesis on the interwar period published in 1964. A relatively 
more balanced evaluation of Horthy and his era did not appear 
until the mid-seventies. The 8th volume of a multi-volume 
synthesis of Hungarian history dealing with the interwar period 
had been published in 1976. This treatment omitted most of the 
previously customary accusations and overstatements. (Picture 11.) 
A short portrait of Horthy was also included in the book, authored 
                                                 
9  Gusztáv Heckenast, Miklós Incze, Béla Karácsonyi, Lajos Lukács, György 
Spira, A magyar nép története. Művelt Nép, Budapest, 1953, 552-558, 638. 
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by Zsuzsa L. Nagy. She argued that Horthy rose to prominence in 
1919 because he was a well-known soldier, who impressed the 
officer in Szeged with his “determined countenance”. His election 
to the Regency was conditioned by, Nagy went on to explain, “the  
Picture 11: Ludas-cartoon. “Cat: –Hey, Mickey! Have we 
not enlarged the country? Horthy: –Of course! We've even 
enlarged all the neighbouring countries.” 
relative power relationships as they stood around 1920, including 
the support, domestically, of officer groups and, internationally, of 
Great Britain.” In her reading, Horthy managed to hold onto 
power for a quarter of a century primarily because “as Regent […] 
he distanced himself from extreme rightist officers and […] 
adopted the general views and interests of the ruling class.” Other 
authors argued convincingly in their respective chapters that 
Horthy did in fact expressly consent to the disarming of 
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rampaging officer detachments, that Charles’s attempt to reclaim 
the Hungarian throne were doomed to fail and Horthy very much 
had the support of the entente powers in standing up to him. Even 
his role in the World War II received a more nuanced treatment. 
Gyula Juhász, for instance, mentioned in the same volume that the 
Hungarian participation in the war against Yugoslavia had not 
taken place upon a decision made by Horthy, but following the 
agreement of the Defense High Council and in accordance with the 
proposal from Prime Minister Pál Teleki. He also noted the 
Regent’s opposition to and outrage over the German occupation of 
March 1944, which he accepted, allegedly, only after heated 
debates and long soul-searching. Finally, he noted that coming out 
of the passivity with which Horthy had tolerated the deportation 
of Hungarian Jews from the countryside, he intervened and “he 
stopped the deportations only” in early July 1944, saving the Jews 
of Budapest.10 
The above professionalization of historiography had a beneficial 
effect also on textbook images of Horthy. Here, however, the shift 
to a more nuanced interpretation was slower and more fragmented. 
The new history textbook for Hungarian lyceums, published in 
1982, still carried the old topoi concerning his person. It was 
highlighted that Horthy had been the one to “put down the 
Cattaro navy rebellion, wading in blood”, and once more the 
textbook claimed that Horthy had been forced to relearn 
Hungarian in 1919, because “during the long service in the joint 
k.u.k (i.e. kaiserliche und königliche) forces he had all but forgotten 
his mother tongue.”11 On the same note, it has to be mentioned 
that while historians increasingly held the view that the Horthy 
regime had been neither a fascist system of government, nor a 
clear-cut dictatorship, the secretary for ideology of the Central 
Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party warned, as 
late as 1986, that “the fascistic character of the Horthy regime”, as 
well as “the sometimes hidden, sometimes overt dictatorship” 
were undisputable facts, which yield, taken together, “a 
                                                 
10  Magyarország története 1918-1919, 1919-1945. Ed. by György Ránki. Akadé-
miai, Budapest, 1976, 305, 415-416, 431, 434, 1040, 1152-1153, 1162, 1188. 
11  Ágota, Szirtes Jóvérné, Történelem IV. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982, 84. 
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reactionary politics […] for which there can be no excuse and 
which does not deserve sympathetic interpretation”.12 
The change of system in 1989 and 1990 brought about, among 
other things, rapid and thorough loss of legitimacy for the old 
historical-political canon. The newly gained freedom of 
interpreting the national past, including also the recent pastl, made 
a series of reevaluations unavoidable. The wave of revisionist 
history reached the memory of Miklós Horthy with the Hungarian-
language publication, in 1990, of Péter Gosztonyi’s 1973 German-
language biography of the Regent. Considering post-1945 
Hungarian historiography, Gosztonyi was right to emphasize that 
during the regency, a conservative establishment had ruled the 
country, and that “corruption and abuse of power” was alien to 
Horthy’s thinking. Among other things, “he did not consider his 
place in the state and the establishment – as circumscribed by 
legislation – a means to enrich himself”. He also emphasized “the 
numerous signs” of Horthy’s dislike of Hitler. While he was “an 
accomplice” in the deportation of Hungarian Jews from the 
countryside in spring 1944, he did “order to stop further 
deportations” in the wake of domestic and international protest. 
One may even argue that there is truth to such observations as the 
one explaining the White Terror as a “reaction to the terror 
perpetrated by the Hungarian Soviet Republic”. On the other hand, 
Gosztonyi’s claim according to which the source of the White 
Terror “was not the National Army” should be very difficult to 
support – unlike its opposite, for which historical evidence 
abounds. Other phrasings, for instance the argument that reprisals 
were not initiated or ordered by Horthy personally, do little more 
than go around the question of his responsibility. In view of what 
has been said above, it should be also evident that talking about 
“Horthy’s lack of personal ambitions of power” also requires some 
stretch of imagination. Similarly, the view that “the Regent was 
respected and trusted by the greatest part of society” is based on 
selective evidence. In sum, Gosztonyi’s legitimate attempt to 
counter the negative image of Horthy as present in much of the 
                                                 
12  János Berecz, “Gondolatok a nemzet és a munkásmozgalom történetéről”. 
Társadalmi Szemle, 1986/6, 3-13. 
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Hungarian historiography and public writing included also, to a 
degree, the evading of some problematic points. This undermined 
his enterprise. Willingly or unwillingly, the book idealized the 
image of Horthy.13 
In the context of the ongoing historical-political debate about the 
role of Horthy and the necessary reevaluation of his actions, his 
reburial in 1993 represents a clear and predictable juncture. The 
series of books, articles and interviews which were printed during 
this period show the centre-rightist political parties seeking to 
rehabilitate Horthy’s person and politics. One richly illustrated 
publication set for itself the goal of cleansing his image “from the 
layers of lies” smeared on it “by the propaganda and the courtly 
history of a regime which sought to banish him”.14 
Of all the opinions which were heard in 1993, the greatest 
significance can be attributed to the long interview given by Prime 
Minister József Antall. Attesting to the relatively rapid consolidation 
of the “rehabilitating” discourse about Horthy, Antall echoed much 
the same opinions that Gosztonyi had expressed in his book. 
Accordingly, he referred to the white terror as a reaction to 
Bolshevik acts of cruelty, which was neither instigated nor tolerated, 
but halted at least in part by Horthy. His rise to the office of the 
Regent had no alternative, as, according to Antall, “the republic of 
the October revolution […] was simply unfit to be continued”. The 
restoration plans entertained by Charles IV were equally unrealistic. 
In such a situation, the Prime Minister concluded, “the regency of 
Miklós Horthy became the only option which promised stability for 
the country both in domestic and in foreign policy.” He also added 
that the Regent “never trespassed over the principles of 
constitutionalism and the order of the constitutional monarchy”. 
Moreover, he “was simultaneously strongly opposed to both 
Bolshevism and Nazism”. While many of these claims are 
debatable, Antall also added some remarks which can only be 
described as thoroughly unfounded. He argued for instance that 
                                                 
13  Péter Gosztonyi, A kormányzó, Horthy Miklós. Téka, Budapest, 1990, 30, 
149, 161-164. 
14  László Pusztaszeri, “Egy élet Magyarországért”. In: Vitéz nagybányai 
Horthy Miklós élete képekben. Ed. by Vuray György. Faktor, Budapest, 1993. 
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“Horthy’s anti-Semitism simply did no exist after the World War 
I” and that Horthy had opposed the entry into the war in 1941. 
Antall made sure to emphasize the moral culpability for the 
deportations after the German occupation of 1944. He seemed to 
exclude Horthy from the circle of culprits, however, arguing that 
as soon as he “secured for himself the smallest room for maneuver 
[…] he saved the Jews of Budapest”. Concluding his narrative of 
Horthy, Antall labeled him a “Hungarian patriot”, and voiced his 
conviction that it was the task of politics “to accord him his rightful 
place in the continuity of the national history and in the mind of 
the people”. 15  The final sentence of the Prime Minister stated 
overtly the desire on the part of resurgent Hungarian conservatism 
and centre-rightist thinking in general to make a break in all 
respects with the heritage of the communist period from 1949 to 
1989, and, in doing so, simultaneously hark back to the interwar 
era, integrating its memory and its leaders into the historical canon 
of national identity. 
Through the rediscovery of his person around 1993, Horthy 
became part of a debate on identity politics, one that has not 
subsided for 15 years. In the course of this time, Thomas 
Sakmyster’s biography of Horthy, originally published in 1994, 
appeared also in Hungarian. The professional political biography 
spanning the years from 1919 to 1944 painted a portrait of Horthy 
which was in accordance with that of Hungarian historiography in 
the 1970s and 1980s.16 Gábor Bencsik’s wide-ranging journalistic 
analysis of Horthy, a further book from 2001, reiterated much the 
same opinions about Horthy. The author avoided both the 
revisionism of Communist authors and the apologetic twists 
employed by sympathizers. If anywhere, Bencsik was perhaps a 
little too exonerating in his evaluation of Horthy’s actions as 
Commander in Chief, yet in other aspects he retained a fortunate 
balance in his narrative.17 
                                                 
15  “Interjú Horthy temetéséről Antall József miniszterelnökkel”. In: HIR-
LAP melléklete, Sept. 1993, 1-8. 
16  Thomas Sakmyster, Admirális fehér lovon. Helikon, Budapest, 2001.  
17  Gábor Bencsik, Horthy Miklós. A kormányzó és kora. Magyar Mercurius, 
Budapest, 2001. 
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The interest for these books was dwarfed, however, by the 
success of the memoirs of Countess Ilona Edelsheim Gyulai, the 
widow of Vice-Regent István Horthy. The first volume of the 
memoirs was published in 2000, with the second, and final, 
volume following in 2007. As she made clear in the introduction, 
her aim was to present “the truth” to Horthy’s “descendants” and 
the general public, so that they “need not ponder what grains of 
truth the sea of Nazi and Communist slanders published through 
the years may contain”. Of the episodes in Horthy life which are 
routinely addressed by historical narratives, the memoirs barely 
addressed the seminal 1918–1919 period. The virtually only key 
statement about this period concerned a parallel the author drew 
between the turbulent period after the Great War and the change 
of regime in 1989. In this, she set Horthy’s actions as an example in 
front of our generation: “He brought new energy into the scheme 
of things – something someone called a blood transfusion. Such 
energies are needed today, as well.”  
Taking up the detailed course of events after 1930, the only 
really controversial period the Countess discussed in detail was 
the year 1944. She chose, however, to really focus only on one – if 
crucial – series of events: the tragedy of Jewish Hungarians. The 
text makes it clear that in the view of the writer, Horthy bears little 
responsibility for the fate of the Jews living in the countryside. Her 
second key statement is that Horthy’s decision to halt the 
transports to Auschwitz, saving many Budapest Jews, was made 
not as a concession to foreign and domestic pressure, but in 
response to having received the so-called Auschwitz-protocols on 
3 July, 1944. The gist of this argument is that once the Regent 
found out that Jews were being exterminated rather than being 
taken to labor camps, he acted.18 
These extremely popular memoirs, however, do not represent 
the last chapter in the ongoing story of symbolic politics and 
commemoration around Horthy. Just as the second volume of the 
Edelsheim memoirs hit the streets in spring 2007, a new 
documentary directed by Gábor Koltay about the person of Miklós 
                                                 
18  Ilona Edelsheim Gyulai, Becsület és kötelesség, vol. 1. Európa, Budapest, 
2006, 257-264; vol. 2, 2007, 449. 
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Horthy was shown in a few cinemas. Of all attempts to revive the 
cult of Horthy characteristic of the interwar period, this film stands 
out as the most obvious example of glorification. As several critics 
were quick to point out, the documentary is not merely apologetic, 
but “makes false statements that go beyond mere apology”.19 
The most recent chapter of identity politics involving Horthy 
concerns various plans to secure representation for his figure in 
public spaces. The apropos for these propositions was provided by 
the 50th anniversary of the Regent’s death in February 2007. One 
such initiative was launched by the president of the fringe party 
Movement For a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Gábor Vona, who, as he 
put it, saw the time fit to rehabilitate the Regent, “who is 
represented in public opinion, in politics and in the teaching of 
history in equally negative colors”. This could be remedied, he 
suggested, by removing the statue of Mihály Károlyi, leader of the 
October revolution in 1918 from Kossuth square by the Parliament 
building, and replacing it with that of Horthy.20 
A civic initiative and private persons proposed a similar 
commemoration of Horthy in Szeged at virtually the same time. In 
acknowledgment of the Regent’s deeds, this would have entailed 
setting up a statue of his figure in the city square, next to those of 
István Széchenyi and Ferenc Deák, two 19th century moderate 
progressives. The socialist mayor of the town reacted dismissively 
(as could be expected), stating that as long as he is “mayor of 
Szeged, neither János Kádár, nor Miklós Horthy will receive a 
statue.”21  The debate that has flared up in Szeged reflects the 
trauma of Hungarian collective memory and the lines of division 
which run through this memory. 
At the same time, if a summary of the current situation is to be 
made, it has to be stated first and foremost that the persistent 
attempts since 1989 to reinstate the cult of Horthy in some form 
                                                 
19  Krisztián Ungváry, “A Kormányzó 139 éves”. Népszabadság, February 12, 
2007. 
20  www.hirextra.hu/hirek/article.php?menu-id=1962 (Szoborcsere a 
Kossuth-téren?). 
21  András Kő, “Horthy Miklós szobra Szegeden?”. Magyar Nemzet, June 18, 
2007. 
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have failed to convince the majority in Hungarian society. 
According to Median, a leading polling agency, Miklós Horthy 
ranked third on the list of most negatively viewed 20th century 
public figures in 1999. He scored 20% on the cumulative index, 
preceded by Mátyás Rákosi (52%) and Ferenc Szálasi (35%), while 
János Kádár came in fourth with 12%. When interviewed, only a 
little more than 5% of the representative sample placed him among 
the three most positively viewed historical personalities of the 
century. 22  Opinions may have shifted slightly since 1999. A 
fundamental change, however, is unlikely to have taken place. This 
seems to be confirmed by the non-representative survey of 
Hungary’s largest popular historical periodical, Rubicon. 
According to Rubicon readers, Rákosi and Szálasi are the darkest 
personalities in Hungarian history, while Horthy ranked 5th on the 
negative list – after János Kádár and Béla Kun on the 3rd and 4th 
place, respectively. He failed, however, to make it to the top ten of 
most positively viewed historical figures.23 All this suggests that it 
is only a small, if loud, minority that thinks of Horthy as a great 
patriot and statesman, while their numbers are far exceeded by 
those who hold a highly negative opinion of him. 
 
                                                 
22  Ignác Romsics, “Történelem és emlékezet”. Heti Világgazdaság, July 10, 
1999, 66-69. 
23  ’Szavaztak az olvasók’. Rubicon, 2006/10, 4-5. 
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One primary task of the French cult research should be the 
description and analysis of the Napoleon cult because there was no 
other French public figure except him who had such a cultic fame 
all over the world of which the imperial army could boast about. 
The book by J. Lucas-Dubreton already carries the title: Le culte de 
Napoléon 1815–1848.1 It is a thick monograph which is especially 
useful and rich in information, and which deals with many 
important aspects of the Napoleon question. Yet, it did not utilize 
the approach and methods of cult research. French scholars have 
extensively analyzed the phenomena which pertain to the subject 
of cult but under different themes albeit in full proportions, 
variations and randomness. In this respect there is no reason to 
complain, and seen from the point of view of the relationships of 
cult and identity, the most illuminating phenomenon is the 
Napoleon cult even if we narrow the question of identity down to 
the aspect of national affiliation. And the examination of adoration 
of Napoleon makes it possible to look at more complicated 
connections with of the issue of identity. 
Consciously narrowing the subject, only one series of events is 
highlighted here which led to the reburial of the Emperor in 1840. In 
French history these events are called “The Return of the Ashes”, 
and they are in the focus of this article since they serve as the model 
for modern reburials and for the relations between cult and identity.  
The precondition for a reburial of someone is that the person to 
be reburied gained wide reputation among public by achieving 
                                                 
1  J. Lucas-Dubreton, Le culte de Napoléon. Editions Albin Michel, Paris, 1960. 
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something remarkable. It is useless to waste words in proving how 
qualified Napoleon was in this respect. The other precondition is 
that the person had had to suffer a long-lasting and serious 
injustice which markedly bears on the burial. The lack of deserved 
honor can originate in the burial that takes place in exile on foreign 
soil, and which is not attended by public or is carried out without 
the proper burial ceremony. With the banishment of the defeated 
Emperor to live in exile on the Island of St Helen where he in 1821 
died in English captivity, the second condition materialized. The 
third condition, i.e. that the public opinion which was earlier 
unsympathetic or silenced, turns sympathetic and is given freedom 
to loudly express its demand for rehabilitation. Between 1815 and 
1840 this process took place which enables us to discuss the 
identity question in its frame. 
Reburial of a person is one of the most effective means to create 
identity. Its intellectual seed is the radical revaluation which leads to 
the earlier dishonored person’s public rehabilitation and 
condemnation of those who dishonored him. The reburial ceremony 
means, however, more than a radical change that affected the 
intellectual turnabout. The revaluation is necessarily accompanied 
by devotion and strong emphasis of confinement and other 
passionate feelings: mourning, satisfaction, hostile feelings which 
can transform into unstoppable and intense aversion towards the 
people who the ones who want a reburial regard as enemies or 
traitors. Neither should one forget the suppressed and slumbering 
emotions of the ones who opposed the reburial. In Napoleon’s 
reburial all of these phenomena crop up in sharp outlines. 
The initiators of the reburial are expecting general 
understanding from the public; their goal is mutual consensus. 
Their main interest is participation in the burial ceremony, 
fellowship with the dishonored person evoking people’s feeling to 
identify themselves with the values the deceased person 
represented or what has been assigned to him and to demonstrate 
of him. The main danger in the venture is that the public’s 
indifference, hostility or cautiousness would cause a total failure. It 
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is possible to count on the behavior of the public, and it can be 
assumed how the people will react but one can never be sure. The 
reburial is not a usual celebration, rather it is an exceptional event 
and that is why it can be hazardous. It is literally an event. It is the 
dramatic act of creating or strengthening communal identity. Its 
outcome is influenced by ephemeral actualities, the constellation of 
daily politics, moreover, also by the weather. Yet there is a 
component which depends on the dynamic of the development of 
communal identity. In Napoleon’s case, this was rather 
complicated and unforeseeable.  
The heroes of reburials are mostly politicians, soldiers and public 
figures who where active in shaping history. The identification with 
these people creates more complicated problems than a reburial of 
an artist or a scientist. For example, behind the latter (e.g. Attila 
József or Béla Bartók) stands memorable, verifiable, unquestionable, 
aesthetic and scientific value. In the case of Napoleon it is also easy 
to find the qualities which help people identify themselves with him: 
from humble origins Napoleon reached to the highest position to 
which a Frenchman could. He had a fantastic career. He made 
France great. He conquered most of Europe. He proved through 
several victorious battles how truly talented military leader he was. 
He laid the foundations of the modern judicial system of France. 
However, these factors had their opposing ones, the factors that 
made people to keep distance and show contempt to him, even to 
hate him. His system could be seen as a tyranny from the inside. 
His military success was followed by the curses of mothers who 
waited in vain for their husbands and sons to return from the 
conquests. The marching of the Grande Armée was accompanied 
with enormous human suffering. He lost his key battles, he failed 
as a politician and the final balance of his endeavors was the 
conclusion of a peace treaty which was embarrassing to France and 
which shattered its international position. Moreover, the Bourbons 
regained power and reigned again. They tried with all their might 
to present the Emperor as the Antichrist, as the messenger of Satan, 
as a giant cannibal, as a usurper of the throne, as Nero’s modern 
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embodiment, and last but not the least, as a foreign person who 
forced himself on France; they called him a “Corsican”, a 
“Buonaparte”. This campaign went on successfully for several 
years. The blood-drained, disappointed French people who 
became tired of the war had had enough of the Emperor. It can be 
said that the Napoleon cult sprang from of the Emperor’s anti-cult 
which, interestingly enough, elevated the figure of Napoleon. In 
order to develop the cult only the sign (–, +) had to be changed, 
though this seemed more than impossible. 
Yet it happened. After Napoleon’s death in 1821 Talleyrand said: 
“The death of Napoleon is not an event, it is only a piece of news”, 
but with this statement he totally missed the point.2 The news of 
the Emperor’s death shook not only France but the whole of 
Europe, and even the people in England who were Napoleon’s 
fiercest enemies. In France the scale dipped to the side of the 
positive identification. The enemies of the Emperor shrunk to two, 
each other hating groups, the intransigent republicans and the 
legitimists. Louis the XVIII was placed on the throne with the help 
of the country’s enemy, the Holy Alliance. During the reign of 
Louis and his successor Charles the X the humiliating international 
constellation remained intact. In comparison, the Napoleon era 
was positively remembered. Full employment had been achieved 
at home, mainly because of the lack of manpower in war. 
Moreover, because of intense demand incomes grew high. The rule 
of the Emperor had been the insurance for the peasants since the 
lands they occupied during the revolution remained in their 
possession and the aristocracy could not chase them away. The 
middle classes, the bourgeoisie, enjoyed economic boom thanks to 
export to the conquered lands. During the revolution the church 
lost its position, but Napoleon stabilized it. The emancipation of 
the Jews was also of Napoleon’s doing. The Emperor’s value was 
increased; from a dictator who committed serious crimes against 
                                                 
2  Jean Tulard, “Le retour des Cendres”. In: Les lieux de mémoire, 2. [sous la 
direction de Pierre Nore]. Gallimard, Paris, 1997, 1733. 
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the revolution was transformed into the savior of the achievements 
of the revolution. 
Compared to this, the present time seemed to be the age of 
decline. The loads of goods coming from the English market 
brought hard times to French industry. In the adapting process to 
the achievements of the industrial revolution, unemployment 
increased, high incomes became a memory of the past. Now the 
peasants had a reason to worry about restoration of their 
possession to the aristocrats. All of a sudden the years of the 
Empire seemed the ‘Golden Age’ compared to the devastating 
present. Moreover the Gloire (Glory), the assurance of the French 
power by arms, was on Napoleon’s side. After all, the Napoleon 
cult was kept alive by the approval of some kind of modernization, 
by the demand for the society’s mobility and, above all, by French 
nationalism and national self-interest. Laying the reburial on the 
agenda and voicing and repeatedly demanding it happened 
through this identical transformation.  
Cult is a quasi-religious thinking and way of behaviour, and in 
keeping with it, the Napoleon cult had to utilize sacral images 
because the anti-cult against which it had to fight was couched in 
terms of hellish, devilish and demonic Buonaparte. This magnified 
Napoleon’s worldly size. One of the cultic formulas was 
distributed by a book of propaganda, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélene 
published by Count Las Cases in 1823. In it Napoleon was pictured 
as chained Prometheus. It was based on Napoleon’s diary written 
in St Helen and confiscated by the British Governor. The book had 
an enormous impact as it demolished the anti-cult and became the 
basis of forthcoming devotion to Napoleon. It was not an accident 
that it was secretly the favorite book of Julien Sorel. The Governor 
of Longwood, Hudson Lowe who was exiled to the far away tiny 
island, was mercilessly eager to spread several stories about the 
life and sufferings of the fallen Emperor made the French public 
stand by the undeservedly humiliated titan.  
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The second Christian cultic formula was shaped into classic 
form by the peculiar prediction of Heinrich Heine: “The nation of 
arrogance (England) falls into dust, the graves of Westminster lay 
in ruins and scattered all over, the royal dust, which they contain 
shall be the prey of the winds and fall into oblivion. And Saint 
Helen shall be the Saint Tomb where the people of East and West 
shall go to a pilgrimage with ships decorated with flags and they 
strengthen their hearts with the great memory of the Earthly Christ 
who suffered under Hudson Lowe as it is written in the gospels of 
Las Cases, O’Meara and Antommarch”.3 If the anti-cult presented 
Napoleon as the Anti- Christ, the cult wrote and shaped Christ’s 
suffering story in a way that it could now be applied to Napoleon 
in many different ways. 
In the year of 1840 a ship named Belle Poule indeed appeared on 
the shores of St Helen. Her voyagers were not pilgrims but the 
exiled comrades of Napoleon who were brought there under the 
command of Count Joinville, the son of Louis Philippepe. They had 
come in the purpose to identify Napoleon’s earthly remains and 
place them in several coffins and bring them back to the shores of 
the Seine thus fulfilling the Emperor’s last will to rest among his 
beloved people. 4  Who had asked Joinville to take this lengthy 
voyage, and for what (worldly) reasons did the voyagers participate 
in the series of reburial ceremonies and why they approved them?  
The demand of the reburial began like an ancient tragedy. The 
intimate supporters of Napoleon appeared immediately after the 
Emperor’s death in 1821 in London and asked in the name of 
Madame Mere, the mother of the Emperor, and by referring to the 
ancient tradition, the King and the PM to deliver the corpse of the 
son. One year later the mother tried again. But from the very 
beginning, it was not only a simple family affair. The family, which  
 
                                                 
3  Gilbert Martineau, Le Retour des Cendres. Tallandier, Paris, 1990, 35. 
4  André-Jean Tudesq, “Le reflet donné par la presse”. In: Napoléon aux 
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was sent to exile by the Bourbons, actually a dynasty, was well-
connected from London to Rome, from Vienna to America. Most of 
the followers of course were waiting in France for the resurrection 
of the dead, or if he could not himself, then the Prince of 
Reischstadt, the son of Mary Louise, should march ahead and 
bring the imperial rule back to France. They were the Bonapartists. 
And behind them stood the soldiers and officers of the Grande 
Armeé as well as the former officials of the Empire with masses of 
civilians, peasants and workers whose numbers is difficult to 
determine because they had no right to vote. The Government in 
London tended to oblige, but only if the lawful King of France and 
his cabinet would approach them with a request, for they knew 
that the embers of the revolution could be ignited from the ashes. 
Louis the XVIII certainly did not have the slightest intention to 
conjure up the soul of his mortal enemy, and so the great dead 
remained an English captive beyond his grave. 
From that time on the spell of the great name, the conjuring up 
of the glorious memory of the Empire was necessarily associated 
with every Bonapartist attempt to takeover. The follower’s place, 
after the early death of Napoleon the II was taken by Joseph, the 
oldest brother of the Emperor, but he, after a few failed attempts of 
grabbing the throne, gave up. Instead, the younger cousin of the 
Emperor, Louis Bonaparte, who later became Napoleon the III, 
zealously and stubbornly made efforts to gain power. After a failed 
coup d’état the judge told him sternly: “The greatness of the 
Empire is the glory of the Emperor, not an inheritance of the 
family.” The claimant to the throne bravely replied in his defense: 
“The July monarchy had even less right to demand the 
inheritance”.5 The argument over the inheritance of the Emperor 
makes the problem of appropriation the crux of the theme of 
reburial. It is one of the basic questions of identification in the 
reburial. It is not enough to label the enemies of the one who is  
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about to rehabilitated, one has to ask to whom does the deceased 
belong is who is going to be reburied? Count Rémusat, the Home 
Secretary of Thiers administration in his speech at the House of 
Commons gave a classic definition to the act of appropriation: 
“The 1830 monarchy is the only lawful heir of every memory of 
which France can boast about. It is undoubtedly that class of 
monarchy which first collected all our power and harmonized 
every wish of the French Revolution that can build a statue and a 
sepulchre for a national hero and honor him without fear”.6  
The legal proceedings concerning the inheritance of the remains 
– “who owns the body of the emperor” – between two rival parties 
almost started military actions. During Joinville’s voyage back 
home on the Belle Poule’s deck with the Imperial bier (catafalque) 
‘information’ went around that Louis Bonaparte, who lived in 
London, wanted to attack the ship carrying the ashes and rob the 
Emperor’s remains. The other adventurous idea of the Bonapartist 
exiles was that several rebellious, provincial Bonapartists would 
escort the ship that first anchored at Cherbourg and later at Le 
Havre, to the capital and with the help of the resurrected Emperor 
overthrow the rule of Louis Philippe. Few theorists state that in 
1848, when Louis Philippe was driven away and Louis Bonaparte 
gained power, the harvest of the reburial of 1840 ripened.  
Yet the immediate beneficiary of the homecoming of the ashes 
was the bourgeois monarchy which lived as a parasite on 
Napoleon’s remembrance. Already in 1830, during the July 
revolution, the supporters of Louis Philippe, the Orleanists made 
the Bonapartists, republicans and anarchists who hated the 
Bourbons the dupes of the power, and the bourgeois monarchy 
strived for the sake of its own legitimization and popularity to 
exploit the people worship of Napoleon from the beginning. It was 
Louis Philippe who replaced the statue of Napoleon on top of the 
Vendome column which had been taken down by the Bourbons.  
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At the center of the Étoile the King had the uncompleted triumphal 
arch which served to glorify the Emperor finished. The third and 
most hazardous appropriation manoeuvre was to bring the ashes 
of Napoleon home. In the bourgeois monarchy the members of the 
Parliament, who most of the time run the country, bombarded the 
throne with masses of petitions but Louis Philippe objected to hold 
a cult ceremony since it may have been dangerous for his power. 
Finally, the efforts of PM Thiers, who turned from a Bonapartist to 
an Orleanist, brought success. The King allowed his Government 
to contact the British PM, Lord Palmerston, and demand the 
handing over of the ashes.  
This took place in a very strained international situation. In the 
Middle East France found itself in a conflict with the powers of the 
Holly Alliance, especially with England. Because of the 
humiliation suffered in 1815, the French public zealously wanted 
revanche. The peace politics of Louis Philippe seemed to be a sign 
of cowardice to the revengeful nationalists. Thiers, by promoting 
the bringing of the ashes back home, consciously played with the 
fire. Militarist undertones around the reburial were rather strong. 
The great figure of the French glory, Napoleon had to be freed 
from English captivity so that the nation could regain its self 
esteem. Thus the events had an international dimension and the 
interests of England also had to be weighed. Its Government tried 
to dictate conditions for the burial in order to avoid damage to the 
prestige of the country, but when the question became internal 
affair of the French the British could not exert influence on them. 
Taking the risk, Lord Palmerston obviously did not realize that he 
undermined the position of Louis Philippe. His calculation worked 
well enough since no war ensued. France withdrew from the  
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Middle East conflict with a shameful failure. 7  Louis Philippe 
yielded ground to England. He dismissed Thiers and the reburial 
took place during the reign of a Government which did not want 
to follow the offensive foreign politics of Napoleon. Consequently, 
the burial of the ashes remained a simple propaganda event, and 
was of the symbolic kind at that. 
When the remains of the Emperor arrived in France, the walk on 
tightrope began. The members of the Bonaparte dynasty, the 
family heirs, were not allowed to be present at the funeral. The 
royal families of Europe and the historic aristocracy turned their 
hostile backs to the event during which one usurper elevated 
another to the pedestal. The republicans reluctantly, halfheartedly 
participated. Lamartine succeeded in persuading the Parliament to 
cut the funds that were intended for the expenses of the burial to 
half, an intervention which visibly affected the staging quality. The 
preparations started late and reluctantly. The final resting place, 
the Dome of des Invalides was chosen by the Government with 
extraordinary care and pettiness. The Vendome column and the 
Triumphal Arch were turned down because both of them could 
make a perfect ground for a Bonapartist mass demonstration. The 
Saint-Denis cathedral was not suitable either because a national 
hero did not deserve to rest among French kings. The main reasons 
why des Invalides was chosen were its relative closeness and 
difficulty to reach. The Emperor’s catafalque was floated by boat 
on the Seine to Neuilly because the King wanted to avoid every 
possible encounter with the provincial masses who wished to 
honor the great man. The sailors were forbidden to make contact 
with the people who lived along the river. The organizers even 
thought of having the ceremony in winter hoping for bad weather. 
                                                 
7  Ed. note: This refers to the crisis in Levant in 1839–1840 when the 
Ottoman power was threatened from the south by Mehemet Ali, the 
Viceroy of Egypt. The French supported him but Lord Palmerston sent a 
fleet to demonstrate on the coast of Syria, letting the French know that he 
was ready to fight in order to keep the Ottoman Empire united. Louis 
Philippe pulled back and forced his Foreign Minister to resign.  
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Their wish was fulfilled because the ceremony took place on 
December 15th in freezing cold. 
The mood of the mourners or rather the celebrators was not 
spoiled by the unusual cold. Frighteningly many people 
participated in the parade. The carts carrying the ashes were 
followed by the veterans of the Grande Armeé who for the last time 
wore their carefully guarded uniforms on the occasion. They could 
do that freely because the organizers wanted to emphasize the 
General, the soldier in Napoleon and not the statesman and the 
Emperor. However, the military honor was now similarly 
displayed as in the traditional, feudal and royal ceremonial burials. 
There were not any new or original rituals followed which would 
have been proper to the heir of the Revolution and the Emperor. 
The sanctification of the ashes happened with the church’s active 
co-operation. 
Out of the slogans the celebrating crowd shouted “Vive 
l’Empereur!” was the loudest. Louis Philippe was not celebrated by 
anyone and Louis Bonaparte’s name was not uttered either but the 
popular Joinville, the King’s son who traveled to St. Helen received 
great welcome. Guizot, the most unpopular member of the new 
administration which replaced Thiers’s government, and who was 
known as a fierce enemy of Napoleon encountered heavy verbal 
abuse by the crowd for the great pleasure of Thiers. Many times 
the people shouted the slogans: “Down with the traitors!”, “Down 
with England!” The British Embassy advised Englishmen who 
stayed in Paris at that time to avoid going to the street. Heine, who 
was an advocate of the Napoleon cult, had become more reserved 
because of the French chauvinism that was shown during the 
funeral. After all, the chauvinists yearned for the territories beyond 
the Rhine. The King and his Government who had the police force 
ready calmly reported that serious incidents had not happened. It 
seemed that Bonaparte was successfully detached from the 
irritating movement of Bonapartism, and his heritage became a 
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treasure for whole French nation. 8  Although the epitaph “A 
Napoléon seul” [...] which the republican Lamartine advised to be 
written on Napoleon’s tomb did not get there, it seems that during 
the reburial this formula was victorious.9 In this article it was not 
possible to do anything else but to reconstruct this story of cult and 
identity-building. The discussion on the development and 
consequences of such a process would demand further, 
independent elaboration of the theme.  
                                                 
8  Ed. note: Karl Marx insinuated that ‘summoning of the ghost of 
Bonaparte’ was an attempt to slow or reverse decline of France. The rise 
of the Second Empire of Napoleon III owed much to this nostalgic source. 
Cf. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat. On National Trauma, 
Mourning and Recovery. Transl. by Jefferson Chase. Granta Books, London, 
2003, 106. 
9  Martineau, Le Retour des Cendres, 93. 
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The greatest political cult-spectacle of the twentieth century was 
the third congress of Hitler’s Nazi Party, staged in Nuremberg 
from the 8th to the 14th of September, 1936. In that year Hitler, now 
the incontestable Führer, had made three decisive moves to restore 
the ‘honour’ of Germany. He had cancelled the treaty of Locarno, 
occupied the Rheinland and armed the Wehrmacht to formidable 
strength. Thus the title of the congress: “The Party Congress of 
Honour”. In the very same year his leader cult started to ripen into 
a full-fledged one to reach its apogee in 1938–1940. And it was then 
that the cult no longer knew any bounds within the Party and the 
Germans could no longer avoid seeing and experiencing the 
‘Führer myth’ in every possible media. Hitler himself became 
convinced of his infallibility and began to believe in Providence 
that had called him to lead the German nation. In the process, he 
himself had become a prisoner of the ‘Führer myth’ and, as Ian 
Kershaw has it, a victim of the Nazi propaganda1. 
In view of history of mass communication, it may not be 
inappropriate to analyze the impressions and experiences of a 
Finnish spectator, the radical writer and leading modernist critic, 
Mr Olavi Paavolainen (1903–1964), from the spot. They were 
published as a narrative of travel, titled Kolmannen valtakunnan 
vieraana (1936), a “rhapsody”, as he called it, which exhibited an 
                                                 
1 Kershaw, Ian, The ’Hitler Myth’. Image and Reality in the Third Reich. 
O.U.P., 2001, 82. 
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"apocalyptic"2 approach to dictatorial power politics and German 
political mission in general that shocked the reading public not 
only in Finland but more widely also in other Nordic countries. At 
the time in Finland more people admired than criticized the Nazi 
achievements, and at least right-wing papers deemed the Western 
powers, especially England and France, weak and tame in 
comparison to the German might. As one later observer has neatly 
put it: their attitude towards the Third Reich was "like a sewing 
circle's towards a Panzer"3. 
Paavolainen had got foretaste of Nuremberg in 1934 when Leni 
Riefensthal’s film Triumph des Willens – censured as Nazi 
propaganda in many countries – was shown in Helsinki. He was 
truly shocked. Already the opening scenes of the film in which 
Hitler arrives at Nuremberg by plane descending from foggy 
morning clouds like “an Olympic God riding on an eagle” startled 
him.4 The following pandemonium of soldiers marching on and on 
lasted for three hours. Reminded by this experience Paavolainen 
started to describe what he saw in the 1936 spectacle.  
His point of view was that of communicative visualism5: as a 
spectator among the invited foreign audience he saw and watched it 
all while listening to cultic speeches and music. In order to 
describe the "elementary scenes" of National Socialism one had to 
use one's most acute senses, and concentrate on catching with eye 
and ear what may not normally have been relevant to a critical 
                                                 
2 Paavolainen, Olavi, Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraana (1936). Otava, 
Helsinki, 2003, 11.  
3 Kurjensaari, Matti, Loistava Olavi Paavolainen. Tammi, Helsinki, 1975, 163. 
4 Paavolainen (1936) 2003, 149. 
5 Kanerva, Jukka, An Eye Looking at the Masses. On Olavi Paavolainen’s 
Method of Examining the Process of Politics. In. Transformation of Ideas on 
a Periphery. Ed. Jukka Kanerva – Kari Palonen. IL-MO: Ilmajoki, 1987, 133-
150; Vitári, Zsolt, A Führer mítosz: Adolf Hitler kultusza. Rubicon, 
2007/9, 17-27; Paavolainen, Jaakko, Olavi Paavolainen - keulakuva. Tammi, 
Helsinki, 1991, 140-141. [Before Jukka’s untimely death, I often debated 
with him over these issues and I have ever since remained grateful for his 
insights].  
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mind. With keen sense of sight the politics of the eye, machinated 
by the Nazi propaganda tricksters, could be analyzed, and the 
cultic rituals be intuitively comprehended. The flabbergasted 
spectator could not really explain them in a scholarly fashion. The  
 
methods of intellectual history, political science6, theories of 
dialectical materialism, social psychology or party political 
analysis were all out of place since the spectacle in itself was 
illogical and irrational in its pseudo-religiousness or paganism. In 
an age when book had been replaced by picture – recall the auto-
da-fé of books in May, 1933 – the pictures and images lied to one’s 
face and only appearances counted. It was communication of 
illusions. If one believed that pictures (cameras) did not lie, in the 
Nazi cult-spectacle they created illusions in the similar way as did 
the pictures in German newspapers, magazines and films (news-
reels) telling of the Nazi revolution. These pictures creating 
‘wonderful’ images could be reckoned at a glance without any 
serious intellectual effort, and they excited the senses better than so 
many words. Nuremberg spectacle was the climax of this pictorial 
display as it was laid out in extraordinarily grand manner.  
As Paavolainen in the beginning of his narrative observes, it was 
ultimately the de-eroticized male body that was the visual object in 
focus of communication. Realizing that the body and habitus of 
Hitler himself may have not been attractive to women as such, it 
naturally stood aloof from any sexual evaluation for him.7 
Nevertheless, it was not Hitler's body as such that stood in the 
limelight because it communicated an altogether different 
                                                 
6 Leading Finnish political scientists denounced both Fascism and National 
Socialism as "despotism" (in Finnish: mielivalta), and especially Hitler's 
Germany had jettisoned the ideals and practices of a Rechtstaat. See: 
Ruutu, Yrjö, Nykyajan diktatuurijärjestelmät. In. Historian 
diktaattorityyppejä. Historian Aitta VII. Gummerus, Jyväskylä – Helsinki, 
1937, 74-76. 
7 It may be added that most of the foreign observers who discussed with 
Hitler had great difficulties in bearing his attitude and posture for a 
longer time. So inhuman he appeared to be.  
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message, that of an ascetic Leader, about the special role of whom 
we have more to say later. The ideal body present at the Congress 
was the one of a young male, described and classified as ‘racially’  
 
(Nordische Rasse8) pure and superior to any other human 'race', 
incarnated in the healthy and fit German soldier or the half-naked 
worker in the Arbeitsdienst. Nazis apparently freed the male9 body 
from bourgeois privacy to become the public object of cult, making 
it a modern, heathen idol. It was not only an object of hope, 
experiment and belief for the future but it was given such rights 
and tasks of which it could not have earlier dreamt of. But all these 
hordes of male bodies belonged collectively to the state and were 
to serve its purposes in work and ultimately in war. They were 
meant to be heroes – cultic figures also in a classical sense – but 
remain puritan, corporeal, asking no questions. As Paavolainen 
recounted, altogether half a million of them had been commanded 
to appear in the Congress. With another half a million spectators, it 
was the largest political 'show' on earth so far. Everything in 
Germany pointed to it: at every railway station on his journey to 
the venue, Paavolainen saw the same poster: “Ein Reich – ein Volk – 
ein Führer”10. On the train he saw how SA-men played like school-
children, ate sandwiches, polished their belts, played the 
                                                 
8 Paavolainen (1936) 2003, 86. In one of his earlier works Paavolainen had 
greatly admired how the Germans in the reconstruction after the defeat in 
the Great War had started to build also the bodies of their young (Körper-
Kultur). See: Paavolainen, Olavi, Nykyaikaa etsimässä (1929). Otava, Keuruu, 
1990, esp. 443. 
9 It must be noted that one of the reasons why Paavolainen detested Nazi 
regime was its degrading treatment of women. See for details: 
Paavolainen (1936) 2003, 329-346. Cf. Kurjensaari 1975, 172-173. The other 
one was its blatant racism. Let it suffice here to recall how during his visit 
to Rome in 1937 Paavolainen was amazed by the despair with which the 
Pope called modern science to combat the Nazi 'racial' doctrines. See for 
this: Paavolainen, Olavi, Risti ja hakaristi (1937). Gummerus, Jyväskylä, 
2005, 204-207. 
10 Paavolainen (1936) 2003, 158. 
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harmonica and lute, and practiced new songs. And he recorded 
how one enthralled little boy watched these men mouth open and 
picked up the tune: “[…] und Morgen die ganze Welt”. On the 
arrival, the Führer-Wetter, lovely sunshine, set in as if Heaven itself 
had blessed the spectacle.11 The conditions to communicate a 
collective message to the organized and disciplined Massenmensch 
were perfect.  
As an honorary guest of the German Literary Society 
Paavolainen could watch at close range the opening speech of 
Alfred Rosenberg, whom he described as “a man with helpless and 
cynically benevolent smile hardened in an instant into a thin, 
malicious line of mouth showing what immense ambition fed by 
inferiority complex and perseverance [was] hidden in this former 
teacher of drawing from Tallinn”.12 Hitler deserved a more 
positive summary: he is “[only] personally genius, he glows of 
prophecy and enormous will-power” hiding his otherwise 
“comical appearance” before he started to speak. Paavolainen 
emphasized that Hitler, who always spoke to tens of thousands, 
must be seen giving a speech since the radio transmitted his voice 
too loud which was highly disturbing and misleading.13 Hitler’s 
act of speech was simply phenomenal. Paavolainen did not want to 
polemize against his style of communication since its weaknesses – 
as Paavolainen had it: “...total ignorance of the nature of artistic 
creative work” – were too obvious and because the conclusion of 
all speeches in Nuremberg was the same: the war between 
National Socialism and Bolshevism was to be “greatest war of 
religion in history”.14 It could be seen and sensed that the greatest 
turning-point of European history was inevitably at hand, and 
there was no arguing against that.  
                                                 
11 Ibid., 159. 
12 Ibid., 167. 
13 Ibid., 174. 
14 Ibid., 183, 188. 
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Paavolainen rather moved on to describing the Luitpold-Halle, 
the Congress Center, built to serve the ‘God of Today’ – the 
incarnation of modern Messianism – and to epitomize the 
momentary excitement and ecstasy prevailing in it. Its “tragic 
beauty” and “the loftiness of the morituri” – SA- and SS-men 
everywhere – told that the culture of National Socialism set out to 
a crusade of swastika, without knowing whether it would prevail 
or be utterly defeated.15 This was the essence of Nazi 
communication to Paavolainen: to create expectations of something 
really great to happen, not yet of achievement or fulfillment. The 
paradox for Paavolainen was: this ambiguity - to believe or not to 
believe - did not seem to awaken any doubts in anyone at the scene: 
the meaning of the cult was to augur the launching of the ‘final 
solution’ awaited for so long. Facing such a spectacle of power, 
could there remain any reasons to be suspicious? 
Paavolainen was to remember all his life the sight of the prelude 
to Joseph Goebbels’s speech in the Hall: hundreds of stiff SA-
standards were carried in and placed behind the pulpit while 
military music was played. Before the speech-act a piece of C.M. 
Weber was sounded. Paavolainen was sitting dumbfounded and 
gazing eye to eye with the leaders of the Third Reich. There was 
this Goebbels, who declared that Hitler is "the best European"16. By 
his looks Goebbels was a diva who loved to stand in the spot-light 
and lift his hand at important moments if applause from the crowd 
was not spontaneous. This gesture communicated tacit power in 
the hands of Nazis.  
The climax of Nuremberg was the muster of political leaders 
held during the night on the field of Zeppelin. There was staged 
the final display of the politics of the eye. There was the modern 
cult site of the revived German Urgemeinschaft communicated in all 
its might. Paavolainen confessed that no description could 
encompass it. Notwithstanding, he tried to tell what he saw. The 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 197-199. 
16 Ibid., 199. 
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lighting and atmosphere in Nuremberg town in the evening was 
ominous: all lamps had been dimmed and the streets leading out 
to the field were bordered by SS-men in black uniforms as if they 
were in mourning communicating the seriousness and holiness of 
the occasion. Towards the main scene, gigantic black flags waved 
and large, hot red swastika clothes were ghostly hanging from the 
tribune. The field ahead was ”terribly” alive, and only very slowly 
the ‘eye’ (Paavolainen) began to comprehend the expanse of the 
masses of men in straight lines. Their number was almost five 
times the size of the entire Finnish army17. The ensuing magic play, 
technically insuperable in the world at the time, was actually 
staged for them, the core of Hitler’s most loyal soldier-bodies. 
Invisible spot-lights in between the spectators’ balconies were lit, 
and 114 lamps shed flaming red light against the black sky. In front 
of the balconies, 250 meters away there was a stand on which the 
Führer suddenly, like a bolt from Heaven, appeared. This was a 
modern paragon of communication as revelation. Hitler was 
hailed, and as he took his first steps down, the whole field was 
surrounded by a “temple” formed of blue glaring columns of light 
issuing from 155 enormous spot-lights provided by the Wehrmacht. 
Colored by blue glass walls the parallel beams shot up to the 
cloudless, black sky reaching the stratosphere. To the eye of 
Paavolainen this sight was staggering.18 It communicated 
something superb and other-worldly while its immense power 
could be seen and felt. One million people stared up stunned and 
miraculously silent, their eyes nailed on the middle of the sky 
where the biggest semi-classical-style dome ever seen arched. 
Viewed as a whole, the united beams formed a formidable pagan 
temple, the dome of which could be seen as far as 250 kms away in 
Czechoslovakia. After a while the audience burst into ecstatic, 
childish joy. The message had gone through: the audience’s 
“primitive”, ritual senses were excited by the enormous visual 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 222. 
18 Ibid., picture at page 225. 
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effect. In the meantime, Hitler, now eventually transformed into an 
idol, had reached the honorary tribune, and a fantastic tribute was 
staged for him, a march of 25.000 flags.19 Eight red and silver flows 
of SS-men men cut the standing lines of soldiers on the field. The 
eye of Paavolainen was unable to follow the entire movement as it 
was transforming into “a barbaric dream, a pagan nightmare” in 
his head. One well-informed guest standing behind him whispered 
in his ear: “This reminds me of Assyria and Babylon”20. 
Paavolainen’s ability to take more was undermined and his head 
was full of ‘wild impressions’ while Dr Robert Ley, the 
choreographer of the cult ceremony, announced: “You – Hitler – 
Hitler – Hitler – we hail, and believe in God who has sent You to 
us”. And Hitler answered biblically: “I am with you and you are 
with me”. The crux of the communication of politics of the eye 
followed: “All of you cannot see me, but I can see you and you 
know me! Now we are one”21. The warlord of the Volksgemeinschaft 
had landed. It was the apotheosis of a human god and the birth of 
the first originally European 'religion' was announced. Hitler’s cult 
act sealed the German nation’s belief in him, and the last, 
portentous scene enhanced the message: by a curious chance a 
bright star shone through a hole in the sky opposite Hitler's stand. 
Was it the planet Mars? The last impression Paavolainen caught 
was the excitement of the crowds which almost frightened him as 
he left the scene in a throng. Taking a look back he saw the “blood-
red” flags reflected on the mirror of a river like “flames of a distant 
apocalypse”22.  
Musing over what he had seen, Paavolainen remembered the 
tragic fate of ancient Sparta. The breakthrough of the Nazi 
masculine cult was bound to lead to disaster, terrible destruction. 
In the Nazis’ image of the decadent Europe, there loomed the Jews, 
                                                 
19 Ibid., picture at page 253. 
20 Ibid., 224. 
21 Ibid., 226. 
22 Ibid., 227. 
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the Communists, the korpulente Bierphilister and other degenerates, 
all destined to death23. The “educated”, dynamic youth (Hitler 
Jugend) were geared to wipe them away. And the older generation 
watched their swift manoeuvres with embarrassment and shy 
benevolence: “This child-youth [15 years of age] was full of self-
confidence and self-esteem” bordering to arrogance. They behaved 
like “small, brown goblin Lords” flirting like adult soldiers with 
girls who offered flowers, but if commanded, they would in a 
second return to discipline. The sight of 45,000 such boys, many of 
them overstrained, behind the gates was repulsive to 
Paavolainen.24 There was no idyll in it. It was very different with 
the SA and SS-men. They had lived through the rise of National 
Socialism: its victory was to be theirs, too. Now they seemed to be 
anxiously waiting for the decisive order. Further cultic acts were 
unnecessary for them; they knew what was waiting for them and 
they were mentally prepared. This expectation was so powerfully 
communicated at Nuremberg that it frightened most of the 
spectators as much as it enchanted them. For Paavolainen it was an 
ambivalent experience: the admiration for the Nazi achievement he 
had initially cherished was in the end transformed into sharp 
critical insights telling of the imminent dangers hidden in the 
regime’s show of power. Politics of spectacle of the Nazis was 
meant to assure that they knew what they were doing. But for 
Paavolainen it was too much to swallow. 
No wonder Nazis did not like Paavolainen’s rhapsody and 
consequently he was never again allowed to enter the Third Reich. 
He had unveiled the mask of power by his penetrating gaze - 
exposed something which was not the normal politics of double 
                                                 
23  Ibid., 245. Paavolainen would not directly comment on the future fate of 
Jews since he was not shown any concentration camps but it transpires 
from his rhapsody that he realized that they were to be exterminated, and 
not only by the Nazis. 
24 Ibid., 353. 
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hypocrisy25 but grand seriousness bordering to satanic 
megalomania, i.e. preaching war for war's sake. For those who felt 
betrayed by the Versailles Peace treaties, e.g. the Hungarian 
revisionists or the dreamers of 'Greater Finland' in Finland, the 
Nazi message sounded promising but for those, e.g. the radical 
Left, who were horrified by it, it forebode yet another European 
catastrophe. To Paavolainen personally, the war came to his front 
door in three years time. 
                                                 
25 Cf. Runciman, David, Political Hypocrisy. The Mask of Power from 
Hobbes to Orwell and Beyond. Princeton University Press, Princeton – 
Oxford, 2008, 21. 
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Cultic heritage narratives of the ‘liberation’ 
 
This article deals with the interrelations of solemnity, seriousness, 
humor and irony in museum exhibitions, drawing on the case of 
the so-called ‘liberation exhibitions’ of socialist Hungary. I shall 
pose the question: Is the collective commemoration that takes place 
within the museum bound to be serious, and if so, what does this 
seriousness reveal as regards the institutional forms of 
remembering? I believe this question is especially interesting in the 
case of the ‘liberation exhibitions’ which were borne within a 
specific ideological framework with an attempt at exercising strict 
control over the meanings put forth in the exhibitions. Due to their 
controlled nature and cultural political mission of the Party, I 
regard the exhibitions as ‘cultic projections’ of the Hungarian 
society (1945–1985). First, I shall analyze the serious vs. playful 
nature of the exhibitions. With serious, I mean the attempt to 
control the meanings and taking oneself seriously – (‘oneself’ here 
referring to the representations of the socialist regime and the 
Hungarian society). Secondly, I shall reflect upon the possibilities 
of the realization of humor and irony within the context of the 
                                                 
1  This paper is part of a broader study which analyses the changing 
historical representations created and upheld by the liberation exhibitions 
and which aims at explicating the role of the liberation exhibitions in the 
museological debates on the representation of recent history. The present 
article uses elements of a paper given in ‘Cult and Memory’ conference 
held in Debrecen, Hungary, in November, 2006.  
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museum exhibition. Finally, I shall suggest that the notions of cult 
and heritage are closely related and manifest similar mechanisms 
of selection and legitimization.  
The term ‘liberation exhibition’2 refers to the festivities organized 
around the fourth of April, which took place in order to 
commemorate the “liberation” of Hungary by the Soviet troops 
from the Fascist-German occupation in 1945. As also reflected in the 
exhibitions, the “liberation” of 1945 served as a landmark event, the 
birth of the socialist Hungary, including a new chronology (as 
indicated by the anniversaries in the titles of the exhibitions). 
Further, the “liberation” of Hungary in 1945 was held as a dogma 
until the change of the regime around the turn of the 1980s and the 
1990s. 3  From the viewpoint of historical representation, the 
liberation exhibitions are interesting reflections of the official 
interpretations of history, though at the same time they manifest 
certain ideological tensions, which this article at least partially aims 
at explicating.  
It would go beyond the scope of this article to go back to the 
cultic roots of the museum, the museion of Antiquity4, or to ponder 
over the function of culturally meaningful artefacts as ‘relics’ or the 
                                                 
2  The analysis focuses on the central exhibitions organized every five years 
in various museums in Budapest: “Magyarország a szocializmus útján. 
1945–1960 (“Hungary on the Road to Socialism. 1945–1960”, Modern 
Historical Museum 1960), “A népi demokráciánk húsz esztendeje” (“The 
20 years of our People’s Democracy”, National Museum 1965), “25 éves a 
szabad Magyarország” (“The Free Hungary is 25 years old”, Museum of 
Fine Arts 1970), “Budapest felszabadítása és 30 éves fejlődése” (“The 
Liberation and the 30 years of development in the life of Budapest, 
Budapest History Museum 1975), “Művészet és társadalom 1945–1980 
(“Art and Society 1945–1980”, Műcsarnok 1980), “Utunk, életünk. 
Életmódbéli változások Magyarországon 1944–1985 (“Our Road, our Life. 
Life-style changes in Hungary 1944–1985”, Museum of Ethnography 1985).  
3  Ungváry, Krisztián, “Magyarország szovjetizálásának kérdései”. In: 
Romsics, Ignác, (Ed.), Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar 
történelemről. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002, 279-308. Also worth looking 
into is Ungváry’s witty analysis of the notion of “liberation” including its 
over- and undertones (within the same article).  
4  For an historical overview of museum, see Hooper-Greenhill, Eilean, 
Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge. Routledge, London, 1992. 
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‘resonance and wonder’ that (cultic) objects housed in museums 
evoke5. In other words, museums – historically speaking – are 
impregnated with cultic meaning-making which even the 
‘postmodern museum’ cannot escape. Suffice it to say that the 
museum as cultural practice feeds on this cultic dimension, and at 
the same time, the museum contributes to the (re)production of 
cults and cultic representations. In this respect, the liberation 
exhibitions can be approached as cultic representations of the 
Hungarian society. The exhibitions built around political 
anniversaries reflect a kind of ‘cultic heritage narrative’ 
constructed according to the official ideology of the era. Further, 
the collective celebration of anniversaries can be seen as ritual 
enacting of memory, which again bears close resemblance to cult-
related practices. Viewing from a slightly different angle, the 
commemorative practises manifested in the exhibitions can be seen 
as ritual consumption of culturally meaningful artefacts, projected 
in a heritage-space which at least in part feeds on myths, legends 
and (deliberate) misconceptions of the past. This is not to say that 
cults would merely be a blend of the aforementioned elements, but, 
moreover, a symbolic source a given culture springs from. 
Therefore, if not cults per se, this article aims at exploring historical 
representations of the Hungarian society in a cult-related context, 
which draws on “compulsive anniversaryism”6 and repetitive use 
of cultural texts. 
It is not by coincidence that the historical representations of the 
exhibitions are approached as ‘cultic heritage narrative’. In his 
three-fold definition of cult, Péter Dávidházi distinguishes cult in 
                                                 
5  On the notions of resonance and wonder in relation to objects, see 
Greenblatt, Stephen J., Learning to Curse. Essays on Early Modern Culture. 
Routledge, New York, 1990. 
6  The notion of ‘anniversaryism’ derives from Peter Fowler, which he 
elaborates in the following manner: “We celebrate ourselves, organizations, 
our places, our heroes, sometimes our authentic, significant history; we 
even celebrate celebrations and commemorate disasters. That deemed 
worthy of official national celebration comes from a very filtered sort of 
history.” See Fowler, Peter J., The Past in Contemporary Society. Then, now. 
Routledge, London, 1992, 40.  
VEERA RAUTAVUOMA  
 140
terms of attitudes, ritual and language use.7 It would be bold to go 
as far as to claim that the phenomenon of the liberation exhibitions 
would be equal to a cult but it certainly manifests cultic aspects.8 
Measuring against Dávidházi’s definition, the ritual and 
behavioral aspect gains emphasis in the case of the exhibitions 
through the relic worship and jubilees (which the commemoration 
of anniversary is par excellence). Considering the aspect of language 
use of the exhibitions, leaving aside religious metaphors, what is 
evident are “statements with no claim to (empirical) verifiability”.9 
This bears curious resemblance to the tensions around the notion 
of ‘heritage’, which is prone to be uncritical and celebratory. Kevin 
Walsh10  claims that all nations and societies aim to produce a 
collective memory which is “founded on an idea of age-old organic 
traditions”: “This tradition demands that history is placed in a 
past-pluperfect, and is therefore beyond question”. This idea of 
“past beyond question” is related to Dávidházi’s unquestionable 
value manifested in the core of cult, but at the same time, it bears 
resemblance to the notion of doxa in the Bourdieuan sense of the 
word as the experience by which “the natural and social world 
appears as self-evident”, denoting thus what is taken for granted 
in any particular society.11 Along this line of thought, “[Museums] 
are places for telling, and telling again, the stories of our time, ones 
                                                 
7  Dávidházi, Péter, The Romantic Cult of Shakespeare. Literary Reception in 
Anthropological Perspective. Plagrave, New York, 2002, 8. 
8  In a similar fashion, Gyáni does not discuss the issues of commemorative 
memory and historical legitimatization under the subheading of ‘Cultic 
Past’ (Kultikus múlt) but as filed under “The collective memory of the 
past” (A múlt kollektív emlékezete), even though his considerations on 
commemorative practices and political holidays certainly are in 
approximation to the cultic dimension, not least through his explication 
of ‘the rites of commemorative canon’ (emlékezeti kánon rítusai). See Gyáni, 
Gábor, “Kommemoratív emlékezet és történelmi igazolás”, Relatív 
történelem. Typotex, Budapest, 2007, 89-110.  
9  Dávidházi, The Romantic Cult of Shakespeare, 8.  
10  Walsh, Kevin, The Representation of the Past. Museums and Heritage in the 
Post-modern World. Routledge, London, 1992, 126-7. 
11  Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice. Transl. R. Nice. C.U.P. 
1977 [1972], 164. 
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which have become a doxa through their endless repetition. If the 
meaning of a museum artefact seems to go without saying, this is 
only because it has been said so many times.”12 Thus, from “past 
beyond question” and “compulsive anniversaryism” we do not 
need to take a giant leap to arrive at Gábor Gyáni’s13 notion of 
“tradition-cult”, with which he means the legitimization of 
political and cultural pursuits with a reference to the maintenance 
of traditions. Paradoxically, this results in active (re-)creation of 
tradition, manifested also by the appearance of new celebrations in 
the calendar of the Socialist Hungary.  
 
Irony and humor – killers of solemn commemoration? 
 
The collective, institutional commemoration may be 
characterized as solemn and serious. Exhibitions serve both the 
collective memory and the very act of commemoration. The 
liberation exhibitions were often referred to as jubilee exhibitions 
or memorial exhibitions (jubileum kiállítás, emlékkiállítás), of which 
the former highlights the ceremonial and celebratory nature of the 
exhibition, the latter its commemorating function. The festivities to 
commemorate the milepost of the liberation were to be “worthy of 
the festive occasion” (méltó az ünnephez), as echoed in the opening 
speeches, exhibition plans and the guestbook entries. 14  Jubilee 
exhibitions, besides their role of providing the counterpart for the 
every-day and the mundane, underline the present moment: we 
are here, it is now that we remember. In addition, the highlighted 
present serves the symbolic act of returning to the point of 
departure, and while traversing again the road taken (cf. “Our 
road”, “on the road” in the titles of the exhibitions), evaluating the 
achievements in the light of the present and the future.  
                                                 
12  Bennet, Tony, The Birth of the Museum. History, Theory, Politics. Routledge, 
London and New York, 1995, 147. 
13  Gyáni, Gábor, “A hagyomány mint politikai kultusz”, 2000, (1992, 7.), 3-6. 
14  On the ceremonial readings of the exhibitions, see Rautavuoma, 
Veera, ”The Imagined Communities of a Guestbook”, In. Cult, Community, 
Identity. Publication Series of the Research Centre for Contemporary 
Culture 97. University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, 2009, 209-218. 
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If commemorations are bound to take solemn and serious forms, 
where does humor or irony fit in? An even more complex issue is 
to try to find the locii of humor and irony in the exhibitions that 
now exist only through their textual remains. Above, “serious” 
was defined as discourse which takes itself seriously and attempts 
to control its meanings. Along these lines, humor can be defined as 
a form of non-serious discourse15 which to some extent is related to 
irony whose “meaning is always other than and more than the 
said”. 16  Humorous is often identical with witty, which often 
provides for solidarity but which at the same time can be exclusive 
and ridiculing – this is to say dangerous, both in social and 
ideological terms. Irony may be even more dangerous, in the sense 
that it often bears trans-ideological functions towards or against 
something or someone. What is more, irony in its self-reflexive and 
self-critical mode may challenge the discursive hierarchies17 which 
are all the more essential in view of strongly controlled ideological 
constructions. Neither humor nor irony can be separated from its 
discursive context, without which the meanings are very difficult, 
if not impossible to interpret. 18  Further, both discursive 
phenomena may be approached from the viewpoint that – despite 
the fact that their meanings cannot be interpreted “as such” – they 
nevertheless reveal a great deal about the values and the possible 
ways of interpreting their social realities. Humor and irony can 
have similar effects, based as they are upon the incongruity 
between the usual and the unexpected, the said and the unsaid.19 
In ideological terms, humor and irony can manifest critical 
positions and function as a tool to oppose the dominant discourse. 
Another question, however, is where exactly the humor or irony 
can be found – especially afterwards – in the multidimensional 
                                                 
15  Mulkay, Michael, On Humour. Its nature and place in modern society. 
Cambridge, 1988, 22-38. 
16  Hutcheon, Linda, Irony's Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony. Routledge, 
London & New York, 1994, 12-13.  
17  Siegle, Robert, The Politics of Reflexivity: Narrative and the Constitutive 
Poetics of Culture. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, 390. 
18  Mulkay, On Humour, 57-92.  
19  Hutcheon, Irony's Edge, 62.  
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narrative of the exhibition.20 This question is difficult to pin down 
for three reasons. First of all, humor and irony entails two actors: 
they are created in a specific discourse between the writer’s 
intention and the individual readings of a certain text. In this sense, 
the only mode of finding out about the possible (implicit) ironizing 
intentions of the exhibition curators is through their own accounts 
(e.g. Péter Szuhay’s account on a liberation exhibition in The 
Museum of Ethnography21). Equally scarce information is available 
concerning the visitors’ interpretations of these exhibitions.22 The 
second problem has to do with the fragmentary character of the 
research material. Since the exhibition scripts contain only one level 
of the multilayered exhibition narrative which consists of visual 
elements and use of space, the entire exhibition narratives are no 
longer available for inspection. The third problem is connected to 
the time lapse between the exhibition and its interpretation in the 
present. It is worthwhile to ponder over the question: Do discourses 
born in a certain ideological and historical context inevitably 
become ironic as they are interpreted in the present, when the 
control of the previous regime no longer has a hold over the 
meanings? 23  This question is especially relevant in the case of 
totalitarian regimes, with regard to the symbolic order they 
                                                 
20  On the challenges of reading museum exhibitions, see MacDonald, Sharon 
and Fyfe, Gordon (Eds.), Theorizing Museums. Representing identity and 
diversity in a changing world. Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge, 1996, 1-14.  
21  Szuhay, Péter, “Hagyományok és újítások a Néprajzi Múzeum kiállítási 
törekvéseiben 1980-2000”. Néprajzi Értesítő 2002. Annales Musei Ethno-
graphiae. Néprajzi Múzeum, Budapest, 2003, 77-96.  
22  On the use of guest books as research material, see Rautavuoma, 
Veera,  ”The Imagined Communities of a Guestbook”, In. Cult, Community, 
Identity. Publication Series of the Research Centre for Contemporary 
Culture 97. University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, 2009, 209-218.  
23  Also Gyáni takes up the question of irony in relation to the study of cults 
in his overview of the history the Hungarian study of cults which sprang 
among literary historians in their attempt to pin down the phenomena 
and processes in the history of literature that – strictly speaking – extend 
the scope of history of literature ‘proper’. In part, this resulted in literary 
historians exchanging the dominant solemn academic tones with ironic 
tones. See, Gyáni, Relatív történelem, 21-36.  
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maintain. After the collapse of the socialist regime, it is difficult not 
to put such terms as “liberation” or “counterrevolution” into 
quotation marks, but by so doing, we not only refer to the language 
use of the former regime but also bring in an element of irony.24  
 
Staging the tragedies and comedies of history 
 
The “liberation” of 1945 was inevitably one of the most 
important dates in the political calendar under the Hungarian 
socialism. 25  The exhibitions were first and foremost jubilee 
exhibitions, with the air of celebration encoded in their messages. 
According to the script, the aim of the exhibition curators in 1960 
was to conclude the exhibition “with festive atmosphere”26 (Figure 1),  
Figure 1: AD-I-1691-80. Socialist perspectives in Budapest, Hungary and 
worldwide: the “festive atmosphere” of the 1960 exhibition. 
                                                 
24  Hutcheon remarks that quotation marks can be used for the purpose 
of ”framing with irony”. See Hutcheon, Irony's Edge, 145. 
25  On communist political holidays, see Szabó Ildikó, A pártállam gyermekei. 
Tanulmányok a magyar politikai szocializációról. Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest:, 2000, 104-109; Gyáni, Relatív történelem, 96-97.  
26  The historical archive of the National Museum of Hungary (Magyar 
Nemzeti Múzeum Történeti Adattára, AD) AD-I-194-75/1  
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while in 1970, the aim was to create a “realistic, uplifting and 
inspiring effect”.27 What was this festivity and ceremonial nature 
made of? Typically, descriptions of the losses of the Second World 
War, the admiration of the strenuous reconstruction and a look 
into the future perspectives, mostly with citations from major 
politicians or congresses of the Communist Party. However, while 
skimming through the exhibitions, it becomes evident that the 
ceremonious character was over the years modified in terms of 
style and content, so that the exhibitions gained a lighter and far 
less grave tone. The exhibition of 1970 had an epilogue-like 
caricature exhibition entitled “This is how we live”. According to 
the exhibition plan, the main idea behind this closing part of the 
exhibition was to give insights into the way the events of ever-day  
Figure 2: AD-I-1690-80. Caricature exhibition for “relaxed and cheerful spirits”. “This is 
how  we live” as an epilogue to the exhibition proper in 1970. 
life are rooted in the history of the recent twenty-five years, along 
with the problems that have been faced, are being faced at the 
                                                 
27  AD-I-367-75  
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moment and will have to be faced in the future.28 At the same time, 
the caricature exhibition had been created in order to make sure 
the museum visitor leaves the museum in relaxed and cheerful 
spirits. 29  This can be interpreted as an attempt to “brush the 
museum visitor in” to the ideological message of the exhibition 
with the help of the relatively safe and politically correct humor of 
the caricature exhibition. Consequently, the humor applied in the 
exhibition was separated from the grave, ceremonious part of the 
exhibition (Figure 2), though there were counter-arguments 
against the inclusion of the caricatures in the exhibition, partly 
because the caricatures could endanger the seriousness of the 
exhibition as a whole.  
A different kind of modification of the solemn tones appears in 
the exhibition invitation of the liberation exhibition of 1970. The 
back-cover of the first version presents the Liberation Memorial30 
on top of the Gellert Hill. In the final version, however, this 
gloomy image has been replaced with the reproduction of Arnold 
Gross’s copper engraving entitled “The City of Blue Dreams” (Kék 
álmok városa). The message is clear: let us celebrate the liberation 
rather with dream-like images than in the shadow of the Soviet 
soldier’s machine-gun (Figures 3-6). Similar changes of tone seem 
to appear together with the more overt discussion on the role of 
humor in the exhibitions. In the memos of the exhibition of 1985, 
the absence of humor is criticized, along with the grave tones of 
the quotations from the congresses of the Socialist Party.31  
                                                 
28  AD-I-387-75 
29  Ibid.  
30  The memorial, designed by Zsigmond Kisfaludy Strobl in 1947, consists 
of a female figure holding a palm leaf above her head, a Soviet solder and 
male figures killing a dragon. The memorial is still in its place, though 
several elements have been removed, including the memorial plate that 
spoke out the gratitude of the Hungarian nation to the liberators. The 
figure of the Soviet soldier is now in the Statue Park on the outskirts of 
Budapest, designed to house “the gigantic memorials from the 
communist dictatorship”, as is stated on the homepage of the Statue Park 
(http://www.szoborpark.hu).  
31  The ethnographic archive of the Hungarian Museum of Ethnography 
(Néprajzi Múzeum Ethnológiai Adattár, EAD) EAD 17/1985  
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Figures 3.-4: AD-I.367-75 1. and 2. version of the exhibition invitation in 1970.  
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Figures 5.-6: AD-I.367-75. Blue dreams instead of the memory of the Soviet soldier: 1. 
and 2. version of the back-cover of the invitation. 
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There seems to be an interesting parallel between the historical 
representations and the display politics 32  of the exhibition. 
According to current exhibition criticism, the excessive reduction 
of “historical facts” led into “anaemic” exhibitions.33 As a result, 
the national history was narrowed down to the history of the 
Party.34 While the mode of display of political history is “separate 
from life”35 and the focus of the entire exhibition is on political 
history, it seems that the mode of display is rather grave and 
ceremonious, which leaves little space for emotions. Paradoxically, 
the aim was to achieve a ceremonious and festive effect, but on the 
level of the museum display this goal was not achieved. The same 
issue was brought up in a criticism by Károly Vörös36 five years 
later, with a reference to the absence of conflicts and paradoxes37 in 
the exhibition of 1970, though these are the elements a Marxist 
exhibition should draw on. Marxist political history, impregnated 
with an optimistic future-orientation, was set out to record and 
highlight the achievements on the road to the Paradise of 
Socialism.38 Along these lines, the creation of binary oppositions 
between the sad past, the promising present and the glorious 
                                                 
32  Here, display politics is understood as the multiple consequences of 
displaying culturally significant artifacts, thus rendering them to 
the ’museum gaze’, which in itself is a cultural artifact. For further 
discussion on the politics of display, see e.g. Karp & Lavin (Eds.), 
Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display. Smithsonian 
Institution Press: Washington DC and London, 1991.  
33  Gerelyes, Ede, “A felszabadulási kiállítások tanulságai”. Legújabbkori 
Múzeumi Közlemények, 1965:2-3. 12.  
34  Ibidem.  
35  Ibid., 11.  
36  Historian, influential figure within Hungarian museology, who worked e.g. 
in the Budapest Museum of History, later in the Ministry of Education and 
the Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
37  Vörös, Károly, “Jegyzetek a ‘25 éves a szabad Magyarország’ című 
kiállítás megtekintése után”. Magyar Munkásmozgalmi Múzeumi Közle-
mények 1970:1, 83-84.  
38  See Halmesvirta, Anssi, ”Suomen historian roistot ja sankarit 
unkarilaisille tarjoiltuna”. In: Ahonen, Kalevi et al (Eds.), Toivon historia. 
Gummerus, University of Jyväskylä, 2003, 210.  
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future was a widely-accepted tool for promoting ideological and 
cultural political goals. As Sallay Ditróiné points out: “From a 
cultural political viewpoint, it is good to keep in mind the past, 
since by contrasting the new and the old system we can prove our 
progress”.39  
An even greater problem according to Vörös is the omission of 
tragedy – and here Vörös means the personality cult of Mátyás 
Rákosi40 that took place around the turn of 1940s and 1950s, which 
Vörös calls “the most tragic element of the time”. Because of this 
omission, claims Vörös, the museum visitors are not able to 
experience the pathos embedded in the tragic events. If there is no 
tragedy, the “healthy forces” working behind the tragedy are left 
unnoticed. However, in Vörös’s view, tragedy is not complete 
without comedy. What is more, Vörös calls for humor organically 
built into the exhibition; the caricature exhibition in the closing 
part of the exhibition is in itself insufficient. This is to say that 
according to his line of thought, the over-all image of the era is 
incomplete without both tragedy and comedy. Interestingly 
enough, Vörös calls for the kind of narration and plot-structure of 
Hungarian recent history that echoes the metahistorical elements 
of historiography that Hayden White criticizes. As White points 
out in his much-debated and polemical study, “to historicize any 
structure, to write its history, is to mythologize it”.41 Even if we did 
not agree with White’s extreme conceptions on the interrelatedness 
of fiction and historiography, we may for the moment turn into his 
famous categorization of nineteenth century history. White has 
identified features in the nineteenth century writing of history that 
remind of elements in fictive texts. He claims that historiography 
in the nineteenth century is a plotted spiral beginning and ending 
with irony, and in between there is romance, tragedy and comedy, 
                                                 
39  See e.g. Ditróiné Sallay, Katalin, ”Művelődéspolitika és a múzeumok”, 
Déri Múzeum Évkönyve 1972, Debrecen, 1972. 621.  
40  Cf. Apor’s article in this volume and his “A Rákosi-kultusz” in Rubicon, 
2007/9, passim.  
41 White, Hayden, Tropics of Discourse. Essays on Cultural Criticism. The John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978 [1985], 104. 
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in this order. 42  Although somewhat far-fetched, the parallels 
between White’s categories and the elements that Vörös judged as 
missing from the exhibition may with further investigation prove 
telling. Whereas White’s spiral begins and ends with irony, there is 
no mention of irony in Vörös’s account. If we consider irony as 
being related to the notion of the “inadequacy of language to its full 
presentation of its object”43, there are no doubts whatsoever in 
Vörös’s criticism that would hint at any uncertainties as regards the 
possibilities of “truthful” representation. This is hardly surprising, 
since Marxist political history and historical materialism were prone 
to leave aside the considerations of the limits of representation.  
Another ‘tragic element’, the dramatic power of which the 
exhibition had left unnoticed, were the tragic events of 1956, and – 
naturally – this has not been discussed in the memos, articles or 
exhibition criticism. However, this (dogmatic) omission is taken up 
in one guestbook entry of the 1970 exhibition. The entire entry is as 
follows: “1945 – 1970/1956 [signature]”44 It is obvious that the 
benefits of the contrast and comparison of some ‘gloomy past’ and 
victorious present may be applied only if these tragic elements fall 
out of the historical era (1944/1945 – present) that is being 
celebrated in the exhibition.  
Currently, what cultural critics and new historicists have 
emphasised is the “fact” that “Both history and fiction are 
discourses that constitute systems of signification by which we 
make sense of the past”. 45  This “theoretical self-awareness of 
history and fiction as human constructs” is what Hutcheon calls 
‘historiographic metafiction’.46 Thus, to call for such metahistorical 
or metafictional elements in a museum exhibition is – in addition 
to highlighting certain elements of recent past – in fact a demand 
                                                 
42  White, Hayden, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973, 8-10.  
43  White, Tropics of Discourse, 207. 
44  AD-I-133-75 A “25 éves a szabad Magyarország” vendégkönyve I-II. 
45  Hutcheon, Linda, A Poetics of Postmodernism. History, Theory, Fiction. 
Routledge, London, 1988, 89. 
46  Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 5.  
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to mythologize the past to some extent for the purpose of attaining 
a powerful representation in the heritage space.  
To risk oversimplification, a more or less linear process can be 
traced in the liberation exhibitions over the years 1960-1985. The 
overtly controlled, ceremoniously grave political-history-driven 
representations evolve into wider displays, which combine societal 
representation and elements of every-day living, occasionally 
deploying lighter tones and humor. This change is reflected in the 
titles of the exhibitions. While in the 1960s and 1970s, titles such as 
“Free Hungary is 25 years old” were predominant, the working 
title of the exhibition of 1980 was “Generations” and the final title 
“Art and Society 1945-1980”. The focus is clearly shifted towards 
the description of social processes. In a sense, this shift in focus 
seems inevitable: in 1980, there is much more “history” to choose 
from than there was in 1965, if the milepost of 1945 is the point of  
Figure 7: AD-I-1727-80. The ceremoneous meets the everyday on the grass-root 
level in 1980. 
departure. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the earlier exhibitions 
had to constrain themselves to the political-ideological changes, 
since societal processes (as reflected in the material culture) are 
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much more gradual and rather invisible in the early years of 
socialism. These shifts in focus and style were not so clear-cut and  
 Figure 8: AD-I-1727-80. Detail of the “unaccustomed look” of the exhibition in 1980, 
which manifests “the power of evidence based on the parallel presence of separate 
collections”  (Fodor 1980:43, 45). 
linear, however. For instance, the exhibition of 1980 bears a great 
deal of inner tension, since it seems to be hovering between the 
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ceremonious and the mundane. On the one hand, the exhibition 
contained a vast number of works of art borne in the spirit of 
“liberation”, but on the other, there was an attempt to descend to 
the grass-root level (see the kindergarten-interior, Figure 7) or an 
attempt at creating surprising or humorous montages (Figure 8). 
The exhibition of 1985 follows this path, and as its sub-heading 
“Change of lifestyles” states, the presentation of the ideological 
milestones is followed by the fore-grounding of the everyday of 
the Hungarian society. The exhibition memos reveal that the 
original title would have been “the Hungarian everyday” (“Magyar 
hétköznapok”), which manifests intriguing tension in relation to the 
practice of celebrating the political anniversaries.  
 
Laughing with or laughing at? 
 
It could thus be concluded that the ceremonious character of 
institutional commemoration is primarily gravity. Or is it? In a 
heavily ideological context, which aims at control over the 
meanings and which turns non-ideological phenomena into 
ideological phenomena through its mode of presentation, gravity 
indeed seems to be a norm. The problem is that presenting the 
ideological-political changes with the help of the museum toolkit 
results in an inconsistent narrative, since making use of the 
museum apparatus in showing and telling entails using artifacts, 
most of which are non-ideological in their essence, to manifest 
ideological changes. 47  Thus, if we read the meanings as their 
‘primary’ meanings in the exhibition, they easily acquire ironic 
tones. As Péter Szuhay48 notes in his historical overview of the 
exhibitions in the Museum of Ethnography, the exhibition of 1985 
can be read on two different levels. According to Szuhay, “the first 
                                                 
47  On the issue of exhibitability, see Michael Baxandall, “Exhibiting 
Intention: Some Preconditions of the Visual Display of Culturally 
Purposeful Objects”. In. Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavin (Eds.), Exhibiting 
Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display. Smithsonian 
Institution Press, Washington DC and London, 1991).  
48  Szuhay, “Hagyományok és újítások a Néprajzi Múzeum kiállítási 
törekvéseiben 1980-2000”, 77-96. 
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level strives for a scientific guise. It is serious and takes itself 
seriously”49, i.e. holds on to the ideological expectations. The other 
level is “airy and playful, at times witty and prone to self-irony”, 
and it is in this respect that Szuhay sees the novelty of the 
exhibition weighed against the history of exhibition-making in the 
Museum of Ethnography. According to Szuhay, the message of the 
exhibition can be summarized in the following manner: “[W]e 
were liberated, and survived countless setbacks such as 
compulsory delivery, the shared rental flat and the “counter-
revolution” just to jump into our Trabants from our tiny housing 
estate flats and leave behind the worries of the society and escape 
into our weekend places. Could this be Canaan?” 50  It is safe 
enough to say that this message is utterly ironic. Another question 
is what kind of reaction the irony arouses in the museum visitor, or 
whether it comes through in his or her reading. As Szuhay notes, 
the visitor is likely to read the messages put forth in the exhibition 
in a serious manner, applying the aforementioned, first level of 
interpretation. 51  In this reading, it is rather the societal 
development and the rising of the standard of living that shifts into 
the focal point of the exhibition.  
The possibility of ironic reading of the exhibition is not 
exclusive of the exhibition discussed above. Rather, all exhibitions 
can be read on either of the two levels, or possibly moving between 
them. Irony can appear in an exhibition through the ironizing 
intention of the museum curator(s), or on the visitor’s behalf, or 
them both. Moreover, ironic readings are possible even if the 
museum curators had no ironic intention. As objects and 
documents obtain their places in the multidimensional museum 
display, ironic montages may be created also unintentionally.52 The 
museum text can gain ironic tones, for instance, due to some 
perceptible contradiction of incongruity but on this basis there is 
                                                 
49  Translations by the present author.  
50  Szuhay, “Hagyományok és újítások a Néprajzi Múzeum kiállítási törek-
véseiben 1980-2000”, 84.  
51  Ibid.  
52  On ironic montages in museum exhibition, see Hutcheon, Irony's Edge, 
176-178.  
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not much we can say about the intentions of the curator(s). Further, 
the visitor can also make up ironic montages through roaming 
around the exhibition and thus creating links and connections 
originally not contained in the exhibition narrative. It is obvious, 
however, that in the case of the liberation exhibitions, the irony 
could be present on the curators’ behalf only covertly with no 
traces of it in the exhibition scripts or opening speeches. Hence, the 
attribution of irony was left to the visitors.53 Indeed, traces of ironic 
readings of the exhibitions can be found in the guestbook entries of 
the exhibitions. These include, for instance, refererences to the 
exhibition as an impressive ‘mausoleum’ (with the entry signed by 
‘Lenin’). 54  In another entry, the undersigned congratulates the 
curators on creating an exhibition of such high level that it 
remained beyond his reach, even if he used a ladder (“A kiállításnak 
olyan magas a színvonala, hogy létrával sem értem föl.”)55. This latter 
remark can be read as an ironic re-reading of the typical guestbook 
entries that first congratulated or thanked the curators, then 
included appreciative remarks on the success of the exhibition, for 
instance, the didactically and aesthetically ‘high level’ it had 
achieved.  
Considering the aim of the present article to pin down the 
interplay of the ceremonious, the grave, the humorous and the 
ironic in the liberation exhibitions, the discussion of irony may 
appear overrepresented. This is hardly surprising, given the fact 
that we are dealing with a phenomenon that heavily draws on an 
official ideology, or moreover, can be seen as its reflection. 
Through the exhibitions, the regime attempted to put forth its own 
truth(s), and if someone was reluctant to accept them, one possible 
mode of opposition was the attribution of irony. Humor is often 
applied to achieve a feel-good effect (as in the case of the caricature 
exhibition in 1970), but at the same time it can be critical (as the 
                                                 
53  See Rautavuoma, Veera, ”The Imagined Communities of a Guestbook”, 
In. Cult, Community, Identity. Publication Series of the Research Centre for 
Contemporary Culture 97. University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, 2009, 209-
218.  
54  AD-I-133-75  
55  Ibid.  
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same example shows, since the caricatures illustrated problems of 
the Hungarian society). In a similar fashion, irony can take up 
many guises and functions, from the oppositional, trans-
ideological function to distancing and mere playfulness.56  
In the light of the exhibition scripts, drafts, memos, and current 
museological writings57, it seems that in 1960 and 1965 humor is 
not even mentioned, whereas in the exhibition of 1975, it became a 
theme both in the work process of creating the display and in the 
exhibition proper, in the form of caricatures. In 1965, the curators 
are warned about the dangers of humor58, in 1970 its absence is 
criticized in the exhibition criticism, in the memos, and in the audit 
statements (lektori vélemény). However, in 1980, humor is not 
brought up in the discussions about the exhibition, and the 
exhibition criticism concentrates on the new concept of the 
simultaneous display of historical documents and elements of 
visual culture in order to evoke an era.59 Then again, the exhibition 
continues the projection of the society and lifestyle, which is made 
all the more explicit in the last exhibition in 1985. With the last 
exhibition, Szuhay’s account hints at the curators’ awareness of the 
ironic reading and its possible consequences on the meanings but, 
at the same time, we have to ask to what extent this awareness is 
the product of hindsight, of looking back upon the exhibition from 
the framework of the present.  
What can then be concluded about the appearance of humor 
and irony in the liberation exhibition, or in more general terms, on 
the role of humor and irony with regard to the collective memory 
                                                 
56  On the functions of irony, see Hutcheon, Irony's Edge, 46-56.  
57  Conference papers and exhibition criticism and other debate within the 
museum profession, mostly published in the yearbooks or publication 
series of museums or in the Múzeumi Közlemények, published by the 
ministries responsible for the museum sector.  
58  In the overview of the 20th anniversary exhibitions, Gerelyes remarks on 
the potential “negative effect” of humor in the exhibitions, though does 
not explicate on the matter. Gerelyes, “A felszabadulási kiállítások 
tanulságai”, 11.  
59  Fodor, Péter, “Művészet és társadalom 1945–1980. Rendhagyó tárlat a 
Műcsarnokban”. Múzeumi Közlemények 1980/2, 43-47.  
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upheld in museums? One way of approaching the question is to 
claim that the realization, the happening of humor or irony in a 
museum exhibition works as a proof for the working of the 
collective memory. This is to say that the operability of collective 
memory is due to the amount and character of mutual knowledge 
a society has in its possession for the humor and the irony to 
function. Ceremonious commemoration may contain ironic and 
humorous tones, and thus, on a more general level, they may have 
contributed to humorous or ironic representations of the recent 
past. Another question is, however, what effects irony or humor 
has on memory?  
 
Cultic heritage: enacting the past beyond question  
 
Museum as a memory institution is designated for creating and 
maintaining memory and for preserving what is worthy of 
preservation. In contrast, most museum exhibitions, including the 
liberation exhibitions, do not exactly create enduring memory. Due 
to their anniversary commemorative function, the exhibitions were 
doomed to temporariness: they were created to celebrate and 
commemorate one moment in time, and with the passing of the 
anniversary, the exhibitions were pulled down. Despite their 
inherent temporariness, it is still worthwhile to approach these 
exhibitions from the viewpoint of memory. Despite the dogmatic 
(or cultic) frame of the commemoration as a collective ritual, the 
exhibition practices do contain ingredients that hint at dynamics 
and multiple voices, even if they did not leave permanent imprints 
on the collective memory.  
According to Andreas Huyssen, “No matter how much the 
museum, consciously or unconsciously, produces and affirms the 
symbolic order, there is always a surplus of meaning that exceeds 
set ideological boundaries, opening spaces for reflection and 
counter-hegemonic memory”.60 Focusing on the issues of humor 
and irony may reveal tensions of alternative views and multiple 
voices in the heritage narrative that belong to the dynamics of 
                                                 
60  Huyssen, Andreas, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of 
Amnesia. Routledge, New York, 1995, 15.  
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institutional memory and thus carry in them the potential for 
change. However, the tension of memory is not the only tension 
present in the exhibitions and their cultic or cult-like 
representations. Equally essential are the questions of heritage, and 
the tension that the notion of heritage is inherently grounded upon: 
it appears as constantly moving between the poles of authenticity 
and fabrication. The same is true for cults: they seem to manifest 
the unquestionable, the (god-)given but at the same time 
incorporate a critical edge, an in-built awareness of their 
constructed character. Much of the realm of what is commonly 
called “heritage”, the ways history is used for different purposes, 
draws on this kind of mythologizing of the past, and indeed, the 
study of cults can be seen as shedding light on these processes and 
practices of mythologization. 
Given the account above, the “cultic revelations” in the context 
of the liberation exhibitions (or the museum as a site for collective 
memory) are rather tentative, if not hypothetical. Still, it is my 
belief that the interrelatedness of memory, heritage and cult would 
deserve further investigation. It is unlikely that the relations 
between cult, memory, and canonical past with its dogmatic 
conceptions of history can somehow be unmasked. Anyhow, such 
investigations shed light on the birth and upholding of past-related 
canons manifested in the ritual enacting of memory actualized in 
political anniversaries. More specifically, taking a closer look at the 
commemorative exhibition practices may prove revealing, owing 
to the enhanced presence of events projected in the heritage-space 
of the museum.  
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Zsuzsanna Varga 
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: A CULTIC PLACE OF 
THE HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURE – BÁBOLNA 
FARM  
 
 
During the course of history, mankind has produced numerous 
cultic places. Most of them, reminding us of the glorious past and 
strengthening our identity belong to a religious or war experiences. 
A place like Bábolna, where it is the successful performance in 
agricultural produce that provides the foundation for a cultic 
place, is a true rarity. As a clear indication of this, the State Farm 
had been a prominent locality for VIP guests to visit – such as 
kings, dukes, presidents, prime ministers, ministers of agriculture, 
secretary-generals of socialist countries.  
Even a quick look into the visitors’ book of Bábolna offers us a 
variegated and impressive list of visitors. N.S. Khrushchev, 
Secretary General of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Haile  
Photo 1: Kekkonen admires Hungarian agriculture. (Published with 
the courtesy of the Kekkonen Archives, Orimattila, Finland.) 
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Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, both in 1964, Josef Klaus, Federal 
Chancellor of Austria in 1967, Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of the 
Republic of Finland in 1963 and 19691 (Photo 1), Ib Frederiksen, 
Minister of Agriculture of Denmark in 1972, Philip, Royal Archduke 
of England in 1973, P. Bratelli, Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Norway in 1974, Al-Atiki, Minister of Financial and Oil Affairs of 
Kuwait in 1975, Earl L. Butz, Minister of Agriculture, US in 1975, 
Josef Ertl, Minister of Agriculture of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1977, Raul Castro Ruz, General of the Revolutionary 
Army of Cuba, Minister of Defense in 1977, Reza Pahlavi, Shah of 
Iran in 1978, R.S. Bergland, Minister of Agriculture, US, in 1978, 
Ramalho Eanes, President of the Republic of Portugal in 1978, E.A. 
Sevardnadze, member of the Political Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party in 1981, M.S. Gorbachev, Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1983, John Block, 
Minister of Agriculture, US, in 1985.  
Reading this list of exquisite visitors, which is no more than a 
brief sample makes you wonder about the secret of Bábolna’s 
attraction. What were the special characteristics that aroused the 
interest of politicians coming not only from the socialist but also 
the top capitalist countries?  
The formation and maintaining of Bábolna as a cultic place is 
tied to the Kádár-regime, it actually served as a national and 
international legitimation for it.2 It is therefore interesting to learn 
                                                 
1  Kekkonen was so impressed that he announced: “If all state farms were 
like this, Hungary would have the most developed agriculture in the 
world.” Kekkonen to Kádár 29th of Sept. 1969. MOL. Finn–KüM. Finn 44-
131-XIX-J/-j-Finn1. 002242-1969.37d. 
2  For an introduction to the history of the Kádár-era in English see: Iván T. 
Berend – György Ránki, The Hungarian Economy in the Twentieth Century. 
Sydney, London, 1985; Lajos Izsák, A Political History of Hungary 1944-
1990. Eötvös University Press, Budapest, 2002; Ignác Romsics: Hungary in 
the Twentieth Century. Corvina – Osiris, Budapest, 1999; Nigel Swain: 
Hungary. The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism. Verso, London & New York, 
1992; Rudolf L. Tőkés: Hungary's Negotiated Revolution. Economic Reform, 
Social Change and Political Succession, 1957-1990. Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. 
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: A CULTIC PLACE...  
 163
about the history of this peculiar ‘socialist creation’, including the 
antecedents, since the selection of the place itself was no accident.3  
After a short historical introduction, the first part of this paper 
– based on archival records and contemporary press releases – 
explores the process saw the former royal stud-farm become an 
exemplary state farm symbolizing the success of socialist 
agriculture. This process can only be truly examined as part of the 
construction of collective identities.4 In order to analyse the cult-
making, special attention is paid to the political, economic, 
organizational and personal factors. The second part of the study 
focuses on the ‘Golden Age’ of Bábolna, with special emphasis laid 
on its cultic presentation i.e. cultic scenario of the VIP-visits, 
memorial of the Bábolna’s stallion and the permanent exhibition in 
the Bábolna-museum. 
 
The Historical Background 
 
At the time when Bábolna was founded in 1789, Hungary 
belonged to Austria, a leading country of Europe with a well-
organized army. In order to ensure mobility, high level stock of 
horses was indispensable. Hungary had long been famous for its 
horsemanship as well as of its first-rate horse-breeding. This had 
led to the Austrian generals to recommend that Bábolna and its 
surroundings should be developed into a state-owned, central 
stud-farm for the elite units of the army of the Emperor Joseph II.5  
The nineteenth century saw the emergence of a further aspect 
apart from the one of the army. The demand for well-trained 
                                                 
3  For a wider background to the representation, meanings and uses of 
space in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, see: Socialist Spaces. 
Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc. Ed. David Crowley, Susan E. Reid. 
Oxford, New York, 2002.  
4  In thinking about the issues in this paper, I have been greatly benefited 
from results of the multidisciplinary research project organised by the 
University of Jyväskylä and Hungarian Academy of Sciences (’Cult, 
Community, Identity’. A Comparative Study on the Construction of Cults 
after World War II.)  
5  Péter Gunst & Imre Wellmann, A 200 éves Bábolna múltjából, 1789–1945. 
Bábolna, 1989, 13-14. 
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racehorses was booming due to a growing popularity of equestrian 
sport. The leaders of the stud-farm turned to Arab horse-breeding 
which proved so successful that horses bred in Bábolna won one 
prestigious horse-race after the other. By this time, Bábolna had 
earned the title “the Mecca of horse-breeding”.6  
Between the two world wars, the stud-farm had grown more 
significant and comprehensive.7 Functioning under the control of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, it was assigned the task of advancing 
the growth of agricultural produce. The scope of Bábolna’s activities 
had, thus, been extended to plant improvement, the production of 
seed-grain as well as the breeding of cattle, sheep and pigs.  
Following the Second World War, the Bábolna Farm had been 
showing a long and marked decline. This is hardly surprising if we 
consider that the importance of cavalry had greatly decreased during 
the war. To make matters worse, the bulk of the horse stock was 
transported to the West for security reasons in late 1944. From there it 
was returned in reduced numbers and in a significantly worse 
condition. The true problem, however, was the decisive change in 
agrarian policy taking place in 1948–1949.8 The Hungarian communist 
party had assumed total power and, acting on instructions coming 
from the Soviet Union, began with the reorganisation of agriculture. In 
this process, on one hand, peasant farms were collectivized, and, on 
the other, state-owned stud-farms were reorganised. 9  
The former royal stud-farm had been transformed into a state 
farm and it was expected to play an active, exemplary role in 
                                                 
6  Ibid., 16-18. 
7  András Klenczner, “Az állami gazdaságokról”. In: Magyarország agrártörté-
nete. Szerk. Orosz István et. al. Mezőgazda Kiadó, Budapest, 1996, 697-698. 
8  For recent writings on the agrarian policies of the 1950s in English see: 
Sándor Szakács, “From Land Reform to Collectivization (1945-1956)”. In: 
Hungarian Agrarian Society from the Emancipation of Serfs (1848) to the Re-
privatization of Land (1998). Ed. Péter Gunst. New York, 1998, 257-298; 
Zsuzsanna Varga,”Agrarian development from 1945 to the present day”. 
In: History of Hungarian Agriculture and Rural Life, 1848–004. Ed. János 
Estók. Budapest, 2004, 221-252. 
9  In its decree of 23rd December, 1948, the government declared the 
establishment of the Bábolna National State Company. Bábolna. Tények és 
adatok, 1945-1989. I. Bábolna, 1989, 3. 
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agricultural development. As a state-owned company it had been 
integrated in the system of planned economy. According new 
regulations, Bábolna was obliged to deliver a prescribed output 
including the cultivation of some forty different kinds of plants 
and the breeding of new species of livestock. 10  The farm was 
compelled to switch over from the former specialization to a mixed 
structure. Despite its significant tradition in large-scale production 
in the 1950s, Bábolna’s performance had been characterised by low 
quality produce and negative balance.11  
As it is generally known, the revolution in 1956 was an 
important turning point in Hungary’s political history. It is, 
however, by no means part of the common knowledge that, 
following the revolution, the agrarian policy had seen changes and 
corrections unprecedented within the socialist block.12 The Kádár-
regime, rising to power with Soviet military aid, had been 
compelled to take these measures. They wanted to make up for a 
lacking political legitimation by increasing the living standards. 
Fulfilling the aims living-standard policy at that time (and for a 
long time to come) depended mainly on food supplies, on which 
people spent a decisive proportion of their income.13  
                                                 
10  This had also sealed the fate of traditional horse-breeding. Firstly, under 
the spell of mechanization, a large number of horses had been slaughtered. 
Secondly, Hungary, being cut off from the Western markets, experienced 
great difficulties selling race horses. To make matters worse, horse-racing, 
was labelled as a relic of an aristocratic era, and was pushed into the 
background. Consequently, the underrating of horse-breeding had become 
inevitable. At a certain point, racehorses were used as draught animals.  
11  István Molnár – Éva Szabóné Medgyesi, Az állami gazdaságok 
Magyarországon. Mezőgazdasági Kiadó, Budapest, 1987, 55. 
12  See more on this: Zsuzsanna Varga, “The Impact of 1956 on the 
Relationship between the Kádár Regime and the peasantry, 1956-1966”. 
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXXIV, Nos. 1-2. 2007, 155-176. 
13  Demand for ample nutrition appeared with elemental force in the early 
Kádár period because in the first half of the 1950s private consumption 
had been held to a very low level as it was a way of paying for the forced 
development of heavy industry and military production. See: Tibor 
Valuch, “A bőséges ínségtől az ínséges bőségig  a fogyasztás változásai 
Magyarországon az 1956 utáni évtizedekben”. In: Magyarország a 
jelenkorban. Évkönyv 2003. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2003, 51-78. 
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Due to a violent introduction of the inappropriate Soviet 
kolkhoz model in the first half of the 1950s to Hungary, agrarian 
gross product had decreased dramatically. The primary goal of the 
correction launched after 1956 was, thus, to increase agrarian 
produce. Even in the course of collectivisation (1959–1961) this goal 
had priority. The reorganisation of peasant farms to socialist large 
farms (agricultural cooperatives), however, had turned the former 
agrarian structure upside down, which led to a further decline in 
produce. 14  Hungary had to import corn and meat. The newly 
established cooperatives were clearly unable to produce the 
amount what had been planned for them for years to come.  
Under such circumstances, the party leadership decided that the 
state-owned farms had to play a significant role in boosting 
agricultural produce. Their primary task was the application of the 
new methods of production and their spreading to cooperatives. 
Lajos Fehér15, secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), responsible for agricultural 
matters, made the plans of the government clear to co-operatives at  
a session of the Central Committee held on 28 March 1962: 
“Cooperatives shall, like locomotives, pull the entire agriculture 
forward.”16  
 
                                                 
14  Iván Pető – Sándor Szakács, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története 
1945-1985. I. (Az újjáépítés és a tervutasításos irányítás időszaka 1945-1968.) 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1985, 461-474. 
15  Lajos Fehér (1917–1981), a former student of the Calvinist boarding-
school in Debrecen, earned his educational degree in History and Latin. 
He joined the illegal communist movement before the Second World 
War. After 1945, he worked as a journalist, as the manager of a state farm 
and the head of the Party’s Agricultural Department. He had worked as 
Deputy Prime Minister for years. Irrespective of the position he was 
holding, he had always been concerned about the situation of the 
agriculture and rural population. Lajos Fehér and the agrarian lobby 
emerging in the 1960s played a significant part in the realization and 
acceptance of the Hungarian model of socialist agriculture.  
16  Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive, hereafter MOL). 
MOL M-KS-288. f. 4/47-48. ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Központi Bizottság 
üléséről, 1962. március 28-30. 
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Bábolna’s Progress 
 
In the beginning of the 1960s, state farms were destined 
primarily for the production of cheap animal products. Statistics 
from the West had shown, for instance, that after the Second 
World War the production of poultry and eggs developed at a 
surprisingly quick rate. This was due to the first-time-ever 
application of an industrial-style production system.17 In general, 
this enabled the agricultural sector to continually produce a 
massive amount of meat.  
The Hungarian party leadership that had previously undertaken 
the policy of improving living standards and was facing deficiencies 
in the performance of a newly collectivised agriculture needed this 
development very badly. The poultry project was launched due to a 
political decision made on the highest level.18 Bábolna had been 
chosen as the location of this experimental project. At first, it seemed 
quite like an abortive effort to convert a traditional stud farm into 
state ownership. The former manager of Bábolna went as far as 
declaring: “Nobody can expect the farmers of Bábolna who had 
made a name for themselves in horse-breeding now simply to 
switch over to poultry. Everyone knows that once you sat in a 
saddle and pulled at the reins you will have a hard time even 
driving a tractor after that, let alone breeding poultry. No way”.19  
It is therefore little wonder that a new manager was appointed 
soon. In the party-state system, appointing company managers fell 
entirely within the authority of the party. This means that in this 
special case, as usual, it was up to a party- organisation outside the 
                                                 
17  The system of large-scale production of poultry and eggs involved all 
biological, technical and organisational aspects of research to actual 
production. This is the so-called “closed production system” meaning the 
practical synthesis of biological and technical science. It aims at a fast, 
significant and economical increase in the specific output of cultivation 
and live stock farming. This required a close coordination and continuous 
updating of all factors of production.  
18  MOL M-KS-288.f. 5/200. ő.e. Jegyzőkönyv a Politikai Bizottság üléséről, 
1960. szeptember 14. 
19  Dancs József, Ez történt a kulisszák mögött. Bábolna, 1983, 8.  
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sphere of economy to make the decision. 20  They chose Róbert 
Burgert 21 , a young (36 at the time) but already experienced 
manager filled with ambition and a need to prove his abilities. He 
was also very proud of the task he had been assigned. In addition 
to this, he was granted total freedom in his work, a gesture 
unprecedented in this era. This great advantage was far more than 
mere moral support, he was granted a remarkable capital to start 
with as well as relative freedom in international relations.22 Finally, 
the authorities provided 50 million forints for the three-year 
poultry project starting in 1960. 23  This remarkably generous 
amount was only one sign that the project was supported by the 
highest level of political decision-making. As a further step, 
Bábolna was allowed to import the required technology from the 
West. This became one of the most significant advantages, since 
Hungary, just like other socialist countries, had been ill-provided 
with convertible foreign currency. Therefore, it was considered a 
true privilege to buy Western technology.  
                                                 
20  MOL M-KS-288.f. 17/5. ő.e. Feljegyzés Fehér Lajos részére a Bábolnai 
Állami gazdaság helyzetéről. 1960. február 
21  Róbert Burgert (1924–1999) had been working in agriculture right from 
the start of his career. Between 1950 and 1960 he had worked as the 
leading agricultural engineer at the State Farm in Pécs of which he later 
became the manager. In the following three decades he had been the head 
manager of Bábolna State Farm and later Bábolna State Combinate. It was 
under his management that industrial-style poultry-farming and egg-
production was launched in Hungary. Furthermore, Bábolna successfully 
adopted professional production in pig- and sheep-farming and maize-
production, the latter being essential for fodder supply. Róbert Burgert 
and his associates had showed entrepreneurship that brought products of 
Bábolna right to the highest ranks of international agriculture. In the 
1970s and 1980s, the Bábolna State Combinate had been one of the best 
known and most successful companies in Hungary.  
22  The author’s interview with Pál Romány (former head of Ministry of 
Agriculture). Budapest, 6 September, 2007. 
23  This amount was double the total subsidies of poultry-farming of all state 
farms in Hungary in the previous year. MOL M-KS-288.f. 28/1959/5. ő.e. 
A Mezőgazdasági Osztály előterjesztése a második ötéves terv mező-
gazdasági beruházásairól. 1959. november. 
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Following this, the managers of Bábolna visited many of the top 
poultry-farms in the world. They finally signed a contract with the 
Lohmann Co. from West Germany.24 It was from them that they 
bought breeding animals and entire poultry stables. Hungarian 
professionals (architects, machine operators, veterinarians, 
chemists, farmers, specialists of foraging) were also trained at the 
farms of the German company.  
For those who know of the relationship between Eastern and 
Western-block countries at the beginning of the 1960s, it may come 
as quite a surprise to learn that Hungarian professionals had been 
allowed to make direct contact with Western Germany. This would 
have certainly been unthinkable without the permission of the 
Soviet Union. The reason why they accepted this contact can be 
explained with the exceptional position Hungary had taken after 
1956. Following the suppression of the revolution, the leadership 
in Moscow had granted Hungary a wider scope for action so as to 
prove the superiority and constancy of the socialist system. 
“Khrushchev had the intention to make Hungary a kind of 
experimental laboratory for an attempt of a reform that would 
make communism more flexible to external conditions.”25  
Beside Western technology, a new work ethic had to be adopted, 
too. Strict labour discipline and precision were not easily accepted, 
leading to the discharge of many workers. In this, in turn, the 
leaders of Bábolna state farm clashed with local party 
organisations. Nevertheless, due to the support from above, these 
conflicts were quickly settled.26  
                                                 
24  See the memoirs of the head of the delegation: János Keserű, 
Parasztsorsfordítók között. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2007, 111-114.  
25  Péter Kende, “Az engedményektől az érdekegyeztetésig. A kádári 
konszolidációról”. In: Péter Kende, A Párizsi toronyból. Cserépfalvi, 
Budapest, 1991, 80.  
26  First, Burgert’s supportes in the Political Committee of the HSWP (e.g. 
Lajos Fehér) played a significant part in settling these conflicts. Later, 
Burgert himself became member of the political leadership. As a first step, 
on the ninth congress of the HSWP held on the 3rd December 1966, he 
was elected member of the Central Committee of the HSWP. Segédkönyv a 
Politikai Bizottság tanulmányozásához. Szerk. Nyírő András. INTERART, 
Budapest, 1989, 197-198. 
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The three-year poultry project was successfully accomplished.27 
This was an absolutely necessary success for the Kádár-government, 
since by 1963–1964, the performance of Hungarian agriculture was 
far behind the expectations. It is therefore little wonder that when N. 
S. Khrushchev paid a visit to Hungary in spring 1964, the first place 
they took him was Bábolna.28 As a special gift, the farm had offered 
Khrushchev a five-in-hand. As the manager Róbert Burgert recalls: 
“Khrushchev was a little surprised. Suddenly, the old man was not 
sure what to do. After a short pause, he said: Listen, if I accept this 
carriage, they are going to dismiss me. They are going to say that I 
have got five horses, so I am a kulak. Now our boss (János Kádár) 
says that we are going to protect you, comrade Khrushchev. This 
was followed by great laughter and Khrushchev finally did accept 
the gift.”29 Khrushchev’s visit to Bábolna became subject to an entire 
newsreel that was later shown all over Hungary.  
The Bábolna State Farm could utilize this popularity and its 
management started to spread its large-scale production system of 
poultry and eggs to other farms of less solid capital. As a firm 
responsible for production, it offered its own modern technology 
and exercised tight control over it in the associated farms. 30 This 
form of cooperation spread quite rapidly and soon made Bábolna 
known throughout the country.  
The following phase of progress is connected to the New 
Economic Mechanism (1968) which was the most radical and 
theoretically most innovative reform in the region – not 
mentioning the one in Yugoslavia. The goal of the reform was to 
alleviate the problems of the planned economy, and to increase the 
efficiency of the economy. It was intended to achieve this partly by 
reducing the role of central planning, and partly by increasing 
                                                 
27  In 1963, the poultry-farming sector produced a profit of 18 175 million 
forints. Tények és adatok, 1945-1989. I. Bábolna, 1989. 14. 
28  Magyar Mezőgazdaság, 1964/15, 1. 
29  Jelenkor,1988/6, 1051-1052. 
30  Partner farms were provided not only with chickens but also with the 
tools, equipment and materials necessary for production. Continuous 
consultation was also made available, and producers were incorporated 
in the marketing chain.  
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companies’ independence. Although one- and five-year plans were 
still made, they were not broken down to company level. There 
were no longer prescriptions as to what, and how much, 
companies should produce. Instead of compulsory directives, 
indirect economic regulators (taxes, credits, non-repayable 
subsidies etc.) were used. Company independence increased in 
terms of both production and investments. Elements of market 
mechanisms (price, profit, tax, credits etc.) were implemented in 
the planned economy system.31 
It was the agricultural sector that was provided with the 
greatest opportunities in the reform. Also Bábolna attempted to 
make the most of the new opportunities, most importantly the 
reform of the system of currency credits. The reform enabled 
companies to buy modern machinery and know-how from abroad. 
The credit was only to be paid back later when it was covered 
mostly by the export of surplus product.32 This way Bábolna was 
able to modernise the production of maize, the main fodder for 
poultry, and therefore a key element of agriculture.  
The establishment of a large-scale maize-cultivation system was 
preceded by years of preparation and experimentation since it 
required the application of western technology. In 1969, a 
delegation consisting of many Hungarian professionals, including 
Róbert Burgert and led by István Gergely, former Deputy Minister 
paid a visit to the United States. While there, the members of the 
delegation had the opportunity to study the various methods of 
maize cultivation on the spot. Due to the currency credit, Burgert 
                                                 
31  For more detailed information on the New Economic Mechanism, see: 
Iván T. Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms, 1953-1988., New York 
1990; Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform. Eds. Paul G. Hare, Hugo K. 
Radice and Nigel Swain. London 1981; Zsuzsanna Varga, “Agriculture 
and the New Economic Mechanism”. In: Hungarologische Beiträge 14. Ed. 
Anssi Halmesvirta. University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, 2002, 201-218. 
32  Pál Izinger, “A harmadik évtized. Az állami gazdaságok 1968-1980 
között”. Valóság, 1983/3, 38-45.  
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bought a John Deer-production line for the cultivation of 6000 
hectares of maize.33  
The establishment of the relations with the United States is also 
worth examination. It was partly due to the mentality of New 
Economic Mechanism that had urged opening to the West. The 
success Bábolna had previously achieved also played an important 
part. All of these factors enabled them to embark on a business 
venture that clearly had its political and economical risks. From 
1970 on, they began spreading this form of production throughout 
Hungary as a forerunner.  
“Babolna’s most notable achievement can be traced to a 1969 
cooperation agreement it entered into with Corn Production 
Systems (Chicago, USA), on the basis of which American 
technology and know-how and local management and inputs were 
synthesized into a large-scale crop management model. This is the 
so-called “technically operated production system”, whose goal is 
to optimize yield, minimize costs, and maximize profits in 
specialized areas of production, such as corn, wheat, or livestock 
operations. In the case of corn, for example, the integrated system 
coordinates all areas of technology and know-how: genetics, plant 
protection, soil management (fertilizer, irrigation, drainage); 
specification of machinery and efficient handling of its 
maintenance and services; grain handling and storage; marketing; 
selection and training of all personnel; and financing and financial 
management.”34  
By the beginning of the new decade, the managers of Bábolna 
had the intention to spread not only within, but also outside 
Hungary. This had been enabled by the advantages granted from 
1st January 1968 on, namely, that the farm was permitted to 
engage in foreign trade without the participation of state-owned 
trade companies. Thanks to these advantages, the export-import 
rights of the company involved the following products: poultry 
                                                 
33  MOL XIX-K-9-ab 34. d. (1969) Tájékoztató jelentés a Magyar Forradalmi 
Munkás-Paraszt Kormány részére a mezőgazdasági szakdelegáció 
amerikai tanulmányútjáról. 
34  Paul Marer, East-West Technology Transfer. Study on Hungary 1968-1984. 
OECD, Paris, 1986, 159-160. 
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(goose, duck, guinea-hen, etc.), stallions and racehorses. After a 
while the Minister of Foreign Trade extended the rights to the 
export of the system of poultry farming as well.35  
Independent farming and the organisation of foreign marketing 
proved very difficult in the first couple of years. Due to this fact, 
Bábolna established two joint ventures with western companies.36 
By means of its joint ventures with western companies, the 
Bábolna State Farm, on the one hand, received the very latest 
information on new scientific findings, and on the other, was 
continuously exposed to the evaluations of the world market.  
 
The ‘Golden Age’ 
 
Bábolna developed fast in the 1960s. In the beginning of the 
decade it was no more than yet another state farm showing a large 
deficit. Despite its long history and tradition, it had brought no 
significant returns. However, due to the radical change of the scope 
of its activities, it showed an unprecedented development. Its 
production value was about three to four times, its profit eight to ten 
times as big as farms of similar area and conditions, according to the 
evaluation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food written at the 
end of 1968. 37  Even more importantly, Bábolna had grown to 
become an innovative agrarian centre. Firstly, this was due to its 
introductory role of western technology that was later applied in 
other farms. Secondly, it started to build its own basis of research.38  
The achievements of Bábolna, remarkable as they might be, 
would not have been sufficient to make it cultic place. Another 
precondition for this was that Hungarian agriculture as a whole 
                                                 
35  MOL M-KS-288. f. 24/1968/11. ő.e. A Külkereskedelmi Minisztérium 
előterjesztése a Gazdaságpolitikai Osztálynak a mezőgazdasági vállalatok 
önálló külkereskedelmi tevékenységéről. 1968. május 10.  
36  One with the German company Lohmann (in 1968), the other with the 
company Protimas AG Friburg, Switzerland (in March 1969).  
37  MOL M-KS-288.f. 24/1969/2. őe. A Mezőgazdasági és Élelmezésügyi 
Minisztérium jelentése az állami gazdaságok 1968. évi gazdálkodásáról.  
38  Modernizációs szigetek. A siker szerkezete a késői államszocializmusban. .Szerk. 
Pál Tamás. Budapest, 1992, 234-244.  
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showed an outstanding performance within the Socialist block. In 
the 1970s, politicians, diplomats and tourists from East and West 
alike were equally impressed by the food supply in the shops, halls 
and markets in Hungary. Their surprise was due to the fact that in 
other Eastern bloc countries the shortage economy was most 
dramatically apparent in agricultural production at the time. In 
Hungary, however, the quantitative satisfaction of the population’s 
food demand was no longer a problem, and it was even becoming 
increasingly possible to meet demands of quality. Beside a high 
quality food supply, the Hungarian export in foodstuffs kept 
growing as well. In the 1970s Hungarian agriculture had been able 
to satisfy the needs of three different markets: the home market, 
the market of COMECON and that of capitalist countries.39 
As a special characteristic of Hungarian agriculture, the 
leadership of the communist party, as part of the policy of living 
standards undertaken after 1956, was compelled to make 
concessions on agricultural issues. These concessions led to that 
Hungarian agriculture gradually differed from the Soviet model 
resulting in the special Hungarian model.40 This is what Bábolna 
essentially stood for.  
The delegations from socialist countries visited Bábolna like a 
cultic place of pilgrimage. They hoped to discover its secret that 
would make their own agriculture work as well just by carefully 
observing it. Some delegations spent as much as weeks there.41 The 
                                                 
39  Mezőgazdasági Statisztikai Zsebkönyv, 1985. Budapest, Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal, 1986, 136-140. 
40  This is explored in much greater depth in my study: “The ‘Modernizing’ 
Role of Agriculture in the Hungarian Economic Reforms”. In: Zur 
Physiognomie sozialistischer Wirtschaftsreformen. Die Sowjetunion, Polen, die 
Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn, die DDR und Jugoslawien im Vergleich. Ed. 
Christoph Boyer. Frankfurt/Main: Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte, 2007, 201-218. 
41  Several socialist countries bought the entire production system of poultry 
and eggs from Bábolna but unfortunately, it could not be put into 
operation everywhere. In the Soviet Union, for example, workers simply 
removed certain service parts like electric switches that were scarce at that 
time and took them home. See more on this: Pál Izinger, “A harmadik 
évtized. Az állami gazdaságok 1968-1980 között”. Valóság, 1983/3, 38-45. 
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statements made by these visitors offer us a glimpse into their 
image of the cult of Bábolna. They admired its ever more awe-
inspiring performance, its dynamic production and the surprising 
fact that whatever unusual activity they started it proved to work. 
For example, in 1970 Bábolna, first in Europe developed a method 
to transport pre-bred pullets by air. The first Hungarian cargo of 
pullets flew to the Middle East (Saudi-Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates).42  
From the beginning of the 1970s on, the results of Hungarian 
agriculture attracted the attention of markets not only in the socialist 
but also the capitalist countries. As an indication of this, the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
organised a comprehensive training between 4th and 18th July, 1971. 
Professionals from 37 different countries had been invited. This 
training was focussed on the issues of large-scale production.43 
During the two weeks of the training, participants got the chance to 
visit several farms, and Bábolna was the first on the list. This 
training proved very successful in attracting attention since many of 
the participants came back to Hungary in the following years.  
A further indication of Bábolna’s success were continuous visits 
from countries with highly developed agriculture starting from the 
middle of the 1970s.44 The first one was by Ib Frederiksen, Minister 
of Agriculture of Denmark in July 1972. After the Austrian and 
Dutch delegations came the Minister from the United States with a 
staff of 27 people in 1975. The following year’s major guest was the 
economic advisor of the President of the United States. 1977 saw the 
visit of the German and later the American Minister of Agriculture 
again. In May 1979, it was the staff of the World’s Poultry Science 
Association (WPSA), consisting of no less than 44 people who came 
to survey Bábolna. The farm also received visitors from Canada, 
Australia, the Middle East, South America and Japan.  
                                                 
42  Bábolna. Tények és adatok, 1945-1989. I. Bábolna, 1989, 26. 
43  MOL XIX-K-9-e 133. d. Tájékoztató a FAO küldöttség magyarországi 
látogatásáról, 1971. július. 
44  On the chronology of these visits see: Bábolna. Tények és adatok, 1945-1989. 
I, 25-85. 
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Analyses of the former visits from western capitalist countries 
show that the visitors’ actual intention had been the observation of 
a potential or future competitor. This aspect had been apparent 
from the earliest visits on. As an example we can quote from the 
press release published after the visit paid by Frederiksen in 1972: 
“In the course of his visit to large farms and agricultural 
cooperatives in Hungary, the Minister has gained experience that 
prompts him to encourage Danish farmers to speed up and 
improve their productivity”. 45  
It would only be proper to ask what it was in Bábolna’s 
performance that inspired awe and admiration in our Western 
guests. One answer might be that Bábolna did not merely buy and 
adopt western technology but went on to develop it. That enabled 
the farm to market their own, specifically manufactured products. 
The cooperation with the company Lohmann is a good example for 
this. 46  Bábolna had bought the system of large-scale poultry 
production from this company from Western Germany. Eight 
years later they broke up the cooperation and started their own 
poultry-project. This became so successful that their specifically 
produced hybrids soon ranked among the best in the world.47  
By representing among top international quality in poultry 
farming, Babolna found access to markets not yet opened to many 
other countries. The Middle East would probably be the best 
example of this. Bábolna had been exporting broiler hatching eggs, 
poultry and even entire units to wealthy oil-producing Arabian 
countries like Saudi-Arabia and Iraq from 1968 on. Later, after 
assessing the local needs, Babolna’s management developed a 
large-scale sheep farming-system.48 It had earned appreciation by 
manufacturing top quality products by impressive innovative 
                                                 
45  Magyar Mezőgazdaság, 1972./30, 2.  
46  MOL XIX-K-9-e 743. d. A magyar – NSZK gazdasági kapcsolatok alakulása.  
47  In 1973, it was the TETRA-SL hybrid (layer) that produced the best 
results in international tests. According to a comparative broiler study 
conducted the same year in the Federal Republic of Germany, TETRA-B 
hybrid (meat) also ranked first. 
48  András Schlett, Sziget a szárazföldön. A Bábolnai Állami Gazdaság története 
1960 és 1990 között. Budapest, 2007, 87-88. 
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capacity in socialist conditions of ownership. A further highly-
valued aspect was the farm’s wide-spread network of cooperation 
and its presence at international markets.  
As a further boost, the local management took special care of 
Bábolna’s cultic reputation. They recognised the farm’s special 
conditions that were due to its impressive history. They restored 
horse-breeding. Stud-horses bred in Bábolna won one national and 
international prize after the other, very much to the farm’s pride.49 
Horse-breeding, although taking up less than one percent of the 
company’s total production, played a major representative role. 
VIP-guests from abroad, beside taking a view of the modern 
systems of production, also had the opportunity to see the Arabian 
herd of horses, the antique carriages and even a horse-show 
performed by buglers on horsebacks.  
In order to retrace the rituals of the Bábolna visits, we first have 
to conjure up the environment itself. This is all the more important 
since most guests were quite astonished upon entering the center 
of the state farm to find a complex of well-preserved nineteenth-
century buildings surrounded by old trees and flower-beds instead 
of modern economic facilities or offices. The delegations were 
received and greeted in the main building. This was followed by a 
brief introduction into the farm’s history by the manager. After this, 
all the guests were invited to the upstairs balcony that offered a 
majestic view to the farmyard. The primary ornament of the yard 
was the statue of the Bábolna stallion. Back in the times of the 
Napoleon wars, when the French army had raided Western 
Hungary, this noble horse took part in one of the battles. The 
riding officer, having got a mortal wound, fell off his horse, while 
the animal, itself wounded, returned to the Bábolna farmyard 
before it finally perished. This “most faithful comrade” had thus 
become the very symbol of Bábolna: it represents loyalty to the 
region, the homeland and the past. As one sociographer writing on 
                                                 
49  The most succesful and well-known racehorse of Hungary, Imperiál was 
bred in Bábolna. It had an exceptional international career of 20 wins and 
two runner-ups from 25 starts.  
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Bábolna once aptly put it: “Here, all that was good and beautiful in 
the past has been preserved, yet expanded with something new”.50  
Moreover, the locals had found a spectacular and fascinating way 
of presenting the old and the new, tradition as well as modernity to 
visitors. The guests, summoned on the main building balcony were 
first greeted by a group of buglers dressed in the traditional uniform 
of the Hungarian hussars. In the first part of the horse-show all the 
best stud horses, first the stallions and then the stock mares were 
shown all around the yard while concurrently their pedigrees were 
being described. Next came in the carriages. In case of a full show, 
all the one-, two- and three-in-hands came rolling in, followed by 
Bábolna’s supreme pride, the four- and five-in-hands. All important 
guests were taken for a ride on the famous four- and five-in-hands, 
and the courageous ones were even allowed to ride it. If the 
members of the delegation showed particular interest in horses, 
there was the further opportunity to visit the indoor riding hall. In 
case the weather allowed it, some guests were even taken to a 
nearby stud-farm to see another horse-show.51  
After conjuring up the past so dynamically, the guests were 
taken to the museum and introduced to the Bábolna state farm’s 
history. The exhibition consisted, on one hand, of written 
documents of the glorious past: charters, documents of 
management, register-books and old paintings, sculptures, 
photographs and awards (medals, ribbons, trophies) as reminders 
of the success of horse-breeding, on the other.  
The banquet was followed by a screening. The films featuring 
showed the most modern parts of the farm: the different phases of 
industrial-style poultry-farming, the system of maize-production, 
etc. The films gave an overview of the farm’s national and foreign 
trade partners as well as its primary export markets. Afterwards, 
depending on the time left, the guests were given the opportunity 
to personally explore the farm’s various departments to which 
they were taken by carriage and not by car.  
                                                 
50  Féja Géza, “Új arcú mezőváros felé”. Bábolnai Híradó, 1975. március 4.  
51  The author’s interview with János Pál (former President of Hungarian 
Horse-breeding Association). Budapest, 10 November 2007. 
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It was, thus, a unique blend of modernity and tradition that had 
given Bábolna its particular character. This speciality is reflected in 
the programs of each foreign delegation. The content of the show 
might have slightly differed according to the various interests of 
the visitors; a delegation of diplomats certainly required a different 
program than the one consisting of professionals in agriculture. 
The constant element, however, was the close relationship between 
past and present, illuminating the cultic significance of the place.  
 
A Sad Prologue 
 
Bábolna celebrated its bicentenary in 1989. This year, however, 
proved to become a landmark not only for Bábolna but for all of 
Hungary as well. After decades of a socialist regime, the 
establishment of democratic institutions and a market-oriented 
private economy began in Hungary in 1988–1989. At the time of 
the transition it seemed that agriculture would be the economical 
sector able to adapt most easily to the conditions of market 
economy. There was a significant amount of market experience 
gathered, not only from Hungary and the COMECON, but also 
from the Western countries. In several branches of production, the 
Hungarian agriculture was among the best in the world.52 
 
                                                 
52  The achievements of the domestic large-farming system in terms of cereal 
farming and meat production were significant even by international 
standards. Measured in terms of per capita grain production, Hungary 
ranked fifth in the world in 1985. With a figure of 1,391 kilograms per 
person, it followed such extensive – with the exception of Denmark – 
grain-producing countries as the United States, Canada and Australia. In 
terms of wheat production Hungary came second only after Canada, and 
in terms of meat production it took fourth place after Denmark, The 
Netherlands and Australia. In the mass-scale production of hens’ eggs, 
Hungary came second to The Netherlands. A magyar mezőgazdaság 
hatékonysága nemzetközi összehasonlításban. Budapest, Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal, 1988, 7-18.  
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In reality, this was the sector that showed the most controversial 
and actually least successful adaptation after the change of system.53 
The parties of the first post-socialist government launched a radical 
transformation of the proprietorship and the entire system of the 
agrarian sector. The conversion of state and co-operative ownership 
into private one was at the centre of the drastic agricultural changes 
of the 1990s. 54  The politico-economic situation of the agrarian 
branch was also unfavourable. The traditional market of the 
COMECON had collapsed. The most serious problem was that the 
Soviet partner had become insolvent. The domestic market for this 
branch narrowed, since massive unemployment and the drastic 
decline in personal incomes led to a fall in food consumption. 
Despite disadvantegous economic conditions, Bábolna seemed to 
have a fair chance of making the best of the political and economic 
transition due to its modern capacity for production and its wide-
spread network of international relations. Bábolna, although 
surviving the forthcoming crisis, had used up all its reserves. By the 
second half of the 1990s, the farm got itself into a significant debt. 
The management’s professional competence also showed a marked 
decline. After 1998, the privatisation of Bábolna was put on the 
agenda. Nowadays we can expect the privatisation of the basic unit 
after a highly unfavourable privatisation deal. The political and 
economic transition has not only had the cultic image of Bábolna fall 
to pieces but, due to a series of incompetent decisions, the 220-year-
old farm itself.  
 
                                                 
53  In the 1990s agricultural production was 20 to 30 per cent lower than in 
1989–1991. While growth in industry began from 1994, and in other sectors 
of the national economy from 1996–1997, the agrarian sector faced a 
continuing and comprehensive crisis. See: A mezőgazdaság strukturális válto-
zásai a kilencvenes években. Statisztikai áttekintés. AKII, Budapest, 2003, 9-13. 
54  In 1990, some 121 state farms were in operation in Hungary, working on 
11 to 12 per cent of the cultivation area. Twenty-five state farms 
(including Bábolna) were placed in permanent state ownership due to 
their role in the protection of biological resources and the supply of 
certified seeds. The other farms were earmarked for privatisation which 
usually took place in several phases. 
SPECTRUM HUNGAROLOGICUM VOL. 4. 
Cultic Revelations: Studies in Modern Historical  
Cult Personalities and Phenomena 
 
 
 
Edit Rózsavölgyi 
CHANGES IN THE HUNGARIAN POLITICAL 
SYSTEM FROM 1988 TO 19901 
 
 
In this essay we intend to view the most important political and 
economic events of 1988-90, which played a crucial role in the 
change of regime in Hungary and outline them as if they were seen 
through several cameras at the same time. One of the lenses is that 
of the analyzing theoretician. The other one is that of an S-VHS 
camera held by the Black Box, the first Hungarian video magazine, 
the collaborators of which undertook the factual documentation of 
the events throughout these years. The third is one man’s 
subjective camera, the reminiscences of László Pesty2, a witness of 
history, who often risked serious danger to record the events of 
these years. 
                                                 
1  Ed. note: This article does not directly deal with cults but it demonstrates 
the change of the system from a ‘politics of the eye’ perspective which 
defies cultic practices.  
2  Dr. László Pesty was born in Budapest, on 11 September 1964. He 
graduated from the University ELTE of Budapest, Faculty of Law and 
from ELTE, Media Faculty. He was a founder and collaborator of the 
Black Box in 1988-1990, a founding member of the Pesty Black Box in 1990. 
He has been a TV reporter and producer since 1998 and reporter of the 
Pesty Black Box television program since 1999. As a war correspondent 
and reporter he went to Cuba with the resistance movement, he visited 
the Russian prisons, witnessed the war in Groznij, in Chechnia and in 
Kharabach during the Armenian-Azerbaidjani war. He also went to the 
Balkans during the wars: in Osiek, in Sarajevo and Montenegro. He 
recorded the revolutionary changes in Czechoslovakia, in the GDR, 
Poland, in the Baltic States, in Moscow and in Romania. He produced 
several documentaries on different topics of social problems in various 
countries all over the world. 
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Illegal, banned press existed in Hungary from the early 1980s. It 
was called ‘samizdat’ originating from the Russian expression ‘sam 
iz daty’, in other words, the system in the USSR by which 
government-suppressed literature was clandestinely printed and 
distributed. The police chased and confiscated these publications 
which were printed in cellars and attics in limited editions and 
distributed among intellectuals.  
In the spring of 1988 six intellectuals, all previously involved in 
the resistance movement, decided to establish the audiovisual 
samizdat. They were film directors András Lányi and Judit Ember, 
photographer István Jávor, producer Márta Elbert, sociologist 
Gábor Vági and cameraman László Pesty. They set up the Black Box 
video magazine. ‘Video’ because it was neither television nor film, 
as they did not broadcast or screen movies; ’magazine’ because it 
came out as a periodical, with several copies issued. They recorded 
events, interviews, street demonstrations clandestinely, and then 
edited the material, making one and a half hour long documentary 
programmes. They produced from two to three hundred VHS 
copies and distributed them.  
The Central European one party dictatorship during the 1970s 
and 1980s meant the following: no free elections, voting for one 
single person of one single party. One single ideology was 
hammered in at schools and universities. Bookshops and TV 
stations reflected the same ideology. It was not possible to travel 
freely from one country to another, nor to express one’s opinions 
freely. The individuals who believed in and spoke out alternative 
ideas were punished with sanctions. These sanctions were very 
rigorous in Soviet Union and in Romania compared to Hungary 
but the system was basically identical. Orwell’s book, 1984 was not 
published in these countries as their leaders knew that the readers 
would have recognized themselves between the lines. Pesty says3:  
 
”In spring 1988, when we started to work [as the group of the Black Box], we 
did not see that the system might collapse. We could not hope this then. We 
                                                 
3  The deep interview with László Pesty some parts of which were 
incorporated into the text was made between the summer of 2000 and 
June 2001. 
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wanted to shoot long documentaries, analytical works about the existing 
situation. We had to accept the frame of an embarrassing clandestine activity 
having no idea for how long. We did not know that within a few months’ 
time demonstrations would take place on the streets of Budapest and parties 
would be founded. Events speeded up two months after our establishing 
date. Thus we started to make action news as nobody else was recording the 
events of the change.” 
 
The year 1987 brought serious changes in Hungarian political 
and economic life. After 40 years establishing private economic 
enterprises was permitted for the first time. Tax legislation was 
introduced. One of the most astonishing economic demonstrations 
of Hungarian society in favor of the market economy and 
consumerism took place when thousands of people queued up in 
the stores of Vienna to buy different consumer goods, mostly 
technical. This shopping craze meant a significant flowing out of 
capital from the country. At the same time inflation and 
unemployment reached considerable proportions in Hungary. 
Among the events that forced the changes the following should be 
mentioned: economic crisis (inflation, unemployment), the 
strengthening of the reform wing of the State Party and perestroika.  
In May 1988 the State Party was preparing for its congress. 
Shakiness and suspense preceded the event. As a result, important 
personal changes among the membership of the Central and 
Political Committee were effected. New watchwords appeared: 
“turn, reform, swerve”. The world press welcomed the events with 
headlines like: ”Hungarian perestroika”, ”Reformers Win”, ”A 
turn in Budapest”. The May congress, however, made its most 
important impact on social self-organization. Several small 
opposition groups already existed, but in the spring and summer 
of 1988 the widespread social conflict exploded, mainly among the 
younger generation and the intellectuals. People, whenever they 
could, on the occasion of an anniversary, for example, went out on 
the streets and spoke out their opinions. The reaction to these 
demonstrations was still that of coshes and arrests. People were 
mobilized and kept together mostly by the following issues: the 
question of the building the Gabcikovo dam, the situation of the 
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Hungarian minorities in Transylvania (Romania) and the judgment 
on the events of 1956. 
Pesty and his colleagues recorded each important event and 
demonstration. Pesty recalls the demonstration of 16th June, 1988: 
 
”This day is the anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy, prime minister of 
the government in charge during the anti-Soviet revolution in 1956. The 
opposition was gathering in the City Center, at the Batthányi sanctuary lamp, 
which is an important memorial place. Liveried or plain-clothes policemen 
were awaiting all around, nobody knew what would exactly happen. Gáspár 
Miklós Tamás philosopher marked out from the masses of the people and 
started to speak. The policemen were approaching him. In that very moment 
a short-haired, bearded young man, another leader of the opposition tightly 
clasped Gáspár Miklós Tamás’ arm because two interlocked men can be 
dragged away with much more difficulty than single one. 
Tear gas, cosh, police attack and arrests. 
Police naturally did not like us shooting, I often managed to record the 
events only hanging the camera down or holding it under my armpit. The 
police wanted to confiscate the camera and the recorded tape but I did not 
give it to them and tried to run away. While I was running they hit me with 
the cosh in a way that I almost lost my eyesight.” 
 
1988 witnessed three police attacks against peaceful 
demonstrators: first on 16th June then on 23rd October, anniversary 
of the 1956 revolution, and finally on 15th November, when the 
Hungarian opposition organized a demonstration against 
Ceausescu as a proclamation of their solidarity with the Romanian 
opposition movement. 
The Hungarian opposition saw that the Black Box people were 
always present and they were the only ones to record the events. 
So they became the media of the opposition. The state owned 
television did not show up at these historical events because they 
were forbidden to do so.  
The functioning of the Black Box was basically ensured by two 
things: the financial support of the Soros Foundation, and the fact 
that the Béla Balázs Studio, the only independent film studio 
existing at the time, housed them, assuring a berth and an 
infrastructure for their activity. Pesty recalls: 
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”The members of the opposition regularly informed us about what was 
going to happen in Budapest and in the country. From the very beginning we 
went out for shooting almost everywhere, to flats, to the street, to cultural 
houses, anywhere where something happened and we knew that the official 
media would not be present. If an atrocity happened on the streets of 
Budapest we rushed many times to the place to document it.”  
 
As the reform objectives of the 1988 party conference got stuck 
at the level of rhetoric and as such at the level of a half turn, the 
tensions and unsolved problems led to the collapse of the MSZMP 
(Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party). It took from the end of 
January until the middle of February 1989 for the party crisis to 
explode, becoming obvious to the public as well. It ended with the 
Central Committee meeting on 10-11th February. The fight was 
primarily for the acceptance of the multiparty system and the 
declaration of 1956 as a popular uprising, which was urged on by 
the announcement of Imre Pozsgay4 at the end of January and was 
unambiguously refused by Károly Grósz’5 response. 
After heated debates, finally both the Central Committee and 
the Political Committee voted for the multiparty system and for 
the re-evaluation of 1956. Events speeded up, decisions made in 
response to pressure from the opposition initially led to the re-
evaluation of several topics (for example, the impact of Imre 
Nagy’s personality and activities) and finally to that of the whole 
of Hungarian history. By that time, substantial international 
attention and solidarity accompanied the Hungarian changes. 
At first, the conservative wing of the state party believed that 
contacting the opposition parties one by one might lead to the 
                                                 
4  Imre Pozsgay was a key player in Hungary’s transition to a western style 
democracy, in the fall of communism or as Hungarians call it “the change 
of the system” (rendszerváltás). With Kádár’s removal in 1988 Pozsgay 
was promoted to Minister of State, a position equal in rank to that of 
Deputy Prime Minister.  
5  Károly Grósz was Chairman of the Council of Ministers until October 7, 
1989 when he was succeeded by Miklós Németh. In May 1988 Grósz was 
elected General Secretary of the MSZMP at Kádár’s recommendation. He 
aimed at accomplishing a moderate and careful reform of socialism 
without touching its foundations. 
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division of the opposition. However, in March 1989, the 
Opposition Roundtable (OR) was formed and acted as the unified 
representative of the opposition, upsetting the expectations of the 
conservatives. The OR began bilateral negotiations and rejected all 
the bills which did not concern the setting up of a freely elected 
parliament, but were aimed at debating the current social affairs. 
During the negotiations, lasting for two months, the opposition 
managed to strengthen the demand that the country was in need of 
a legally and freely elected parliament which should be the one 
and only legitimate power in Hungary. In the course of the 
negotiations, the reform-communist wing of the state party 
gradually strengthened its position. Although the pro-Grósz line 
temporarily slowed the negotiations down, by the end of October 
it was once and for all disarmed. Through informal channels, the 
reform wing and the opposition increasingly and firmly isolated 
the conservative wing of the state party. This was also enhanced by 
the fact that in the course of the summer, on the occasion of Imre 
Nagy’s reburial, 1956 gained an important role in public thinking 
and in the judgment of the political morals. The mood of 
compromise infused with transformation of history politics is 
depicted thus: 
 
“First in February, when the re-evaluation of the revolution, previously just 
referred to as the events of 1956, took place, Imre Pozsgay proposed a 
compromise for the party apparatus. In the long run the message was rather 
simple: if the definition is counterrevolution, then there is no one to negotiate 
with and there is nothing to negotiate about. In this case “we” would sit 
down to come to an agreement with the descendants of the 
“counterrevolutionaries” spitting into our own eyes. If the definition is 
revolution, then again there is no one to negotiate with and there is nothing 
to negotiate about. In this case “we” served a counterrevolutionary regime 
for 35 years and will not be entitled to play any kind of role in a democratic 
regime. Therefore let us choose the middle road: let it be popular uprising. 
This at least allows for some kind of post-historical corrections, and more 
importantly, allows for a compromise. It was not “we” who defeated the 
uprising but “they” who did it, “we” did not impose this system on society 
but “they” did. “We” tried to take advantage of our power within the 
framework provided by “them” and now that we have the opportunity “we” 
return this power to the people. On the occasion of Imre Nagy’s reburial, by 
May, it became clear that the burial, which had turned into a national issue, 
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would define the category of “us” and “them” for the first time in a long 
time. The burial was the burial of state socialism at the same time.” (László 
Bruszt 1990, p. 166.) 
 
In the end, the negotiations began six days before the burial. 
Hence the borderline between “us” and “them” was not defined. 
But it seems that Hungarian society, and within it especially the 
intellectuals, were especially susceptible to such definitions. Until 
today, the intellectual, cultural, and even the scientific strata are 
strikingly politicized in Hungary. The intellectual circles 
continuously register and signal their political affiliation. 
Obviously, an important psychological reason for this is that the 
intellectuals undertook an extraordinarily important role in the 
Hungarian transformations. Only Pesty’s group was allowed to 
participate in the negotiations of the Opposition Roundtable. As 
László Pesty recalls:  
 
“At the Opposition Roundtable the negotiations took place exclusively 
among the already existing opposition parties and the media was excluded. 
Only we could record them. The parties of the OR had to exclude the public 
in order to be able to negotiate in peace as the whole mechanism of the party 
state, including the media, the public administration, the police and the 
political nomenclature was against them. At least for these few hours they 
wanted to be alone and to talk in peace. We handed over the recorded 
material to the leader of the OR day after day, although after a few weeks 
trust had grown so strong that they did not expect us to do so any longer and 
the cassettes could stay with us. We hid them and the participating parties 
gave their consent to the release of the 165 hours long locked-up material 
only in 2000.” 
 
By 1989 danger ceased to exist in Hungary, the police did not 
react violently to the street demonstrations any more, the party 
state slowly retreated, and the negotiating table overtook the role 
of the street. Street demonstrations were still going on and people 
were still frightened of reprisals but they were not subject to them 
any more.  
At this time almost everything remained unchanged in the 
neighboring countries where the first demonstrations had begun 
and police terror was booming. The Hungarian opposition 
continued to take care of its contacts and expressed its solidarity 
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with the opposition groups of the neighboring countries. We 
should not forget that as a consequence of the Trianon Treaty after 
World War I many Hungarians reside in the neighboring countries 
as a substantial minority. Moreover, if changes were to take place 
in only one of the socialist countries, Hungary would be more 
likely to remain isolated in the course of democratic changes and 
reorganization could occur. 
Therefore, in August 1989 a part of the Hungarian opposition 
decided to go to Prague. On behalf of the Hungarian nation they 
wanted to apologize to the Czechs for what had happened on 
August 21, 1968 when Hungarian tanks and soldiers crossed the 
Czechoslovakian border in order to participate in the Soviet 
invasion aimed at defeating the ‘Prague spring’, that is the 1968 
revolution in Prague. The outcome of the event brought about an 
extraordinary reaction in the world media and was an extremely 
important chapter in the life of the Black Box as well: 
 
“Already at the border the Czech secret police removed a substantial part of 
the Hungarian opposition from the train, I was among them. I claimed that I 
was not part of the Hungarian opposition movement any more, I was not an 
activist of the opposition, I just documented the events from outside, 
objectively. We were locked by the Czech authorities for one night, and then 
they made us return to Budapest. Fortunately we still had time. I designed a 
special plan to cross the border. In the end I walked to Czechoslovakia. In the 
morning of the demonstration we gathered at our hiding place in Prague 
where the opposition politicians, my friends, painted a huge transparent 
which said: “Now we’ve come with flowers, not with tanks.” At noon the 
action began on Vencel square. They were demonstrating, making speeches, I 
was recording. The police devastated the Vencel square with unprecedented 
force and brutality. I was arrested first. I threw my camera with the precious 
recording in it over the head of the policemen. My assistant caught it and ran 
into the masses with it. The recording of me being dragged away was not 
only showed in the news of the free countries of the world but also in the 
news of the Hungarian State TV. It was the first time that the Hungarian 
public opinion heard that a video company called Black Box existed. We, 
arrested Hungarians, spent days in prison while in Budapest there were 
demonstrations in front of the Czechoslovakian embassy in order to demand 
our release.” 
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The events followed each other at an increasing speed. At the 
same time as the exclusive negotiations of the OR went on, 
conciliatory meetings took place at the National Roundtable, 
where the groups of the state party, the opposition and civic 
organizations were represented. Both the Hungarian and the 
western media published information about the events. 
As the parliament accepted the law on assembly at the 
beginning of 1989, the legal framework for the multiparty system 
was provided. However, the de facto multiparty system preceded 
the de iure stage which began only at the beginning of November 
when the party law came into effect. The formation of parties, the 
articulation of the different political interests were decisive in 
determining the dynamics of all political actors and political 
spheres. In 1989 the one-party-system ceased to exist, the state 
party disintegrated and was replaced by the MSZP (Hungarian 
Socialist Party) which was integrated into the multiparty system.  
Social scientists divide the genealogy of appearance of the 
parties, into three phases: 
1. The first generation of parties included the MDF (Hungarian 
Democratic Forum), SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) and 
FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats). These parties were formed 
first, gathering the leaders of the opposition around them and they 
were formed by the opposition itself. Their aim was to criticize the 
state party and to counter the autocracy of the MSZMP (Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party). 
2. The main characteristics of the second generation, the so-
called historical or “nostalgia” parties were that they had lesser 
known leaders and they had to fight serious battles among their 
members, who belonged to the different generations (e.g. 
Hungarian Social-Democratic Party, Smallholder’s Party, 
Christian-Democratic Popular Party).  
3. The third generation was represented by the new-born small 
parties, which were formed as opposition to the opposition, and 
were usually issue-focused (e.g. Green Party, Health Party) or 
advocates of extremist trends (e.g. October Party, Radical Party, 
etc.). 
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The fact that by the end of 1989 almost 50 registered parties 
were operating in Hungary, reflected the favorable atmosphere for 
party formation and the desire for the expression of free thought. 
Although the MSZMP announced the introduction of a 
multiparty system only in the spring of 1989, the Independent 
Smallholder's Party and the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party 
had already existed since January, 1989. Several other 
organizations had already had the means to turn into a party at 
short notice. At first, the FIDESZ, for example, recruited members 
through secret and/or informal ways among young people. Only 
the ones who were the most active and the most outspoken were 
able to appear regularly in public. 
In addition to the appearance of the new parties, various civil 
initiatives such as the associations with political orientations, those 
referred to as alternative movements, those established for specific 
purposes, federations like alternative trade unions, youth and 
cultural organizations and societies also played an important role 
in the events. They did not aim at solving political and/or 
economic questions on a global level, with a program, nor at 
gaining power, but simply undertook the representation of the 
interests of different social groups. The scale of values transmitted 
by the parties made their appearance within these movements as 
well. Youth movements also acted as mediators of these values.  
The so called alternative movements proclaimed the values of 
humanity, benevolence and solidarity, for example, the 
environmental protection movements (e.g. Danube Circle), the 
peace movements, human rights movements or those representing 
the rights of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring 
countries, organizations of political prisoners, of prisoners of war, 
of minority groups. Cultural associations and corporations were 
established with similar principles.  
Different professions established associations very swiftly. In 
Budapest the setting up of the OR was linked up with the name of 
the Independent Forum of Lawyers, while the so called Public 
Opinion Club organized regular discussions and debates raising 
political questions or problems related to public life. The 
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establishment of the Black Box Independent Video Magazine was 
opposed to the official electronic media, the only television.  
Several trade unions were formed. Demand for disabled 
people’s rights occurred for the first time in many decades. One of 
the most famous organizations SZETA (Fund in Aid of the Poor) 
was well ahead of the change of the regime, always bearing the 
risk of persecution, as notions like unemployment, poverty and 
any kind of deviation had officially been unknown in Hungary for 
40 years. Everyone „lived in equality and happily ever after”. The 
foundation of new legal entities and a strong desire to establish 
new political parties were the main phenomena that accompanied 
the peaceful political changes of this era.  
A more and more visible differentiation of the political and 
intellectual alignments took shape, alongside the polarization of 
the State Party. Right from the start, the parties which had their 
roots in the opposition life and fed on the soil of the 1980s 
detached themselves from the circle of parties with a great past but 
with a smaller base rooted in the present.  
The formation of the OR played a crucial role for the opposition 
parties in gaining social reputation as well as getting to know and 
to accept one another better. The OR founding organizations were 
the following: FIDESZ, Christian-Democratic Popular Party, MDF, 
Hungarian Popular Party, Hungarian Social-Democratic Party, 
SZDSZ. The OR meetings, the tripartite then bilateral conciliatory 
meetings lined up the elite and the expert advisory panel of the 
parties. Signs of the cooperative ability and intentions of the 
parties were given and the opportunity was created for the parties 
and their leaders to make a name for themselves also ensuring the 
possibility of public appearance. 
Before sitting at the table, the opposition parties were also active 
on the streets. They organized demonstrations, took an active role 
on the occasion of Imre Nagy’s reburial, organized solidarity and 
charity actions and campaigns in the neighboring countries. The 
FIDESZ, MDF and SZDSZ acted the most efficiently in these fields. 
While Hungary was preparing for the first free elections in the 
spring of 1990, the State Party trampled down the institution of 
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democracy. The outburst of the so-called ”Duna-gate case” is 
connected with the name of the Black Box. Pesty recalls: 
 
”I returned back from Romania in January 1990. We were only within a few 
months from the first free elections. The MSZMP made a promise that no 
secret police means or police measures would disturb the preparations of the 
opposition for the elections. The communists assured not to bug the 
opposition leaders during the campaign. One of the majors of the secret 
police showed up at the Black Box in January. He ran the risk to take us into 
a secret filing-cabinet where the still ongoing bugging reports were kept. We 
penetrated into the building under circumstances of a crime story and 
recorded the secret documents with our camera. We hid our collaborator for 
several months so that his colleagues could not take their revenge on him. 
The lie of the state party was revealed, the leaders of the opposition were 
bugged and scouted continuously. As a result of the scandal István Horváth, 
the last communist internal affairs’ minister had no other choice but to resign 
two months before the first free elections. It was perhaps the biggest internal 
affairs’ scandal of the decade, the so called ‘Duna-gate case’.”  
 
Seemingly, the government tried to express its democratic 
intentions by voting a total of 100 million Forints’ support to the 
parties before the elections, taking into account the number of their 
members. The parties who received the largest amount, 15 million 
Forints, were MDF (with 22,000 members), FKGP (with 23,000 
members) and the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party (with 10,000 
members); the smallest amount, assigned to the Hungarian Liberal 
Popular Party (with 1,600 members), was 2 million Forints. SZDSZ 
numbered 8,600, FIDESZ 3,500 members at that time. Party dues 
ranged from 10 to 150 Forints. 
Some parties possessed their own publications. These were the 
following (data quoted from István Stumpf’s article, 1990, pp. 389-
390.): 
MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party): Népszabadság (daily), Újfórum 
(fortnightly), Társadalmi Szemle (monthly) and a regional 
newspaper. 
MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum): Magyar Fórum, Hitel (both 
fortnightly). 
SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats): Beszélő (weekly), SZDSZ-
bulletin. 
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FIDESZ (Alliance of Young Democrats): Magyar Narancs, 
FIDESZ Press. 
FKGP (Independent Smallholder’s Party): Kis Újság 
(fortnightly). 
Magyar Néppárt (Hungarian Popular Party): Szabad Szó 
(fortnightly). 
MSZDP (Hungarian Social-Democratic Party): Szociáldemokrata 
Népszava (fortnightly). 
MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party): Szabadság 
(fortnightly). 
 
MSZP, the ”new” MSZMP and the parties of the Opposition 
Roundtable (SZDSZ, MDF, FIDESZ and the so-called historical 
parties: MSZDP, FKGP, Hungarian Popular Party, Hungarian 
Christian-Democratic Popular Party) proclaimed their political 
programs. The large parties organized their congresses in the 
second half of the year, and these were covered by Hungarian 
Television news. Initiatives resulting in social movements 
increased the popularity of certain parties. In the case of FIDESZ, 
this happened with Viktor Orbán’s speech at the reburial of Imre 
Nagy. The SZDSZ increased its popularity when campaigning for 
signatures for the plebiscitary initiation to elect the president of the 
republic, while those who opposed it, MDF and MSZP, leading the 
polls in close contest, lost some of their popularity in this 
campaign. The index of popularity took shape according to the 
data of the public opinion polls.  
The parties seemed to be grouped around three main political 
streams: 
1. a popular-national and Christian (its main parties were: MDF, 
FKGP, MKDNP), 
2. a social-liberal (SZDSZ, FIDESZ), 
3. a socialist, social-democratic (MSZP, MSZDP). 
Disagreement among the opposition parties, beyond their 
proclaimed political and economic programs, became more and 
more obvious. Confrontation soon took place, on the occasion of 
campaigning for signature for the plebiscitary initiative or of the 
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formation of the Hungarian Television and Radio multiparty 
Board of Supervision.  
The first free elections were over in the spring of 1990. The 
Hungarian Democratic Forum gained the credit for setting up the 
government. The first free local government elections were held in 
the autumn of the same year. László Pesty says: 
 
„We believed that freedom would come from one day or another and market 
economy just be born. The pressure disappeared and the Black Box lost its 
strength in a second. There was no more cohesion among us; contradictions 
came to the fore. I wanted to establish a capitalist company on a market basis 
because there was market economy after all. Two older colleagues of mine 
were for the non-profit profile and for the foundation form. We had no 
political disagreement but we had different views concerning our economic 
operation and therefore we split into two. Under my leadership the Pesty 
Black Box was formed and the other half of the group continued its activities 
under the name of ‘Black Box Foundation’. As the director of the Pesty Black 
Box I still considered the documentation of the continuously changing 
Hungary important. At the beginning of the 90s, while the old communists 
started to disappear, a new epidemic emerged: the extreme right. The 
number of skinhead and other right wing groups was increasing. We began 
documenting their activities. We started to make a social-documentary movie 
about the fall of the living standards and about the increasing 
unemployment. This kind of orientation and the highlighting of social 
problems characterize our work even today… 
1990 is considered to be the year of the change of the system. I do not 
subscribe to this. People carried through the change of the system in the 
demonstrations of 1988 and the politicians of the opposition did the same at 
the negotiating table in 1989… 
I have spoken about the most exciting period of my life. We were young, 
enthusiastic and in love. We were in love with the revolution because 
according to our Central-European standards this was a revolution. People 
were not hanged on the iron stalls of lamps on the streets, there was no 
shooting, we managed to change a political system without fight demanding 
the lives of people and we managed to sweep away the dictatorship. It was a 
beautiful period or rather it was so simple. Only two kind of people existed: 
one which defended the dictatorship – the communistsm, and another which 
stands on our side – the democrats. Everybody marched together on the side 
of the democrats: the right wing, the left wing, the Christian democrats, 
anarchists, radicals and social democrats were all represented among us. In 
one word: everybody who wanted to be a democrat. At that time everybody 
marched under one single flag.  
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By today, this is all gone. These people hate each other by now; they form 
different camps and do not communicate with one another. 
This was a moment which cannot be repeated. 
This was my youth. 
What is left from the revolutionary spirit for today is the inner compulsion 
that under any circumstances we have to bring any event to light when 
human freedom is violated. 
I am interested in one thing only – freedom.” 
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